Sangwani Patrick Nga€™ambi – författare

This book analyses the impact that stabilization clauses have on the development of human rights and gender laws in resource rich nations.Given the fact that stabilization clauses freeze the law for as long as the contract subsists there has been debate on the negative impact stabilization clauses have on the progressive development of human rights in the host State. Firstly, the book examines the mechanisms investors utilise in protecting themselves from host State prerogatives. It then explores the theoretical basis on which stabilization clauses are applied and upheld by arbitral tribunals, and assesses how they can be drafted in a way that protects human rights, particularly in relation to gender discrimination, without forcing the resource rich nations to lose momentum in attracting foreign direct investment. Using Zambia and the Gender Equity and Equality Act of 2015 as a case study, the book explores the compatibility of the legislation with the stabilization clauses contained in the country’s Development Agreements.The book will be of interest to practitioners, scholars and students of international investment law, human rights law and contract law.

Foreign direct investment in the natural resource industries is fostered through the signing of concession agreements between the host State and the investor. However, such concessions are susceptible to alteration by the host State, meaning that many investors now require the insertion of stabilization clauses. These are provisions that require the host State to agree that they will not take any administrative or legislative action that would adversely affect the rights of the investor.

Arguing that it is necessary to have some form of flexibility in concession agreements while still offering protection of the legitimate expectations of the investor, Resource Nationalism in International Investment Law proposes the insertion of renegotiation clauses in order to foster flexible relationships between the investor and the host State. Such clauses bind the parties to renegotiate the terms of the contract, in good faith, when prevailing circumstances change. However these clauses can also prove problematic for both State and investor due to their rigidity. Using Zambia as a case study, it highlights the limitations of the efficient breach theory to emphasise the need for contractual flexibility.