Benjamin A. Schupmann – författare

Can a constitutional democracy commit suicide? Can an illiberal antidemocratic party legitimately obtain power through democratic elections and amend liberalism and democracy out of the constitution entirely? In Weimar Germany, these theoretical questions were both practically and existentially relevant. By 1932, the Nazi and Communist parties combined held a majority of seats in parliament. Neither accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Their only reason forparticipating democratically was to amend the constitution out of existence.This book analyses Carl Schmitt''s state and constitutional theory and shows how it was conceived in response to the Weimar crisis. Right-wing and left-wing political extremists recognized that a path to legal revolution lay in the Weimar constitution''s combination of democratic procedures, total neutrality toward political goals, and positive law. Schmitt''s writings sought to address the unique problems posed by mass democracy. Schmitt''s thought anticipated ''constrained'' or ''militant''democracy, a type of constitution that guards against subversive expressions of popular sovereignty and whose mechanisms include the entrenchment of basic constitutional commitments and party bans.Schmitt''s state and constitutional theory remains important: the problems he identified continue to exist within liberal democratic states. Schmitt offers democrats today a novel way to understand the legitimacy of liberal democracy and the limits of constitutional change.

Can a constitutional democracy commit suicide? Can an illiberal antidemocratic party legitimately obtain power through democratic elections and amend liberalism and democracy out of the constitution entirely? In Weimar Germany, these theoretical questions were both practically and existentially relevant. By 1932, the Nazi and Communist parties combined held a majority of seats in parliament. Neither accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Their only reason forparticipating democratically was to amend the constitution out of existence.This book analyses Carl Schmitt''s state and constitutional theory and shows how it was conceived in response to the Weimar crisis. Right-wing and left-wing political extremists recognized that a path to legal revolution lay in the Weimar constitution''s combination of democratic procedures, total neutrality toward political goals, and positive law. Schmitt''s writings sought to address the unique problems posed by mass democracy. Schmitt''s thought anticipated ''constrained'' or ''militant''democracy, a type of constitution that guards against subversive expressions of popular sovereignty and whose mechanisms include the entrenchment of basic constitutional commitments and party bans.Schmitt''s state and constitutional theory remains important: the problems he identified continue to exist within liberal democratic states. Schmitt offers democrats today a novel way to understand the legitimacy of liberal democracy and the limits of constitutional change.

Recent developments, including anti-democratic moves by governments in Hungary, India, and Turkey and the rise of populist leaders, demonstrate the threat posed to democratic values by legal revolution and other acts committed within the confines of the system. Militant democracy, a form of constitutional entrenchment, can protect these values from the harmful influence of illiberal regimes. However, critics and proponents alike wonder whether these tactics risk undermining democracy in the process of trying to save it. Democracy despite Itself advances a liberal normative theory of militant democracy by combining American philosopher John Rawls' political liberalism with German jurist Carl Schmitt's state theory. It argues for the adoption of three constitutional mechanisms of militant democracy-explicit unamendability, political rights restrictions, and the guardianship of a constitutional court-to prevent the subversion and erosion of democracy by the abuse of legal measures. Rawls' thought provides the substantive democratic content of this theory, establishing basic liberal rights as a precondition for legitimate government. Schmitt's thought provides the militant political form, justifying the state's use of proactive militant measures to preserve the political identity of its constitution. This blending of works by two thinkers rarely regarded as complementary is a novel approach that offers a compelling vision for how liberal democracy can be protected from anti-democratic actors.

Recent developments, including anti-democratic moves by governments in Hungary, India, and Turkey and the rise of populist leaders, demonstrate the threat posed to democratic values by legal revolution and other acts committed within the confines of the system. Militant democracy, a form of constitutional entrenchment, can protect these values from the harmful influence of illiberal regimes. However, critics and proponents alike wonder whether these tactics risk undermining democracy in the process of trying to save it. Democracy despite Itself advances a liberal normative theory of militant democracy by combining American philosopher John Rawls'' political liberalism with German jurist Carl Schmitt''s state theory. It argues for the adoption of three constitutional mechanisms of militant democracy-explicit unamendability, political rights restrictions, and the guardianship of a constitutional court-to prevent the subversion and erosion of democracy by the abuse of legal measures. Rawls'' thought provides the substantive democratic content of this theory, establishing basic liberal rights as a precondition for legitimate government. Schmitt''s thought provides the militant political form, justifying the state''s use of proactive militant measures to preserve the political identity of its constitution. This blending of works by two thinkers rarely regarded as complementary is a novel approach that offers a compelling vision for how liberal democracy can be protected from anti-democratic actors.

Recent developments, including anti-democratic moves by governments in Hungary, India, and Turkey and the rise of populist leaders, demonstrate the threat posed to democratic values by legal revolution and other acts committed within the confines of the system. Militant democracy, a form of constitutional entrenchment, can protect these values from the harmful influence of illiberal regimes. However, critics and proponents alike wonder whether these tactics risk undermining democracy in the process of trying to save it. Democracy despite Itself advances a liberal normative theory of militant democracy by combining American philosopher John Rawls'' political liberalism with German jurist Carl Schmitt''s state theory. It argues for the adoption of three constitutional mechanisms of militant democracy-explicit unamendability, political rights restrictions, and the guardianship of a constitutional court-to prevent the subversion and erosion of democracy by the abuse of legal measures. Rawls'' thought provides the substantive democratic content of this theory, establishing basic liberal rights as a precondition for legitimate government. Schmitt''s thought provides the militant political form, justifying the state''s use of proactive militant measures to preserve the political identity of its constitution. This blending of works by two thinkers rarely regarded as complementary is a novel approach that offers a compelling vision for how liberal democracy can be protected from anti-democratic actors.