Andrei P. Tsygankov – författare

Although many observers argue that US-Russia relations are a simple reflection of elites' political and economic preferences in both countries, these preferences tend to arise from pre-existing belief systems that are deeply rooted in the public and accentuated by mass media. In Dark Double, Andrei P. Tsygankov focuses on the driving power of values and media, in addition to political and economic interests, in structuring US-Russia relations. By analyzing mainstream US newspapers and other media sources, Tsygankov identifies five media narratives involving Russia since the Cold War's end and studies them through a framework of three inter-related factors: historic and cultural differences between the two countries, inter-state competition, and polarizing domestic politics. He shows how Americans' negative views toward Russia draw from a deep wellspring of suspicion and are further enhanced by a biased media that regularly exploits such negativity, Russia's centralization of power and anti-American attitudes. Given the intensity of our current impasse with Russia, Dark Double represents an important intervention that forces us to think about the sources of conflict in a new way.

Although many observers argue that US-Russia relations are a simple reflection of elites' political and economic preferences in both countries, these preferences tend to arise from pre-existing belief systems that are deeply rooted in the public and accentuated by mass media. In Dark Double, Andrei P. Tsygankov focuses on the driving power of values and media, in addition to political and economic interests, in structuring US-Russia relations. By analyzing mainstream US newspapers and other media sources, Tsygankov identifies five media narratives involving Russia since the Cold War's end and studies them through a framework of three inter-related factors: historic and cultural differences between the two countries, inter-state competition, and polarizing domestic politics. He shows how Americans' negative views toward Russia draw from a deep wellspring of suspicion and are further enhanced by a biased media that regularly exploits such negativity, Russia's centralization of power and anti-American attitudes. Given the intensity of our current impasse with Russia, Dark Double represents an important intervention that forces us to think about the sources of conflict in a new way.

This book provides a succinct account of the major periods in evolution of Russia's 'strong state' construct by reviewing the external and internal contexts of its emergence, progression, and fall in Muscovy, St. Petersburg, Soviet Union, and post-Soviet Russia, with an emphasis on the last two decades. Each time a combination of these contexts was distinct, thereby producing different political outcomes in Russia. The book argues that a perspective on Russia from a Western viewpoint is limited and that there has been an alternative way of thinking about the nation and its problems. While focusing on contemporary developments of the Russian state, the book situates them in a broader historical context and highlights that the roots of these developments are in the Tsar's autocratic system. Russia's strong state has evolved and survived throughout centuries and that alone suggests its historical vitality and possible future revival. From this perspective, the central scholarly question is not whether Russia will recreate a strong state, but, rather, what kind of a strong state it will be and under which circumstances it is likely to function.

This book provides a succinct account of the major periods in evolution of Russia's 'strong state' construct by reviewing the external and internal contexts of its emergence, progression, and fall in Muscovy, St. Petersburg, Soviet Union, and post-Soviet Russia, with an emphasis on the last two decades. Each time a combination of these contexts was distinct, thereby producing different political outcomes in Russia. The book argues that a perspective on Russia from a Western viewpoint is limited and that there has been an alternative way of thinking about the nation and its problems. While focusing on contemporary developments of the Russian state, the book situates them in a broader historical context and highlights that the roots of these developments are in the Tsar's autocratic system. Russia's strong state has evolved and survived throughout centuries and that alone suggests its historical vitality and possible future revival. From this perspective, the central scholarly question is not whether Russia will recreate a strong state, but, rather, what kind of a strong state it will be and under which circumstances it is likely to function.

