In recent years, Western experts have generally portrayed the Kremlin’s actions as either strategic or tactical. Yet this proposition raises a very important question: how closely does the West’s interpretation of Russian strategy reflect the country’s own definitions? 

While many military historians have sought to interpret Russian strategy, Strategiya takes a different approach. It brings together, in English, the classic works of the Russian art of strategy, which were rediscovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of explaining his analysis of Russia’s contemporary strategy, Ofer Fridman offers his translation of and commentary upon the founding texts of Russia’s own Clausewitzes, Baron Jominis and Liddell Harts, who have been inspiring Russian strategic thinking—both its conceptualisation and its implementation—from the moment Moscow rejected the exclusive role of Marxism-Leninism in strategic affairs.

Russian contemporary strategists draw their inspiration from three main schools of thought. While works by Soviet military thinkers have already been translated into English, those by both Imperial strategists and military thinkers in exile have remained almost inaccessible to the Western reader. Filling this lacuna, Strategiya offers a fascinating glimpse inside the foundations of Russian strategic thought and practice.

This book is about Russia. Yet, this book is not about Russia per se. To those, whose sole interest is a better understanding of the Kremlin’s decision making and how it shapes Russia’s present and future, we would refer to a rather long list of sources that we dutifully noted throughout the book. Instead, based on our expertise in Russian studies and the challenges that we experienced in the past 2 years, this book aims to offer a methodology to address questions when there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer (due to lacking reliable information). Any attempt to answer this sort of questions using the commonly accepted deductive approach, based on scientific methods is bound to fail, because of the very nature of these questions. Therefore, using Russia as a case study, this book aims to advance a way of analysing (however limited, biased and uncertain) available information to advance a more critical understanding of the subject in question by using the methodology of dialectic inquiry.

In recent years, Western experts have generally portrayed the Kremlin’s actions as either strategic or tactical. Yet this proposition raises a very important question: how closely does the West’s interpretation of Russian strategy reflect the country’s own definitions? 

While many military historians have sought to interpret Russian strategy, Strategiya takes a different approach. It brings together, in English, the classic works of the Russian art of strategy, which were rediscovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of explaining his analysis of Russia’s contemporary strategy, Ofer Fridman offers his translation of and commentary upon the founding texts of Russia’s own Clausewitzes, Baron Jominis and Liddell Harts, who have been inspiring Russian strategic thinking—both its conceptualisation and its implementation—from the moment Moscow rejected the exclusive role of Marxism-Leninism in strategic affairs.

Russian contemporary strategists draw their inspiration from three main schools of thought. While works by Soviet military thinkers have already been translated into English, those by both Imperial strategists and military thinkers in exile have remained almost inaccessible to the Western reader. Filling this lacuna, Strategiya offers a fascinating glimpse inside the foundations of Russian strategic thought and practice.

This book is about Russia. Yet, this book is not about Russia per se. To those, whose sole interest is a better understanding of the Kremlin’s decision making and how it shapes Russia’s present and future, we would refer to a rather long list of sources that we dutifully noted throughout the book. Instead, based on our expertise in Russian studies and the challenges that we experienced in the past 2 years, this book aims to offer a methodology to address questions when there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer (due to lacking reliable information). Any attempt to answer this sort of questions using the commonly accepted deductive approach, based on scientific methods is bound to fail, because of the very nature of these questions. Therefore, using Russia as a case study, this book aims to advance a way of analysing (however limited, biased and uncertain) available information to advance a more critical understanding of the subject in question by using the methodology of dialectic inquiry.