B.C. Hopkins - Böcker

§ 1. Remarks on the Current Status of the Problematic. The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in Being and Time, has almost been universallyl received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"2 will, if 3 the conclusions reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological /I superiority" over Husserl. This is not to suggest that the tendency toward Heidegger partisan­ ship in the literature treating the relationship of his phenomenology to Husserl's has its basis in extra-philosophical or extra-phenome­ nological concerns and considerations. Rather, it is to draw attention to the undeniable 'fact' that Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology has cast a "spell" over all subsequent discussions of the basic problems and issues involved in what has become known as their "controversy.

James F. Sheridan Allegheny College As we come to the end of the century, an attentive student of con­ temporary European philosophy will no doubt be startled by a volume titled Husserl in Contemporary Context. Such philosophers are most likely to believe that Hussed has now been declared II classical" rather than a contemporary thinker or, worse, simply old fashioned. Access to Hussed today will most likely come through the allegedly definitive critiques of his work by Heidegger and Derrida and to a lesser extent through the readings of his work by Levinas and Merleau­ Ponty although Merleau-Ponty himself has been declared old fashioned by some postmodems. Hence, if by II contemporary" one understands the problematic set by the work of the late Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, et. al., Hussed's work seems strange indeed in such a contemporary context, seems better understood as the last gasp of philosophy dominated by metaphysics and thus fit only for inclusion in courses in the history of philosophy.

Many of the contributions to this volume are based on research originally presented at the first meeting in the United States of Japanese and American phenomenologists that took place at Seattle University in the Summer of 1991. In addition, other contributions have been added in order to supplement and complement the themes of the work presented at this meeting.

This book reassesses the phenomenological 'controversy' between Husserl and Heidegger over the proper status of the phenomenon of intentionality. It seeks to determine whether Heidegger's hermeneutical critique of intentionality is sensitive to Husserl's reflective account of its 'Sachen selbst'. Hopkins argues that Heidegger's critique is directed toward the 'cogito' modality of intentionality, and therefore, passes over its 'non-actional', or 'horizonal', dimension in Husserl's phenomenology. As a result of this, he concludes that Heidegger misinterprets Husserl's account of the intentional 'immanence' exhibited by phenomenological reflection. On the basis of these findings, Hopkins suggests that the phenomenological methodology, operative in the so-called hermeneutic critique of transcendental consciousness, itself involves transcendental 'presuppositions' that are most appropriately characterized in terms of intentional, and reflective, phenomena.

The volume contains contributions from major interpreters of Husserl's phenomenology. Among the topics investigated are phenomenology and ontology, the phenomenology of the ego, the phenomenology of logic, the phenomenology of the life-world, and phenomenology and science. 'These essays remind us that what Husserl proposed to the philosophical community was a program of research rather than a systemization of results. One simply does not read Husserl as one reads, say, Sartre. To take Husserl as a teacher is to agree to do philosophy rather than to engage in the sort of activity well described as 'philosophy appreciation'. To understand Husserl is to do what the contributors to this volume have done, to appropriate his work and to extend that work in his terms and in theirs.' (from the Preface).