Carl Knight - Böcker

Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. Responsibility and Distributive Justice both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards. Written by established experts in the field and emerging scholars, it contains essays previously unpublished in academic books or journals. It will be of interest to researchers and students in political and moral philosophy.

The most influential theory of distributive equality to have emerged since John Rawls' justice as fairness is luck egalitarianism, which aims to neutralize the distributive effects of luck. The standard form, brute-luck egalitarianism, advanced by Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, and Ronald Dworkin, allows the unequal consequences of option luck (the results of deliberate gambles) to stand while neutralizing the unequal consequences of brute luck (the results of unchosen risk). Critics of luck egalitarianism, including relational egalitarians such as Elizabeth Anderson, have claimed that the view requires the abandonment of those with bad option luck, and that this harsh treatment is contrary to egalitarian goals. Luck egalitarians have responded by moderating their view, and even in some cases by accepting the core of relational egalitarianism, which is now in the ascendency.Leaving Nothing to Chance reverses this retreat from luck egalitarianism, presenting a bold new theory of equality that overcomes criticism of luck egalitarianism by reinterpreting and strengthening its core commitment to equalizing the effects of luck. It offers the first major statement of all-luck egalitarianism, which unlike brute-luck egalitarianism neutralizes the unequal consequences of option luck as well as brute luck. The book further pursues the goal of luck neutralization by opening or 'greying' the black box of responsibility, rejecting personal identity in favour of a thin account of what matters for prudence and responsibility, and defending a moral rather than prudential account of the value of choice. While most recent egalitarian philosophers conclude that equality requires luck neutralization to be curbed or abandoned altogether, Leaving Nothing to Chance shows that the problems of brute-luck egalitarianism's partial luck neutralization can instead be overcome by fully neutralizing luck.

Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. Responsibility and Distributive Justice both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards. Written by established experts in the field and emerging scholars, it contains essays previously unpublished in academic books or journals. It will be of interest to researchers and students in political and moral philosophy.

How should we decide which inequalities between people are justified, and which are unjustified?One answer is that such inequalities are only justified where there is a corresponding variation in responsible action or choice on the part of the persons concerned. This view, which has become known as 'luck egalitarianism', has come to occupy a central place in recent debates about distributive justice. This book is the first full length treatment of this significant development in contemporary political philosophy.Each of its three parts addresses a key question concerning the theory. Which version of luck egalitarian comes closest to realizing luck egalitarian objectives? Does luck egalitarianism succeed as a view of egalitarian justice? And is it sound as an account of distributive justice in general?The book provides a distinctive answer to each of these questions, along the way engaging with the leading theorists identified in the literature as luck egalitarians, such as Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, and Ronald Dworkin, as well as the most influential critics, including Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, Samuel Scheffler, and Jonathan Wolff.Key Features*Presents a critical survey of already classic debates about responsibility, equality and justice*Provides a sustained engagement with luck egalitarianism's critics*Stakes a distinctive position on the key questions regarding luck egalitarianism