Inbunden, Engelska, 2026
349 kr
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Alvin E. Roth – författare
Visar alla böcker från författaren Alvin E. Roth. Handla med fri frakt och snabb leverans.
22 produkter
22 produkter
- E-bokPDF, Engelska, 2013
906 kr
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Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially becauseof the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and agrowing theoretical literature.The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce,and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges. - Häftad, Engelska, 2015
1 015 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges. - Inbunden, Engelska, 2013
2 112 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges - Häftad, Engelska, 2005
621 kr
Skickas inom 11-20 vardagar
Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concerns some aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley's original 1953 paper defining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubik applying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley's 1969 paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume. The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in the volume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley's other major contributions to game theory. The other chapters cover the reformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have been inspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study of coalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, to problems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utility is not transferable. - Häftad, Engelska, 2005
691 kr
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Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games. - Häftad, Engelska, 2005
663 kr
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Testing economic propositions in laboratory experiments has proven a very fruitful research endeavor in recent years. This volume brings together the major contributors to experimental economics. The papers present their views on the way experiments should be done, on the power and limitations of the techniques, and on the areas in which experimentation could contribute substantially to our understanding of economic behavior. This book distills the main lessons from great experience in experimental work. It will be essential reading for all who wish to follow experimental work or who wish to do such work themselves. - Inbunden, Engelska, 1985
1 682 kr
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Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games. - Inbunden, Engelska, 1987
1 542 kr
Skickas inom 11-20 vardagar
Testing economic propositions in laboratory experiments has proven a very fruitful research endeavor in recent years. This volume brings together the major contributors to experimental economics. The papers present their views on the way experiments should be done, on the power and limitations of the techniques, and on the areas in which experimentation could contribute substantially to our understanding of economic behavior. This book distills the main lessons from great experience in experimental work. It will be essential reading for all who wish to follow experimental work or who wish to do such work themselves. - Inbunden, Engelska, 1988
1 529 kr
Skickas inom 11-20 vardagar
Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concerns some aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley's original 1953 paper defining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubik applying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley's 1969 paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume. The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in the volume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley's other major contributions to game theory. The other chapters cover the reformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have been inspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study of coalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, to problems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utility is not transferable. - Del 18 - Econometric Society Monographs
Two-Sided Matching
A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
Häftad, Engelska, 1992634 kr
Skickas inom 11-20 vardagar
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann - E-bokEngelska, 2015
102 kr
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From the winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, a "fluent and accessible" guide to understanding matching markets (Economist.com)."An exciting practical approach to economics that enables both individuals and institutions to achieve their goals without running afoul of the profit motive." —Kirkus Reviews (starred review) Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? If you''ve ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you''ve participated in a kind of market. This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn''t the only factor determining who gets what.In Who Gets What—and Why, Nobel laureate Alvin E. Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows us how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions."In this fascinating, often surprising book, Alvin Roth guides us through the jungles of modern life, pointing to the many markets that are hidden in plain view all around us." —Dan Ariely, author of Predictably Irrational and The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty"Mr. Roth''s work has been to discover the most efficient and equitable methods of matching, and implement them in the world. He writes with verve and style . . . Who Gets What—and Why is a pleasure to read." —Wall Street Journal "A book filled with wit, charm, common sense, and uncommon wisdom." —Paul Milgrom, professor of economics, Stanford University and Stanford Business School - Häftad, Engelska, 2016
158 kr
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- Häftad, Engelska, 1997
1 247 kr
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This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E.Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate. - Inbunden, Engelska, 2016
834 kr
