Competing Coalitions in World Trade Law: Transnational Advocacy and Nutrition Label Regulations in Chile and Indonesia argues that today's political economy of trade law is—for an important subset of social issues—best theorized as the exercise of regulatory network power by competing transnational coalitions. The book traces how WTO law, processes, and institutions within and between governments are used to advance the regulatory objectives of coalitions of transnational corporations and business-friendly bureaucrats; and how social regulation-focused coalitions of national and international bureaucrats work alongside civil society to resist these industry coalitions to prevail in their regulatory aims. The book finds that WTO law has significant impacts on social regulation in countries around the world, in particular in low- and middle-income countries susceptible to pressure from global industry coalitions. It is the granular, quotidian uses of WTO law which significantly affect regulatory and societal outcomes. To reveal these patterns, the book uses empirical material from interviews, document requests, and participant observation to focus on one specific area of social concern: the regulation of processed foods to combat the rising prevalence of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). Two case studies on nutrition label regulations in Chile and Indonesia document how competing coalitions of industry and health advocates contested the potential introduction of mandatory nutrition labels on processed foods. Competing Coalitions in World Trade Law offers a counterpoint to accounts of the "re-securitization" of trade relations due to great power competition in which nationality figures as a theoretically sound organizing principle in global economic relations. While this account may have analytical traction for security-related sectors and industrial policy, contests over social regulatory programs filtering through trade law institutions, for example over health policy or the environment, are often better understood as a series of contests between competing transnational coalitions and their exercise of global network power.

Competing Coalitions in World Trade Law: Transnational Advocacy and Nutrition Label Regulations in Chile and Indonesia argues that today's political economy of trade law is—for an important subset of social issues—best theorized as the exercise of regulatory network power by competing transnational coalitions. The book traces how WTO law, processes, and institutions within and between governments are used to advance the regulatory objectives of coalitions of transnational corporations and business-friendly bureaucrats; and how social regulation-focused coalitions of national and international bureaucrats work alongside civil society to resist these industry coalitions to prevail in their regulatory aims. The book finds that WTO law has significant impacts on social regulation in countries around the world, in particular in low- and middle-income countries susceptible to pressure from global industry coalitions. It is the granular, quotidian uses of WTO law which significantly affect regulatory and societal outcomes. To reveal these patterns, the book uses empirical material from interviews, document requests, and participant observation to focus on one specific area of social concern: the regulation of processed foods to combat the rising prevalence of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). Two case studies on nutrition label regulations in Chile and Indonesia document how competing coalitions of industry and health advocates contested the potential introduction of mandatory nutrition labels on processed foods. Competing Coalitions in World Trade Law offers a counterpoint to accounts of the "re-securitization" of trade relations due to great power competition in which nationality figures as a theoretically sound organizing principle in global economic relations. While this account may have analytical traction for security-related sectors and industrial policy, contests over social regulatory programs filtering through trade law institutions, for example over health policy or the environment, are often better understood as a series of contests between competing transnational coalitions and their exercise of global network power.