Thomas G. Paterson – författare

Today they stand as enemies, but in the 1950s, few countries were as closely intertwined as Cuba and the United States. Thousands of Americans (including Ernest Hemingway and Errol Flynn) lived on the island, and, in the United States, dancehalls swayed to the mambo beat. The strong-arm Batista regime depended on Washington''s support, and it invited American gangsters like Meyer Lansky to build fancy casinos for U.S. tourists. Major league scouts searched for Cuban talent: The New York Giants even offered a contract to a young pitcher named Fidel Castro. In 1955, Castro did come to the United States, but not for baseball: He toured the country to raise money for a revolution.Thomas Paterson tells the fascinating story of Castro''s insurrection, from that early fund-raising trip to Batista''s fall and the flowering of the Cuban Revolution that has bedeviled the United States for more than three decades. With evocative prose and a swift-moving narrative, Paterson recreates the love-hate relationship between the two nations, then traces the intrigue of the insurgency, the unfolding revolution, and the sources of the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA assassination plots, and the missile crisis. The drama ranges from the casino blackjack tables to Miami streets; from the Eisenhower and Kennedy White Houses to the crowded deck of the Granma, the frail boat that carried the Fidelistas to Cuba from Mexico; from Batista''s fortified palace to mountain hideouts where Rau''l Castro held American hostages. Drawing upon impressive international research, including declassified CIA documents and interviews, Paterson reveals how Washington, fixed on the issue of Communism, failed to grasp the widespread disaffection from Batista. The Eisenhower administration alienated Cubans by supplying arms to a hated regime, by sustaining Cuba''s economic dependence, and by conspicuously backing Batista. As Batista self-destructed, U.S. officials launched third-force conspiracies in a vain attempt to block Castro''s victory. By the time the defiant revolutionary leader entered Havana in early 1959, the foundation of the long, bitter hostility between Cuba and the United States had been firmly laid.Since the end of the Cold War, the futures of Communist Cuba and Fidel Castro have become clouded. Paterson''s gripping and timely account explores the origins of America''s troubled relationship with its island neighbor, explains what went wrong and how the United States "let this one get away," and suggests paths to the future as the Clinton administration inches toward less hostile relations with a changing Cuba.

These essays deal with some major subjects in American diplomacy since the war, including Truman's foreign policy, George F. Kennan and America's 'containment' policy, the Point Four Program and the developing world, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East, the Vietnam war, the CIA and Congressional Oversight of Intelligence, among others. Paterson takes the view that the US became locked in early on to a view of foreign policy based on combating the Communist menace, and so foreign policy was distorted by this overwhelming consideration.

This book covers every aspect of Kennedy's foreign policy - Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Canada, and subjects such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, atomic policy, economic policy, and the Peace Corps.

Paterson tells the fascinating story of the love-hate relationship that has grown between Cuba and the USA, from Castro's early fund-raising tours in the USA to support his revolution to Eisenhower's failed efforts to maintain support for Batista.

This provocative volume, written by the distinguished diplomatic historian Thomas G. Paterson, explores why and how Americans have perceived and exaggerated the Communist threat in the last half century. Basing his spirited analysis on research in private papers, government archives, oral histories, contemporary writings, and scholarly works, Paterson explains the origins and evolution of United States global intervention. Deftly exploring the ideas and programs of Truman, Kennan, Eisenhower, Dulles, Kennedy, Nixon, Kissinger, and Reagan, as well as the views of dissenters from the prevailing Cold War mentality, Paterson reveals the tenacity of American thinking about threats from abroad. He recaptures the tumult of the last several decades by treating a wide range of topics, including post-war turmoil in Western Europe, Mao''s rise in China, the Suez Canal, the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War, CIA covert actions, and Central America. Paterson''s vivid account of America''s Cold War policies argues that, while Americans did not invent the Communist threat, they have certainly exaggerated it, nurturing a trenchant anti-communism that has had a devastating effect on international relations and American institutions.

The first major reassessment of John F. Kennedy''s foreign policy since his death, this volume of original essays compels new thinking about the 1960s. Basing their analysis on extensive research in archival documents and oral histories, twelve accomplished historians explore the primary foreign policy assumptions and objectives of Kennedy and his advisers. The contributors examine the Cold War, global crisis, domestic politics, decision-making, personality and style, and historical lessons in shaping Kennedy''s diplomacy. This provocative volume explores such key issues as the Atlantic alliance, nuclear arms, United States economic hegemony, the Cuban missile crisis and the covert war against Fidel Castro, Third World neutralism, the Peace Corps, and the Vietnam War. The contributors also examine the Kennedy Administration''s policies towards Latin America, Canada, the Middle East, South Asia, China, and Africa, and assess the costs and consequences of Kennedy''s record. The Kennedy legacy included a deepening war in Vietnam, an accelerated nuclear arms race, excessive activism in the Third World, greater factionalism in the Atlantic community, and a globalism of overcommitment. These well-researched essays challenge us to reckon with a past that has not always matched the selfless and self-satisfying image Americans have of their foreign policy and of Kennedy as their young, fallen hero who never had a chance to fulfill his goals. Identifying arrogance, ignorance, impatience, and exaggerations of the Communist threat as the factors that actually denied Kennedy the victory he craved, this study reveals that he had his chance--and he failed.