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When The Handbook of Experimental Economics first came out in 1995, the notion of economists conducting lab experiments to generate data was relatively new. Since then, the field has exploded. This second volume of the Handbook covers some of the most exciting new growth areas in experimental economics, presents the latest results and experimental methods, and identifies promising new directions for future research. Featuring contributions by leading practitioners, the Handbook describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, other-regarding preferences, market design, political economy, subject population effects, gender effects, auctions, and learning and the economics of small decisions. Contributors focus on key developments and report on experiments, highlighting the dialogue between experimenters and theorists. While most of the experiments consist of laboratory studies, the book also includes several chapters that report extensively on field experiments related to the subject area studied.* Covers exciting new growth areas in experimental economics* Features contributions by leading experts* Describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, market design, political economy, gender effects, auctions, and more* Highlights the dialogue by experimenters with theorists and each other* Includes several chapters covering field experiments related to the subject area studied - Häftad, Engelska, 2020
615 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
An indispensable survey of new developments and results in experimental economicsWhen The Handbook of Experimental Economics first came out in 1995, the notion of economists conducting lab experiments to generate data was relatively new. Since then, the field has exploded. This second volume of the Handbook covers some of the most exciting new growth areas in experimental economics, presents the latest results and experimental methods, and identifies promising new directions for future research.Featuring contributions by leading practitioners, the Handbook describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, other-regarding preferences, market design, political economy, subject population effects, gender effects, auctions, and learning and the economics of small decisions. Contributors focus on key developments and report on experiments, highlighting the dialogue between experimenters and theorists. While most of the experiments consist of laboratory studies, the book also includes several chapters that report extensively on field experiments related to the subject area studied.Covers exciting new growth areas in experimental economicsFeatures contributions by leading expertsDescribes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, market design, political economy, gender effects, auctions, and moreHighlights the dialogue by experimenters with theorists and each otherIncludes several chapters covering field experiments related to the subject area studied - E-bokPDF, Engelska, 2020
1 749 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.
- E-bokPDF, Engelska, 1992
764 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. ''This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets … The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.'' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann - E-bokEngelska, 1992
764 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. ''This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets … The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.'' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann - E-bokPDF, Engelska, 2016
1 178 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
An indispensable survey of new developments and results in experimental economicsWhen The Handbook of Experimental Economics first came out in 1995, the notion of economists conducting lab experiments to generate data was relatively new. Since then, the field has exploded. This second volume of the Handbook covers some of the most exciting new growth areas in experimental economics, presents the latest results and experimental methods, and identifies promising new directions for future research.Featuring contributions by leading practitioners, the Handbook describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, other-regarding preferences, market design, political economy, subject population effects, gender effects, auctions, and learning and the economics of small decisions. Contributors focus on key developments and report on experiments, highlighting the dialogue between experimenters and theorists. While most of the experiments consist of laboratory studies, the book also includes several chapters that report extensively on field experiments related to the subject area studied.
Covers exciting new growth areas in experimental economicsFeatures contributions by leading expertsDescribes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, market design, political economy, gender effects, auctions, and moreHighlights the dialogue by experimenters with theorists and each otherIncludes several chapters covering field experiments related to the subject area studied - Häftad, Tyska, 2017
175 kr
Skickas inom 3-6 vardagar
- Häftad, Svenska, 2021
156 kr
Skickas
Marknader är en urgammal mänsklig uppfinning som används för att organisera, samarbeta, samordna och konkurrera med varandra. I slutänden är marknader ett verktyg för att avgöra vem som får vad. Ibland behöver köpare och säljare bara komma överens om ett pris för att kunna handla med varandra. Den här boken handlar om när det är mycket svårare än så. På så kallade »matchningsmarknader« måste parterna passa ihop på fler sätt än att komma överens om ett pris. Ibland finns priser inte alls. Alvin E. Roth tilldelades 2012 Riksbankens pris till Alfred Nobels minne. I boken »Vem får vad – och varför« berättar han om njurbyten, jobbansökningar, läkares AT-tjänstgöring och nätdejting. Samtliga är exempel på när era parter ska hitta varandra och passa ihop, ofta utan att pengar över huvud taget är inblandade. Så hur kan matchning då ske på ett effektivt och rättvist sätt? Boken är en initierad och samtidigt lättillgänglig introduktion till det snabbt växande forskningsfältet marknadsdesign, fylld med exempel från det vardagliga livet. Denna svenska översättning, utgiven av Ohlininstitutet, har ett specialskrivet förord av professor Tommy Andersson, världsledande forskare inom området marknadsdesign. Andersson ligger bland annat bakom Skandinaviens första njurbytesprogram.