In Whose World Order? Andrei P. Tsygankov examines how Russian elites engage American ideas of world order and why Russians perceive these ideas as unlikely to promote a just or stable international system. Tsygankov focuses on Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis, which argues for the global ascendancy of Western-style market democracy, and Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations," which drew attention to what Huntington perceived to be an increasingly dominant global disorder. Tsygankov argues that Russian intellectuals received the ideas of these two prominent American scholars critically. Tsygankov traces the reasons for Russian perceptions to the ethnocentric nature of the two sets of ideas and the inability of their authors to fully appreciate Russia's distinctive historical, geopolitical, and institutional perspectives.Throughout this rich study Tsygankov points to the need for scholars to study cultural perceptions in world politics as a means of eliminating some of the obstacles that stand in the way of a truly global society. He also raises the issue of whether or not intellectuals should accept moral responsibility for the ideas they produce and what implications this may have for international relations theory.

In Whose World Order? Andrei P. Tsygankov examines how Russian elites engage American ideas of world order and why Russians perceive these ideas as unlikely to promote a just or stable international system. Tsygankov focuses on Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis, which argues for the global ascendancy of Western-style market democracy, and Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations," which drew attention to what Huntington perceived to be an increasingly dominant global disorder. Tsygankov argues that Russian intellectuals received the ideas of these two prominent American scholars critically. Tsygankov traces the reasons for Russian perceptions to the ethnocentric nature of the two sets of ideas and the inability of their authors to fully appreciate Russia's distinctive historical, geopolitical, and institutional perspectives.Throughout this rich study Tsygankov points to the need for scholars to study cultural perceptions in world politics as a means of eliminating some of the obstacles that stand in the way of a truly global society. He also raises the issue of whether or not intellectuals should accept moral responsibility for the ideas they produce and what implications this may have for international relations theory.

This book explores how culture shapes foreign economic policy in post-Soviet states. After the Soviet empire fragmented, some of the newly emerged nations directed their economic activities primarily toward Russia and other former republics, while others turned sharply away from the Soviet bloc. Taking a constructivist approach, Andrei P. Tsygankov explains the striking variation by making the original argument that a new state's strength of national identity shapes its foreign economic policy. The stronger the identity, the more likely the new state was to shift away from the empire. Drawing on detailed case studies of Latvia, Ukraine, and Belarus, the author demonstrates how the Baltic nations, with a strong sense of identity, chose to deal with Russia and other ex-Soviet nations on a strictly bilateral basis and entered preferential arrangements with European countries. Ukraine, with moderate identity strength, pursued active economic relations with both Russia and Europe. Finally, Belarus, with a relatively weak identity, pursued an effort to reintegrate with Russia at the expense of developing ties with Europe. Employing a range of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, this study brings a national identity perspective into the forefront of international political economy theory.

Russian Realism analyzes Russian contemporary geopolitical thinking, or realism, and explores the notion of Derzhava as the foundation of Russian realism.The author defines Russian realists as all those favoring actions by the Russian state in defense of its interests, including protection of national sovereignty, security, power, and prestige on the international scene. What makes Russian realism distinct is its "vision of Russianness" formed by the country’s historical, cultural/religious experience, and its semi-peripheral position in the international system. The vision stresses the importance of survival, preservation of strong state, and protection of national interests from external infringement.Mainstream literature, especially in the West, tends to ignore Russian theoretical debates and narratives; this book remedies this by providing significant insights into Russian realist thinking. It explores the historical unfolding of the longstanding national debates about Russia’s role in Europe/the West and how realists have reframed these debates in response to multiple international and domestic developments. The book also identifies distinct groups and debates within the broad school of Russian realism.This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history. It will also appeal to a broader general audience of those interested in Russia and international politics.

Russian Realism analyzes Russian contemporary geopolitical thinking, or realism, and explores the notion of Derzhava as the foundation of Russian realism.The author defines Russian realists as all those favoring actions by the Russian state in defense of its interests, including protection of national sovereignty, security, power, and prestige on the international scene. What makes Russian realism distinct is its "vision of Russianness" formed by the country’s historical, cultural/religious experience, and its semi-peripheral position in the international system. The vision stresses the importance of survival, preservation of strong state, and protection of national interests from external infringement.Mainstream literature, especially in the West, tends to ignore Russian theoretical debates and narratives; this book remedies this by providing significant insights into Russian realist thinking. It explores the historical unfolding of the longstanding national debates about Russia’s role in Europe/the West and how realists have reframed these debates in response to multiple international and domestic developments. The book also identifies distinct groups and debates within the broad school of Russian realism.This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history. It will also appeal to a broader general audience of those interested in Russia and international politics.

