Ariel Rubinstein - Böcker
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20 produkter
20 produkter
997 kr
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The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book. It uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points, and includes detailed proofs given as explanations for the models. The text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course.
611 kr
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318 kr
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943 kr
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Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.
441 kr
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Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.
432 kr
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This book presents Ariel Rubinstein's lecture notes for the first part of his well-known graduate course in microeconomics. Developed during the fifteen years that Rubinstein taught the course at Tel Aviv University, Princeton University, and New York University, these notes provide a critical assessment of models of rational economic agents, and are an invaluable supplement to any primary textbook in microeconomic theory. In this fully revised and expanded second edition, Rubinstein retains the striking originality and deep simplicity that characterize his famously engaging style of teaching. He presents these lecture notes with a precision that gets to the core of the material, and he places special emphasis on the interpretation of key concepts. Rubinstein brings this concise book thoroughly up to date, covering topics like modern choice theory and including dozens of original new problems. Written by one of the world's most respected and provocative economic theorists, this second edition of Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory is essential reading for students, teachers, and research economists.* Fully revised, expanded, and updated * Retains the engaging style and method of Rubinstein's well-known lectures * Covers topics like modern choice theory * Features numerous original new problems--including 21 new review problems * Solutions manual (available only to teachers) can be found at: http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/microTheory/.
740 kr
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740 kr
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559 kr
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559 kr
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573 kr
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754 kr
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554 kr
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754 kr
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377 kr
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559 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
377 kr
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559 kr
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164 kr
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Del 7 - World Scientific Series In Economic Theory
Models Of Bounded Rationality And Mechanism Design
Inbunden, Engelska, 2016
1 628 kr
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This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory.All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem.Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model.The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.