Michelle Bentley – författare

The non-use of biological weapons has been described as the 'great mystery of biological warfare.' The Biological Weapons Taboo solves that mystery by analysing the bioweapons taboo, in the first comprehensive study of the concept. Bentley explains precisely why bioweapons are perceived as repulsive and how this sentiment is consequently expressed in the form of political behaviours, including the refusal to engage in biological aggression. Drawing on extensive archival evidence, this volume looks back on United States' foreign policy decision-making (particularly in relation to the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention) to demonstrate how and why the taboo has comprised a decisive factor in shaping both biowarfare strategy and political rhetoric - and why the taboo needs to be recognised as a necessary consideration in the study of bioweapons.In analysing a taboo, the volume also takes the debate on international norms forward by questioning and challenging the wider analytic comprehension of 'taboo' itself. Rejecting current definitions of the concept as inadequate, Bentley proposes a new and original model of understanding based on the normative characteristics of disgust, stigmatization, and fetishization.

President Obama’s first term in office was subject to intense criticism; not only did many feel that he had failed to live up to his leadership potential, but that he had actually continued the foreign policy framework of the George W. Bush era he was supposed to have abandoned. This edited volume examines whether these issues of continuity have been equally as prevalent during the president’s second term as his first. Is Obama still acting within the foreign policy shadow of Bush, or has he been able to establish his own approach towards international affairs, distinct from his predecessor? Within this context, the volume also addresses the idea of legacy and whether Obama has succeeded in establishing his own distinct foreign policy doctrine. In addressing these questions, the chapters explore continuity and change from a range of perspectives in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, which are broadly representative of a spectrum of theoretical positions.With contributions from a range of US foreign policy experts, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of US foreign policy, Foreign Policy Analysis and American politics.

This edited volume is an innovative analysis of President Barack Obama’s foreign policy, security and counter-terrorism policy, specifically within the context of ending the now infamous War on Terror. The book adopts a comparative approach, analysing change and continuity in US foreign policy during Obama’s first term in office vis-à-vis the foreign policy of the War on Terror, initiated by George W. Bush following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite being heralded as an agent of change, since his election in 2008 Obama has faced criticism that his foreign policy is effectively the same as what went before and that the War on Terror is still alive and well. Far from delivering wholesale change, Obama has been accused of replicating and even reinforcing the approach, language and policies that many anticipated he would reject. With contributions from a range of US foreign policy experts, this volume analyses the extent to which these criticisms of continuity are correct, identifying how the failure to end the War on Terror is manifest and explaining the reasons that have made enacting change in foreign policy so difficult. In addressing these issues, contributions to this volume will discuss continuity and change from a range of perspectives in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. This work will be of great interest to students and scholars of US foreign policy, security studies and American politics.

This book examines the use of concepts – specifically ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) – in US foreign policy discourse. Current analysis of WMD definition has made headway into identifying the repercussions that the conceptual conflation of such diverse weapons – typically understood as a reference to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons – has for international security. While the concept assumes these weapons are ‘equal’, the vast disparity between them, and their disparity from the conventional weapons from which they are supposedly distinct, means this approach is seen as unreflective of reality, causing miscalculations in security policy. Not least, this has highlighted that the issue of WMD definition is a priority concern where this has direct implications for strategy. In contrast, Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Foreign Policy argues that this approach does not accurately portray conceptual meaning, particularly where it overlooks how political language is constructed. In demonstrating this, the book presents a conceptual history of WMD detailing how this has been defined and used since its emergence into political discourse c.1945. Specifically, it argues that definition is an inherently strategic act; policymakers have deliberately included (or excluded) certain weapons and threats from the classification in order to shape foreign policy dialogues. As such, understanding the WMD concept is not a search for a single interpretation, but an analysis that seeks to comprehend what the concept means at any given time, especially where this relates to the political circumstances of its use. By identifying a variety of ways in which WMD has been defined, the book constructs a dynamic view of conceptual meaning that recognises and, more importantly explains, the inherent diversity in interpretation as the consequence of epistemic and institutional context and the strategic response of policymakers.This book will be of much interest to students of Weapons of Mass Destruction, US foreign and security policy, security studies, political narratives and IR.

Did you know? In 1939 the famous Illumination lights were set up but never switched on, due to the outbreak of the Second World War. High winds can make the Blackpool Tower sway up to an inch. Blackpool can boast some of the best examples of Victorian architecture in Britain. From the momentous to the outlandish, this book is packed full of fun facts and trivia about everything to do with the self-styled ‘Vegas of the North’. Much more than a tourist guide, residents too will discover things they never knew about the town. Facts, history, humour; it’s all here in this engaging little book.

