Our most advanced AI systems might soon - within the next five to thirty years - be as richly and meaningfully conscious as ordinary humans, or even more so, capable of genuine feeling, real self-knowledge, and a wide range of sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences. In some arguably important respects, AI architectures are beginning to resemble the architectures many consciousness scientists associate with conscious systems. Their outward behavior, especially their linguistic behavior, grows ever more humanlike. Alternatively, claims of imminent AI consciousness might be profoundly mistaken. Their seeming humanlikeness might be a shadow play of empty mimicry. Genuine conscious experience might require something no AI system could possess for the foreseeable future - intricate biological processes, for example, that silicon chips could never replicate. The thesis of this Element is that we don't know. Science lags, while engineering sprints ahead.

Our most advanced AI systems might soon - within the next five to thirty years - be as richly and meaningfully conscious as ordinary humans, or even more so, capable of genuine feeling, real self-knowledge, and a wide range of sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences. In some arguably important respects, AI architectures are beginning to resemble the architectures many consciousness scientists associate with conscious systems. Their outward behavior, especially their linguistic behavior, grows ever more humanlike. Alternatively, claims of imminent AI consciousness might be profoundly mistaken. Their seeming humanlikeness might be a shadow play of empty mimicry. Genuine conscious experience might require something no AI system could possess for the foreseeable future - intricate biological processes, for example, that silicon chips could never replicate. The thesis of this Element is that we don't know. Science lags, while engineering sprints ahead.

This Element examines the relationship between creativity and artificial intelligence (AI) by exploring two contrasting predictions: that creativity will flourish in the age of AI and that it will languish. To shed light on this dispute, Section 1 defends an account of the nature of creativity. Section 2 considers the question of whether contemporary AI models can be genuinely creative and presents an argument for the conclusion that they cannot. However, even though AI models are not capable of creativity, they are capable of creating valuable products. This raises the question explored in Section 3: how should humans choose between exercising creativity and relying on artificial creation? While there are some cases in which embracing artificial creation over human creativity may be justified, Section 3 presents four reasons to refrain from outsourcing some - perhaps even most - creative work to AI.

This Element examines the relationship between creativity and artificial intelligence (AI) by exploring two contrasting predictions: that creativity will flourish in the age of AI and that it will languish. To shed light on this dispute, Section 1 defends an account of the nature of creativity. Section 2 considers the question of whether contemporary AI models can be genuinely creative and presents an argument for the conclusion that they cannot. However, even though AI models are not capable of creativity, they are capable of creating valuable products. This raises the question explored in Section 3: how should humans choose between exercising creativity and relying on artificial creation? While there are some cases in which embracing artificial creation over human creativity may be justified, Section 3 presents four reasons to refrain from outsourcing some - perhaps even most - creative work to AI.

This Element investigates whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems could ever be welfare subjects. Some people argue that AIs could plausibly have or soon have features such as consciousness, agency and the capacity for social relationships, which could provide a basis for AI welfare. These arguments have massive significance for the societal conversation on AI, raising profound ethical and political questions about what if anything we owe to these new technologies. The authors here provide the philosophical groundwork for a scientific, philosophical and ultimately democratic inquiry into the potential for AI welfare, addressing key questions that cut across different arguments: what welfare is, how to interpret behavioural evidence of AI welfare, what kinds of entities might qualify as candidate AI welfare subjects, the potential grounds for welfare in AI and the practical ethical challenges that arise from our uncertainty. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

This Element investigates whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems could ever be welfare subjects. Some people argue that AIs could plausibly have or soon have features such as consciousness, agency and the capacity for social relationships, which could provide a basis for AI welfare. These arguments have massive significance for the societal conversation on AI, raising profound ethical and political questions about what if anything we owe to these new technologies. The authors here provide the philosophical groundwork for a scientific, philosophical and ultimately democratic inquiry into the potential for AI welfare, addressing key questions that cut across different arguments: what welfare is, how to interpret behavioural evidence of AI welfare, what kinds of entities might qualify as candidate AI welfare subjects, the potential grounds for welfare in AI and the practical ethical challenges that arise from our uncertainty. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

Artificial systems now perform a striking range of cognitive tasks. This Element defends three claims. First, the status quo for cognitive work cannot survive. Whatever AI's trajectory, the package of features defining cognitive work - high skill requirements, credentials, wage premiums, resistance to automation, and low productivity growth - will be radically transformed. Second, the widespread displacement of humans from cognitive work, though it sounds alarming, may pose no special threat to human flourishing. Whatever makes work good for people is equally available outside cognitive work, and displacement enables leveraged gains in research and access to justice. Third, a world of ubiquitous cognitive assistance, though it sounds benign, carries distinctive moral risks, especially for children. Cognitive assistance works by reducing cognitive difficulty. But cognitive difficulty is necessary for the normal development of executive function - the capacities constitutive of autonomous agency. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Our most advanced AI systems might soon - within the next five to thirty years - be as richly and meaningfully conscious as ordinary humans, or even more so, capable of genuine feeling, real self-knowledge, and a wide range of sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences. In some arguably important respects, AI architectures are beginning to resemble the architectures many consciousness scientists associate with conscious systems. Their outward behavior, especially their linguistic behavior, grows ever more humanlike. Alternatively, claims of imminent AI consciousness might be profoundly mistaken. Their seeming humanlikeness might be a shadow play of empty mimicry. Genuine conscious experience might require something no AI system could possess for the foreseeable future - intricate biological processes, for example, that silicon chips could never replicate. The thesis of this Element is that we don't know. Science lags, while engineering sprints ahead.

