Richard Foley - Böcker

The humanities and the sciences face challenging times, each in their own way. The humanities suffer shrinking enrollments and budgets, and are perceived by some as irrelevant in a changing economy. The sciences face a political climate that disrespects academic expertise and challenges settled debates. Meanwhile age-old disputes about their spheres of knowledge continue: does scientific knowledge subsume that of the humanities? Are their forms of knowledge complementary, or ultimately at odds?Richard Foley, a philosopher of knowledge and the former Dean of Arts and Sciences at New York University, here provides a concise and accessible overview of what the overarching goals of these disciplines are, relative to one another, and what kind of knowledge they aim to produce. His fundamental argument is that the sciences aim at insights that ideally are not limited to particular locations or times and are also perspective-free and wholly descriptive, whereas the humanities appropriately seek insights about specific locations and times, with the insights being perspective-based and having evaluative as well as descriptive elements. He also finds these two spheres of knowledge to be complementary in the search for understanding of our world and the human condition. The ultimate goal of Foley's investigation however is an eloquent defense and celebration of the culture of academic research. In an era of sound-bites and tweet-length falsehoods, this culture values and supports long-term intellectual achievements for the good of humanity--produced with hard work, dedication, and patience. The Geography of Insight is essential reading for readers both inside and outside of the academy.

In this book Foley offers a major new theory of rationality. His aim is to escape the `doldrums of Descartes' by lowering the standard for what is rational from his impossibly demanding level of certainty. Foley takes a belief's being rational as a matter of its seeming from some perspective to be objectively likely to be true. This makes for an attractive mix of subjective and objective components in his concept of rationality. The subjective component makes rationality attainable; the objective component preserves the discipline of external constraint.

Epistemology with a Broad and Long View is an original and provocative challenge to standard epistemologies that assume that the reasonability of beliefs is wholly a function of considerations indicating their current likelihood. Richard Foley argues that this view, although widely accepted, is excessively narrow. Foley argues for a less constricted epistemology that acknowledges that, in addition to beliefs and degrees-of-confidence, intellectual commitments play a vital role in our intellectual lives; that the key issue in overseeing all these attitudes is whether it's appropriate to revise or add to them for our purposes; and that a mixture of practical, ethical, political, social, and long-term intellectual considerations, and not just ones about current likelihood, determine what's appropriate. On this view, there is no purely epistemic notion of reasonability. There are truth-related considerations, but except in those rare cases where there is complete certainty, they don't determine the reasonability of our belief-like attitudes. They do so only in partnership with a broad and long range of non-truth-related considerations. Foley suggests that a failure to recognize these partnerships can result in theoretical confusion, and also can impede our ability to understand and deal with dogmatists who have unlikely or toxic views. Foley's overriding theme is that a broad and long view is as necessary for making sense of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of our opinions, as it is for other aspects of our lives.

To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that does not beg the question. Moreover, he shows how this account of intellectual self-trust can be used to understand the degree to which it is reasonable to rely on alternative authorities. This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the centre of intellectual trust.

To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that does not beg the question. Moreover, he shows how this account of intellectual self-trust can be used to understand the degree to which it is reasonable to rely on alternative authorities. This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the centre of intellectual trust.

Most Perl programmers know about the Perl debugger--the nifty little built-in utility that you can use to fully debug any programs that you write. Inside the interactive debugger environment, you're prompted for commands that let you examine your source code, set breakpoints, dump out function call stacks, change values of variables, and much more. It's so convenient that some programmers run it just to test out Perl constructs as they create a program. But although it's on their radar, not many Perl programmers take the time to master the debugger. That's where the Perl Debugger Pocket Reference comes in. This little book provides a quick and convenient path to mastery of the Perl debugger and its commands. Written by a core member of the Perl debugger development team, it's an ideal quick reference to debugger commands, as well as a detailed tutorial on how to get started. The Perl Debugger Pocket Reference provides complete coverage in a conveniently small package. Maybe you write code so clean you never have to look at it twice. Or perhaps you'd rather focus your energies on writing clean code, rather than learning about the debugger.But if you need to learn about the Perl debugger in a hurry, the Perl Debugger Pocket Reference is the book you'll want to have close by. And you can always keep a copy on hand to share with programmers who need it more than you do. O'Reilly's Pocket References have become a favorite among programmers everywhere. By providing a wealth of important details in a concise, well-organized format, these handy books deliver just what you need to complete the task at hand. When you've reached a sticking point in your work and need to get to a solution quickly, the new Perl Debugger Pocket Reference will get you back on the right track.

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information.Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

Combining the best features of C, UNIX utilities, and regular expressions, Perl has grown as one of the most powerful and popular scripting languages. The valuable Perl is often used for system administration, text processing and Web programming. It is even being used for more exotic areas, like bioinformatics. Perl is supported by all of the most prominent operating systems, including Windows, Unix, OS/2, Amiga, and others. Pro Perl Debugging steps in to help resolve the dilemma of application testing and debugging - one of the biggest time commitments in a programmers daily routine. What this book will do is rescue you from substandard application testing practices. The book commences with several chapters that overview the debuggers basic features, then covers common debugging scenarios. The concluding portion examines debugger customization, alternative debugging utilities, and debugging best practices. Table of Contents * Introduction * Inspecting Variables and Getting Help * Controlling Program Execution * Debugging a Simple Command Line Program * Tracing Execution * Debugging Modules * Debugging Object-Oriented Perl * Using the Debugger As a Shell * Debugging a CGI Program * Perl Threads and Forked Processes * Debugging Regular Expressions * Debugger Customization * Optimization and Performance Hints and Tips * Command Line and GUI Debuggers * Comprehensive Command Reference * Book References and URLs