US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy doctrine is the subject of vast debate. Analysts and practitioners routinely disagree as to what ideology and thinking informed his foreign policy approach – and even whether Trump was politically capable of formulating a doctrine at all. This book explores one specific line of analysis, which deals with the concept of what has been termed the ‘doctrine of unpredictability’.Trump has repeatedly declared that being unpredictable comprises the ideal approach to foreign policy for a state leader. Never be predictable; never let others know what you will do next. The contributors to this volume consider whether a conception of unpredictability did inform Trump’s foreign policy as a coherent doctrine. Yet this book also takes the issue further to problematize what the very concept of unpredictability means in respect to International Relations. What is unpredictability – and how does the concept apply in respect to Trump especially? What impact does unpredictability have on international relationships? How far does unpredictability deviate from previous approaches to foreign policy, not least Madman Theory? And is it even possible to understand the idea of unpredictability fully within a discipline that is more typically committed to comprehending certainty in respect to international politics?The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Cambridge Review of International Affairs.

US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy doctrine is the subject of vast debate. Analysts and practitioners routinely disagree as to what ideology and thinking informed his foreign policy approach – and even whether Trump was politically capable of formulating a doctrine at all. This book explores one specific line of analysis, which deals with the concept of what has been termed the ‘doctrine of unpredictability’.Trump has repeatedly declared that being unpredictable comprises the ideal approach to foreign policy for a state leader. Never be predictable; never let others know what you will do next. The contributors to this volume consider whether a conception of unpredictability did inform Trump’s foreign policy as a coherent doctrine. Yet this book also takes the issue further to problematize what the very concept of unpredictability means in respect to International Relations. What is unpredictability – and how does the concept apply in respect to Trump especially? What impact does unpredictability have on international relationships? How far does unpredictability deviate from previous approaches to foreign policy, not least Madman Theory? And is it even possible to understand the idea of unpredictability fully within a discipline that is more typically committed to comprehending certainty in respect to international politics?The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Cambridge Review of International Affairs.

This edited volume is an innovative analysis of President Barack Obama’s foreign policy, security and counter-terrorism policy, specifically within the context of ending the now infamous War on Terror. The book adopts a comparative approach, analysing change and continuity in US foreign policy during Obama’s first term in office vis-à-vis the foreign policy of the War on Terror, initiated by George W. Bush following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite being heralded as an agent of change, since his election in 2008 Obama has faced criticism that his foreign policy is effectively the same as what went before and that the War on Terror is still alive and well. Far from delivering wholesale change, Obama has been accused of replicating and even reinforcing the approach, language and policies that many anticipated he would reject. With contributions from a range of US foreign policy experts, this volume analyses the extent to which these criticisms of continuity are correct, identifying how the failure to end the War on Terror is manifest and explaining the reasons that have made enacting change in foreign policy so difficult. In addressing these issues, contributions to this volume will discuss continuity and change from a range of perspectives in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. This work will be of great interest to students and scholars of US foreign policy, security studies and American politics.

President Obama’s first term in office was subject to intense criticism; not only did many feel that he had failed to live up to his leadership potential, but that he had actually continued the foreign policy framework of the George W. Bush era he was supposed to have abandoned. This edited volume examines whether these issues of continuity have been equally as prevalent during the president’s second term as his first.Is Obama still acting within the foreign policy shadow of Bush, or has he been able to establish his own approach towards international affairs, distinct from his predecessor? Within this context, the volume also addresses the idea of legacy and whether Obama has succeeded in establishing his own distinct foreign policy doctrine. In addressing these questions, the chapters explore continuity and change from a range of perspectives in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, which are broadly representative of a spectrum of theoretical positions.With contributions from a range of US foreign policy experts, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of US foreign policy, Foreign Policy Analysis and American politics.

This book analyses the Syria crisis and the role of chemical weapons in relation to US foreign policy. The Syrian government's use of such weapons and their subsequent elimination has dominated the US response to the conflict, where these are viewed as particularly horrific arms - a repulsion known as the chemical taboo. On the surface, this would seem to be an appropriate reaction: these are nasty weapons and eradicating them would ostensibly comprise a 'good' move. But this book reveals two new aspects of the taboo that challenge this prevailing view. First, actors use the taboo strategically to advance their own self-interested policy objectives. Second, that applying the taboo to Syria has actually exacerbated the crisis. As such, this book not only provides a timely analysis of Syria, but also a major and original rethink of the chemical taboo, as well as international norms more widely.