David Estlund – författare

A leading political theorist’s groundbreaking defense of ideal conceptions of justice in political philosophyThroughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian?Utopophobia argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. David Estlund does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does he assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. Estlund engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, he counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated.Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, Utopophobia stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.

Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy''s tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the "epistemic value" of the procedure--the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision--is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn''t simply rule. Estlund''s theory--which he calls "epistemic proceduralism"--avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view. If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic--with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.

Traduit de l''anglais par YVES MEINARD. Paru aux États-Unis en 2008 aux EDITIONS PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. Première traduction française. Faut-il sacrifier la vérité à la démocratie ? S''il est vrai que certaines lois sont meilleures que d''autres, c''est à celles-là que nous voulons être soumis. Mais il est dès lors tentant, la majorité ne prenant pas toujours les bonnes décisions, de ne confier le pouvoir qu''aux plus compétents. Le gouvernement d''une élite savante soumet toutefois le peuple à une autorité illégitime, car le savoir ne confère aucun droit à commander autrui. L''épistocratie, qui réserve le pouvoir aux seuls experts, est inacceptable. Dans cette contribution majeure à la théorie démocratique contemporaine, David Estlund montre comment concilier la recherche de lois justes et le respect de l''égalité morale des citoyens. Il ouvre ainsi une nouvelle perspective philosophique pour penser l''autorité de la démocratie. Entre le souci de la vérité et le pouvoir au peuple, il n''est pas sûr que nous devions choisir.