Alon Rosen - Böcker

The two-volume set LNCS 11891 and 11892 constitutes the proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2019, held in Nuremberg, Germany, in December 2019.The 43 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 147 submissions.

The two-volume set LNCS 11891 and 11892 constitutes the proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2019, held in Nuremberg, Germany, in December 2019.The 43 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 147 submissions.

Zero-knowledge proofs are fascinating and extremely useful constructs. Their fascinating nature is due to their seemingly contradictory de?nition; ze- knowledge proofs are convincing and yet yield nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being proved. Their applicability in the domain of cryptography is vast; they are typically used to force malicious parties to behave according to a predetermined protocol. In addition to their direct applicability in cr- tography, zero-knowledge proofs serve as a good benchmark for the study of variousproblemsregardingcryptographicprotocols(e.g.,“securecomposition of protocols”). A fundamental question regarding zero-knowledge protocols refers to the preservation of security (i.e., of the zero-knowledge feature) when many - stances are executed concurrently, and in particular under a purely as- chronous model. The practical importance of this question, in the days of extensive Internet communication, seems clear. It turned out that this qu- tion is also very interesting from a theoretical point of view. In particular, this question served as a benchmark for the study of the security of concurrent executions of protocols and led to the development of techniques for coping with the problems that arise in that setting.