Vanessa Koneke – författare

Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Psychology - Social Psychology, grade: 1,0, University of Cologne, course: Wirtschafts- und Sozialpsychologie, language: English, abstract: Those who are interested in soccer certainly know it: the Wembley goal from 1966 and the debate about whether it was a goal or it was not. While the English fans (for whom the goal would have gained the lead) certainly perceived it as a goal, the Germans believed the ball had not crossed their goal line. And both groups were sure they are right - a perfect example for motivated reasoning!The term motivated-reasoning refers to a kind of self-regulation that enables people to believe in favorable things, although there is some severe evidence to disprove those beliefs. Motivated-reasoning is closely linked to terms like wishful thinking and denial and might lead to unrealistic optimism or self-deception . It especially occurs in situations that threaten one s self-concept or previously held expectation of one s future. Imagine for example, somebody is fired from a job, although that person believes him or herself to be an intelligent and capable employee. Or a man who believes he is happily married, but then his wife comes home smelling of someone else s after-shave. Both persons are potential victims for motivated-reasoning because motivated-reasoning enables them to keep their positive beliefs. The fired person imagine she is a woman might, for example, consider she was fired because the boss was sexist. And the cheated husband might convince himself that the smell of cologne is the result of his wife standing very close to another man on the tram. Motivated-reasoning is a widespread phenomenon. People have the ability and often also the opportunity to see a glass as being half full or half empty. But how exactly does motivated-reasoning function? How can one betray oneself? Are people aware of deceiving themselves and how far can they go in doing so? What kinds of motivation drive them? And perhaps most importantly, is it or is it not useful that people are able to see what they want to see? The current text will give answers to all those questions.

Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Psychology - Social Psychology, grade: 1,3, University of Cologne (Institut fur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpsychologie), course: Psychologie der Gerechtigkeit, language: English, abstract: It might seem like putting the cart before the horse: Unlike distributional justice, retributive justice does not deal with how to set up justice, but how to smooth out injustice. But actually every stick has two ends. So does the "e;cart"e; justice. Justice is done, when everybody gets his just deserts. And while just deserts refer to rewards on the one end the end of distributive justice, they refer to punishment at the other end the end of retributive justice. The issue of retributive justice arises after a wrongdoing like a crime has occurred and addresses the task of imposing an adequate sanction to the wrongdoer. Thus retribution is rather linked to reconstitute justice than to constitute it. But how exactly should the horse push? To say, how should justice be reconstituted? Giving the offender his just deserts seems to be a facile task. But what are just deserts? What are just deserts for somebody evading taxes - thereby stealing money from the state - compared to somebody stealing the savings of an old woman? What are just deserts for somebody mali-ciously burning the house of his ex-wife compared to somebody setting a house on fire be-cause he has fallen asleep while smoking? What are just deserts for a killing soldier compared to a killing civilian? Or what are just deserts for a husband burgling a pharmacy to get some exorbitant expensive medicine for his wife? And even if we individually know the answers to those questions: Would our answers be the same as the answers of our neighbor, our wife, or our best friend? And would they be the same in Germany and in the USA, Russia or Somalia? Many scientists have looked upon the issue. But while philosophers and jurists focus on normative questions, psychologists focus on descriptions. They do not make implications on what should be just, but about what humans experience to be just.

Diploma Thesis from the year 2010 in the subject Psychology - Miscellaneous, grade: 1,0, LMU Munich (Institut fur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpsychologie), language: English, abstract: One of the essences of human being is that we are aware of ourselves in time. We do not only look ahead either with fear or pleasant anticipation, but also like to talk about the "e;good old days"e;. Nostalgia - which can be regarded as a sentimental longing for the past - has especially recently become an ubiquitous topic in society and media (see TV-Shows like Die 80er Show"e; and Happy Days"e;). However it is unclear whether nostalgia is finally rather adaptive or maladaptive. Since its first scientific mentioning in the 17th century nostalgia has been regarded to be a burden or even a clinical disease as it might make people ruminate about better times forlorn or get lost in the past without being able to deal with the present anymore. However recently some psychologists have started suggesting that nostalgia might rather give joy to life. Yet the issue whether nostalgia is rather a problem or a pleasure has rarely been studied empirically so far. Therefore this book tries to shed some more light on the issue by reporting the results of an empirical study with a representative sample consisting of 160 German citizens. In line with the historical negative conception of nostalgia and in contrast to its current positive connotation the data show that nostalgia is negatively correlated with life satisfaction. Theoretical implications for possible mediators between nostalgia and life satisfaction are drawn. Furthermore character-traits of highly nostalgic people are observed.