The "Russian Idea" in International Relations identifies different approaches within Russian Civilizational tradition — Russia’s nationally distinctive way of thinking — by situating them within IR literature and connecting them to practices of the country’s international relations.Civilizational ideas in IR theory express states’ cultural identification and stress religious traditions, social customs, and economic and political values. This book defines Russian civilizational ideas by two criteria: the values they stress and their global ambitions. The author identifies leading voices among those positioning Russia as an exceptional and globally significant system of values and traces their arguments across several centuries of the country’s development. In addition, the author explains how and why Russian civilizational ideas rise, fall, and are replaced by alternative ideas. The book identifies three schools of Russian civilizational thinking about international relations – Slavophiles, Communists, and Eurasianists. Each school focuses on Russia’s distinctive spiritual, social, and geographic roots, respectively. Each one is internally divided between those claiming Russia’s exceptionalism, potentially resulting in regional autarchy or imperial expansion, and those advocating the Russian Idea as global in its appeal. Those favoring the latter perspective have stressed Russia’s unique capacity for understanding different cultures and guarding the world against extremes of nationalism and hegemony in international relations.This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, Russia–Western relations, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history, including the history of ideas.

The "Russian Idea" in International Relations identifies different approaches within Russian Civilizational tradition — Russia’s nationally distinctive way of thinking — by situating them within IR literature and connecting them to practices of the country’s international relations.Civilizational ideas in IR theory express states’ cultural identification and stress religious traditions, social customs, and economic and political values. This book defines Russian civilizational ideas by two criteria: the values they stress and their global ambitions. The author identifies leading voices among those positioning Russia as an exceptional and globally significant system of values and traces their arguments across several centuries of the country’s development. In addition, the author explains how and why Russian civilizational ideas rise, fall, and are replaced by alternative ideas. The book identifies three schools of Russian civilizational thinking about international relations – Slavophiles, Communists, and Eurasianists. Each school focuses on Russia’s distinctive spiritual, social, and geographic roots, respectively. Each one is internally divided between those claiming Russia’s exceptionalism, potentially resulting in regional autarchy or imperial expansion, and those advocating the Russian Idea as global in its appeal. Those favoring the latter perspective have stressed Russia’s unique capacity for understanding different cultures and guarding the world against extremes of nationalism and hegemony in international relations.This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, Russia–Western relations, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history, including the history of ideas.

Russian Westernizers and Change in International Relations summarizes the Westernizing trend in Russian thought from the early nineteenth century to the present day.This book looks at Russian thinkers and politicians who have considered Western/European civilization to be superior to others and who have drawn the conclusion that Russia consequently ought to align itself with the West, rather than preserving certain traditional Russian values – and that not doing so is an impediment to political, social, and economic evolution. Within this trend of thought, the author identifies four schools – Christian Westernizers, Economic Liberals, Political Liberals, and Social State Supporters – and explores examples of each. The author compares Russian thinkers from different periods, finding contrasts and similarities within their political and historical settings and assessing their responses to their unique circumstances. He analyzes Russian Westernizers’ self‑definition and ideas of national freedom relative to those of Western nations, exploring how the West’s definition of values and institutions has changed over time. He shows how Western historical developments affected waves of Westernization and pro‑Western thinking inside Russia, arguing the importance of this being grounded in national state‑building priorities. The growing complexity of global relations, the declining global influence of the West, and the war in Ukraine present Russian Westernizers with new questions and challenges, and this book assesses the resulting implications.This book will appeal to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, Russia–West relations, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history including the history of ideas.

