Recent challenges to US maritime predominance suggests a return to great power competition at sea, and this new volume looks at how navies in previous eras of multipolarity grappled with similar challenges.

The book follows the theme of multipolarity by analysing a wide range of historical and geographical case studies, thereby maintaining the focus of both its historical analysis and its policy implications. It begins by looking at the evolution of French naval policy from Louis XIV through to the end of the nineteenth century. It then examines how the British responded to multipolar threat environments, convoys, the challenges of demobilization, and the persistence of British naval power in the interwar period. There are also contributions regarding Japan’s turn away from the sea, the Italian navy, and multipolarity in the Arctic. This volume also addresses the regional and global distribution of forces; trade and communication protection; arms races; the emergence of naval challengers; fleet design; logistics; technology; civil-naval relations; and grand strategy, past, present, and future.

This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, strategic studies and international relations history, as well as senior naval officers.

Recent challenges to US maritime predominance suggests a return to great power competition at sea, and this new volume looks at how navies in previous eras of multipolarity grappled with similar challenges.

The book follows the theme of multipolarity by analysing a wide range of historical and geographical case studies, thereby maintaining the focus of both its historical analysis and its policy implications. It begins by looking at the evolution of French naval policy from Louis XIV through to the end of the nineteenth century. It then examines how the British responded to multipolar threat environments, convoys, the challenges of demobilization, and the persistence of British naval power in the interwar period. There are also contributions regarding Japan’s turn away from the sea, the Italian navy, and multipolarity in the Arctic. This volume also addresses the regional and global distribution of forces; trade and communication protection; arms races; the emergence of naval challengers; fleet design; logistics; technology; civil-naval relations; and grand strategy, past, present, and future.

This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, strategic studies and international relations history, as well as senior naval officers.

How have navies contemplated possible enemies? How did they learn, or fail to learn, once operations began? How does this analysis inform today’s planning for future conflict? These questions guide the noted historians and naval strategists who contributed to Planning for War at Sea. A central theme is the regular failure of navies’ best-laid plans.

Covering four centuries of naval warfare, the chapters illustrate the challenges all navies faced when considering possible enemies. Even during the Age of Sail, ships were among the most expensive and long-term national endeavors. Navies therefore planned well in advance for future wars, usually without knowing their adversaries or how they would fight them at sea. Building a capable navy requires sustained investment in naval infrastructure long before the fighting starts.  

In the final chapters naval strategists expand on this historical analysis to address how effectively or ineffectively today’s three leading navies—Russia, China, and the United States—have configured themselves during the post–Cold War era in preparing for future great power conflict. This collection is an important work for strategists, scholars, and policymakers.

Recent challenges to US maritime predominance suggests a return to great power competition at sea, and this new volume looks at how navies in previous eras of multipolarity grappled with similar challenges.

The book follows the theme of multipolarity by analysing a wide range of historical and geographical case studies, thereby maintaining the focus of both its historical analysis and its policy implications. It begins by looking at the evolution of French naval policy from Louis XIV through to the end of the nineteenth century. It then examines how the British responded to multipolar threat environments, convoys, the challenges of demobilization, and the persistence of British naval power in the interwar period. There are also contributions regarding Japan’s turn away from the sea, the Italian navy, and multipolarity in the Arctic. This volume also addresses the regional and global distribution of forces; trade and communication protection; arms races; the emergence of naval challengers; fleet design; logistics; technology; civil-naval relations; and grand strategy, past, present, and future.

This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, strategic studies and international relations history, as well as senior naval officers.

Recent challenges to US maritime predominance suggests a return to great power competition at sea, and this new volume looks at how navies in previous eras of multipolarity grappled with similar challenges.

The book follows the theme of multipolarity by analysing a wide range of historical and geographical case studies, thereby maintaining the focus of both its historical analysis and its policy implications. It begins by looking at the evolution of French naval policy from Louis XIV through to the end of the nineteenth century. It then examines how the British responded to multipolar threat environments, convoys, the challenges of demobilization, and the persistence of British naval power in the interwar period. There are also contributions regarding Japan’s turn away from the sea, the Italian navy, and multipolarity in the Arctic. This volume also addresses the regional and global distribution of forces; trade and communication protection; arms races; the emergence of naval challengers; fleet design; logistics; technology; civil-naval relations; and grand strategy, past, present, and future.

This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, strategic studies and international relations history, as well as senior naval officers.

How have navies contemplated possible enemies? How did they learn, or fail to learn, once operations began? How does this analysis inform today’s planning for future conflict? These questions guide the noted historians and naval strategists who contributed to Planning for War at Sea. A central theme is the regular failure of navies’ best-laid plans.

Covering four centuries of naval warfare, the chapters illustrate the challenges all navies faced when considering possible enemies. Even during the Age of Sail, ships were among the most expensive and long-term national endeavors. Navies therefore planned well in advance for future wars, usually without knowing their adversaries or how they would fight them at sea. Building a capable navy requires sustained investment in naval infrastructure long before the fighting starts.  

In the final chapters naval strategists expand on this historical analysis to address how effectively or ineffectively today’s three leading navies—Russia, China, and the United States—have configured themselves during the post–Cold War era in preparing for future great power conflict. This collection is an important work for strategists, scholars, and policymakers.