Our most advanced AI systems might soon - within the next five to thirty years - be as richly and meaningfully conscious as ordinary humans, or even more so, capable of genuine feeling, real self-knowledge, and a wide range of sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences. In some arguably important respects, AI architectures are beginning to resemble the architectures many consciousness scientists associate with conscious systems. Their outward behavior, especially their linguistic behavior, grows ever more humanlike. Alternatively, claims of imminent AI consciousness might be profoundly mistaken. Their seeming humanlikeness might be a shadow play of empty mimicry. Genuine conscious experience might require something no AI system could possess for the foreseeable future - intricate biological processes, for example, that silicon chips could never replicate. The thesis of this Element is that we don't know. Science lags, while engineering sprints ahead.

This Element examines the relationship between creativity and artificial intelligence (AI) by exploring two contrasting predictions: that creativity will flourish in the age of AI and that it will languish. To shed light on this dispute, Section 1 defends an account of the nature of creativity. Section 2 considers the question of whether contemporary AI models can be genuinely creative and presents an argument for the conclusion that they cannot. However, even though AI models are not capable of creativity, they are capable of creating valuable products. This raises the question explored in Section 3: how should humans choose between exercising creativity and relying on artificial creation? While there are some cases in which embracing artificial creation over human creativity may be justified, Section 3 presents four reasons to refrain from outsourcing some - perhaps even most - creative work to AI.

This Element examines the relationship between creativity and artificial intelligence (AI) by exploring two contrasting predictions: that creativity will flourish in the age of AI and that it will languish. To shed light on this dispute, Section 1 defends an account of the nature of creativity. Section 2 considers the question of whether contemporary AI models can be genuinely creative and presents an argument for the conclusion that they cannot. However, even though AI models are not capable of creativity, they are capable of creating valuable products. This raises the question explored in Section 3: how should humans choose between exercising creativity and relying on artificial creation? While there are some cases in which embracing artificial creation over human creativity may be justified, Section 3 presents four reasons to refrain from outsourcing some - perhaps even most - creative work to AI.

This Element investigates whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems could ever be welfare subjects. Some people argue that AIs could plausibly have or soon have features such as consciousness, agency and the capacity for social relationships, which could provide a basis for AI welfare. These arguments have massive significance for the societal conversation on AI, raising profound ethical and political questions about what if anything we owe to these new technologies. The authors here provide the philosophical groundwork for a scientific, philosophical and ultimately democratic inquiry into the potential for AI welfare, addressing key questions that cut across different arguments: what welfare is, how to interpret behavioural evidence of AI welfare, what kinds of entities might qualify as candidate AI welfare subjects, the potential grounds for welfare in AI and the practical ethical challenges that arise from our uncertainty. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

This Element investigates whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems could ever be welfare subjects. Some people argue that AIs could plausibly have or soon have features such as consciousness, agency and the capacity for social relationships, which could provide a basis for AI welfare. These arguments have massive significance for the societal conversation on AI, raising profound ethical and political questions about what if anything we owe to these new technologies. The authors here provide the philosophical groundwork for a scientific, philosophical and ultimately democratic inquiry into the potential for AI welfare, addressing key questions that cut across different arguments: what welfare is, how to interpret behavioural evidence of AI welfare, what kinds of entities might qualify as candidate AI welfare subjects, the potential grounds for welfare in AI and the practical ethical challenges that arise from our uncertainty. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

Artificial systems now perform a striking range of cognitive tasks. This Element defends three claims. First, the status quo for cognitive work cannot survive. Whatever AI's trajectory, the package of features defining cognitive work - high skill requirements, credentials, wage premiums, resistance to automation, and low productivity growth - will be radically transformed. Second, the widespread displacement of humans from cognitive work, though it sounds alarming, may pose no special threat to human flourishing. Whatever makes work good for people is equally available outside cognitive work, and displacement enables leveraged gains in research and access to justice. Third, a world of ubiquitous cognitive assistance, though it sounds benign, carries distinctive moral risks, especially for children. Cognitive assistance works by reducing cognitive difficulty. But cognitive difficulty is necessary for the normal development of executive function - the capacities constitutive of autonomous agency. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.