Russian Westernizers and Change in International Relations summarizes the Westernizing trend in Russian thought from the early nineteenth century to the present day.This book looks at Russian thinkers and politicians who have considered Western/European civilization to be superior to others and who have drawn the conclusion that Russia consequently ought to align itself with the West, rather than preserving certain traditional Russian values – and that not doing so is an impediment to political, social, and economic evolution. Within this trend of thought, the author identifies four schools – Christian Westernizers, Economic Liberals, Political Liberals, and Social State Supporters – and explores examples of each. The author compares Russian thinkers from different periods, finding contrasts and similarities within their political and historical settings and assessing their responses to their unique circumstances. He analyzes Russian Westernizers’ self‑definition and ideas of national freedom relative to those of Western nations, exploring how the West’s definition of values and institutions has changed over time. He shows how Western historical developments affected waves of Westernization and pro‑Western thinking inside Russia, arguing the importance of this being grounded in national state‑building priorities. The growing complexity of global relations, the declining global influence of the West, and the war in Ukraine present Russian Westernizers with new questions and challenges, and this book assesses the resulting implications.This book will appeal to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, Russia–West relations, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history including the history of ideas.

Since Russia has re-emerged as a global power, its foreign policies have come under close scrutiny. In Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin, Andrei P. Tsygankov identifies honor as the key concept by which Russia's international relations are determined. He argues that Russia's interests in acquiring power, security and welfare are filtered through this cultural belief and that different conceptions of honor provide an organizing framework that produces policies of cooperation, defensiveness and assertiveness in relation to the West. Using ten case studies spanning a period from the early nineteenth century to the present day - including the Holy Alliance, the Triple Entente and the Russia-Georgia war - Tsygankov's theory suggests that when it perceives its sense of honor to be recognized, Russia cooperates with the Western nations; without such a recognition it pursues independent policies either defensively or assertively.

Since Russia has re-emerged as a global power, its foreign policies have come under close scrutiny. In Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin, Andrei P. Tsygankov identifies honor as the key concept by which Russia's international relations are determined. He argues that Russia's interests in acquiring power, security and welfare are filtered through this cultural belief and that different conceptions of honor provide an organizing framework that produces policies of cooperation, defensiveness and assertiveness in relation to the West. Using ten case studies spanning a period from the early nineteenth century to the present day - including the Holy Alliance, the Triple Entente and the Russia-Georgia war - Tsygankov's theory suggests that when it perceives its sense of honor to be recognized, Russia cooperates with the Western nations; without such a recognition it pursues independent policies either defensively or assertively.

In recent times, US-Russia relations have deteriorated to what both sides acknowledge is an “all time low.” Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election and Putin’s continued support for the Assad regime in Syria have placed enormous strain on this historically tense and complex relationship. In one of the first analyses of the evolving Trump-Putin relationship, leading scholar of Russian foreign policy Andrei P. Tsygankov challenges the dominant view that US-Russia relations have entered a new Cold War phase. Russia’s US strategy, he argues, can only be understood in the context of a changing international order. While America strives to preserve its global dominance, Russia—the weaker power—exploits its asymmetric capabilities and relations with non-Western allies to defend and promote its interests, and to avoid yielding to US pressures. Focusing on key areas of conflict and mutual convergence—from European security to China and the Middle East, as well as cyber, nuclear, and energy issues—Tsygankov paints a nuanced and unsentimental picture of two countries whose ties are likely to remain marked by suspicion and conflict for years to come.

In recent times, US-Russia relations have deteriorated to what both sides acknowledge is an “all time low.” Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election and Putin’s continued support for the Assad regime in Syria have placed enormous strain on this historically tense and complex relationship. In one of the first analyses of the evolving Trump-Putin relationship, leading scholar of Russian foreign policy Andrei P. Tsygankov challenges the dominant view that US-Russia relations have entered a new Cold War phase. Russia’s US strategy, he argues, can only be understood in the context of a changing international order. While America strives to preserve its global dominance, Russia—the weaker power—exploits its asymmetric capabilities and relations with non-Western allies to defend and promote its interests, and to avoid yielding to US pressures. Focusing on key areas of conflict and mutual convergence—from European security to China and the Middle East, as well as cyber, nuclear, and energy issues—Tsygankov paints a nuanced and unsentimental picture of two countries whose ties are likely to remain marked by suspicion and conflict for years to come.

Now fully updated and revised, this clear and comprehensive text explores the past thirty years of Soviet/Russian international relations, comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin. Challenging conventional views of Moscow’s foreign policy, Andrei Tsygankov shows that definitions of national interest depend on visions of national identity and is rooted both in history and domestic politics. Yet the author also highlights the role of the external environment in affecting the balance of power among competing domestic groups. Drawing on both Russian and Western sources, Tsygankov shows how Moscow’s policies have shifted under different leaders’ visions of Russia’s national interests. He gives an overview of the ideas and pressures that motivated Russian foreign policy in six different periods: the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s, the liberal “Westernizers” era under Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the relatively hardline statist policy under Primakov, the more pragmatic course of limited cooperation under Putin and then Medvedev, and the assertive policy Putin has implemented since his return to power. Evaluating the successes and failures of Russia’s foreign policies, Tsygankov explains its many turns as Russia’s identity and interaction with the West have evolved. The book concludes with reflections on the emergence of the post-Western world and the challenges it presents to Russia’s enduring quest for great-power status.

Now fully updated and revised, this clear and comprehensive text explores the past thirty years of Soviet/Russian international relations, comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin. Challenging conventional views of Moscow’s foreign policy, Andrei Tsygankov shows that definitions of national interest depend on visions of national identity and is rooted both in history and domestic politics. Yet the author also highlights the role of the external environment in affecting the balance of power among competing domestic groups. Drawing on both Russian and Western sources, Tsygankov shows how Moscow’s policies have shifted under different leaders’ visions of Russia’s national interests. He gives an overview of the ideas and pressures that motivated Russian foreign policy in six different periods: the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s, the liberal “Westernizers” era under Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the relatively hardline statist policy under Primakov, the more pragmatic course of limited cooperation under Putin and then Medvedev, and the assertive policy Putin has implemented since his return to power. Evaluating the successes and failures of Russia’s foreign policies, Tsygankov explains its many turns as Russia’s identity and interaction with the West have evolved. The book concludes with reflections on the emergence of the post-Western world and the challenges it presents to Russia’s enduring quest for great-power status.

This book focuses on Western attitudes toward Russia and the Russians following Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. Western attitudes, while diverse, often revealed a highly negative reaction that condemned not only the Kremlin but the broader Russian society for its alleged complicity and support for the war. The author uses the metaphor of “canceling” to capture the attitude toward Russians that (1) holds them responsible for the war in Ukraine, (2) denies acceptance and recognition to various expressions of Russian culture, politics, and society, and (3) favors maximum pressures and the ultimate defeat over negotiations with Russia.

This clear and comprehensive text explores the past thirty years of Soviet/Russian international relations, comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin. Challenging conventional views of Moscow’s foreign policy, Andrei Tsygankov shows that definitions of national interest depend on visions of national identity and is rooted both in history and domestic politics. Yet the author also highlights the role of the external environment in affecting the balance of power among competing domestic groups. Drawing on both Russian and Western sources, Tsygankov shows how Moscow’s policies have shifted under different leaders’ visions of Russia’s national interests. He gives an overview of the ideas and pressures that motivated Russian foreign policy in six different periods: the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s, the liberal “Westernizers” era under Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the relatively hardline statist policy under Primakov, the more pragmatic course of limited cooperation under Putin and then Medvedev, and the assertive policy Putin has implemented since his return to power, most importantly in his invasion of Ukraine which began in 2022.