Hilary Kornblith – författare

Epistemology has traditionally been motivated by a desire to respond to skeptical challenges. The skeptic presents an argument for the view that knowledge is impossible, and the theorist of knowledge is called upon to explain why we should think, contrary to the skeptic, that it is genuinely possible to gain knowledge. Traditional theories of knowledge offer responses to the skeptic which fail to draw on the resources of the sciences. This is no simple oversight; there are principled reasons why such resources are thought to be unavailable to the theorist of knowledge. This book takes a different approach. After arguing that appeals to science are not illegitimate in responding to skepticism, this book shows how the sciences offer an illuminating perspective on traditional questions about the nature and possibility of knowledge. This book serves as an introduction to a scientifically informed approach to the theory of knowledge. This book is a vital resource for students and scholars interested in epistemology and its connections to recent development in cognitive science.

Epistemology has traditionally been motivated by a desire to respond to skeptical challenges. The skeptic presents an argument for the view that knowledge is impossible, and the theorist of knowledge is called upon to explain why we should think, contrary to the skeptic, that it is genuinely possible to gain knowledge. Traditional theories of knowledge offer responses to the skeptic which fail to draw on the resources of the sciences. This is no simple oversight; there are principled reasons why such resources are thought to be unavailable to the theorist of knowledge. This book takes a different approach. After arguing that appeals to science are not illegitimate in responding to skepticism, this book shows how the sciences offer an illuminating perspective on traditional questions about the nature and possibility of knowledge. This book serves as an introduction to a scientifically informed approach to the theory of knowledge. This book is a vital resource for students and scholars interested in epistemology and its connections to recent development in cognitive science.

Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. Philosophers have frequently extolled the value of reflective self-examination, and a wide range of philosophers, who differ on many other things, have argued that reflection can help to solve a number of significant philosophical problems. The importance of reflecting on one's beliefs and desires has been viewed as the key to solving problems about justification and knowledge; about reasoning; about the nature of freedom; and about the source of normativity. In each case, a problem is identified which reflective self-examination is thought to address.Kornblith argues that reflection cannot solve any of these problems. There is a common structure to these issues, and the problems which reflection is thought to resolve are ones which could not possibly be solved by reflecting on one's beliefs and desires. More than this, he suggests that the attempt to solve these problems by appealing to reflection saddles us with a mystical view of the powers of reflective self-examination. Recognition of this fact motivates a search for a demystified view of the nature of reflection.To this end, Kornblith offers a detailed examination of views about knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity in order to better understand the motivations for extolling self-reflective examination. He explores both the logic of these views, and the psychological commitments they involve. In the final chapter, he offers a more realistic view of reflection, which draws on dual process approaches to cognition.

This volume draws together influential work by Hilary Kornblith on naturalistic epistemology. The naturalistic approach sees epistemology not as a matter of analysis of concepts, but as an explanatory project constrained and informed by work in the cognitive sciences. These essays expound and defend Kornblith's distinctive view of how we come to have knowledge of the world. He offers critical discussion of alternative approaches, such as foundationalism, the coherence theory of justification, internalism, and externalism; and he discusses social epistemology, the role of intuitions in philosophical theorizing, epistemic normativity, and the ways in which philosophical theories may be informed by empirical considerations. Kornblith aims to show how an epistemology which is based in the sciences of cognition may provide the understanding and intellectual illumination which has always been the goal of philosophical theorizing.

Philosophers have traditionally used conceptual analysis to investigate knowledge. Hilary Kornblith argues that this is misguided: it is not the concept of knowledge that we should be investigating, but knowledge itself, a robust natural phenomenon, suitable for scientific study. Cognitive ethologists not only attribute intentional states to non-human animals, they also speak of such animals as having knowledge; and this talk of knowledge does causal and explanatory work within their theories. The account of knowledge which emerges from this literature is a version of reliabilism: knowledge is reliably produced true belief.This account of knowledge is not meant merely to provide an elucidation of an important scientific category. Rather, Kornblith argues that knowledge, in this very sense, is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts are examined in detail and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon of knowledge (even of human knowledge). One traditional objection to this sort of naturalistic approach to epistemology is that, in providing a descriptive account of the nature of important epistemic categories, it must inevitably deprive these categories of their normative force. But Kornblith argues that a proper account of epistemic normativity flows directly from the account of knowledge which is found in cognitive ethology. Knowledge may be properly understood as a real feature of the world which makes normative demands upon us.This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.

Philosophers have traditionally used conceptual analysis to investigate knowledge. Hilary Kornblith argues that this is misguided: it is not the concept of knowledge that we should be investigating, but knowledge itself, a robust natural phenomenon, suitable for scientific study. Cognitive ethologists not only attribute intentional states to non-human animals, they also speak of such animals as having knowledge; and this talk of knowledge does causal and explanatory work within their theories. The account of knowledge which emerges from this literature is a version of reliabilism: knowledge is reliably produced true belief.This account of knowledge is not meant merely to provide an elucidation of an important scientific category. Rather, Kornblith argues that knowledge, in this very sense, is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts are examined in detail and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon of knowledge (even of human knowledge). One traditional objection to this sort of naturalistic approach to epistemology is that, in providing a descriptive account of the nature of important epistemic categories, it must inevitably deprive these categories of their normative force. But Kornblith argues that a proper account of epistemic normativity flows directly from the account of knowledge which is found in cognitive ethology. Knowledge may be properly understood as a real feature of the world which makes normative demands upon us.This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.

Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. Philosophers have frequently extolled the value of reflective self-examination, and a wide range of philosophers, who differ on many other things, have argued that reflection can help to solve a number of significant philosophical problems. The importance of reflecting on one's beliefs and desires has been viewed as the key to solving problems about justification and knowledge; about reasoning; about the nature of freedom; and about the source of normativity. In each case, a problem is identified which reflective self-examination is thought to address.Kornblith argues that reflection cannot solve any of these problems. There is a common structure to these issues, and the problems which reflection is thought to resolve are ones which could not possibly be solved by reflecting on one's beliefs and desires. More than this, he suggests that the attempt to solve these problems by appealing to reflection saddles us with a mystical view of the powers of reflective self-examination. Recognition of this fact motivates a search for a demystified view of the nature of reflection.To this end, Kornblith offers a detailed examination of views about knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity in order to better understand the motivations for extolling self-reflective examination. He explores both the logic of these views, and the psychological commitments they involve. In the final chapter, he offers a more realistic view of reflection, which draws on dual process approaches to cognition.

Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman’s work, followed by Goldman’s responses to each essay. Critiques Alvin Goldman’s groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topicsFeatures contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophersCovers Goldman’s views on epistemology—both individual and social—in addition to cognitive science and metaphysicsPays special attention to Goldman’s writings on philosophy of mind, including the evolution of his thoughts on Simulation-Theory (ST)

Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman’s work, followed by Goldman’s responses to each essay. Critiques Alvin Goldman’s groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topicsFeatures contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophersCovers Goldman’s views on epistemology—both individual and social—in addition to cognitive science and metaphysicsPays special attention to Goldman’s writings on philosophy of mind, including the evolution of his thoughts on Simulation-Theory (ST)

This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.

This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.

What happens when we have second thoughts about the epistemic standing of our beliefs, when we stop to check on beliefs which we have already formed or hypotheses which we have under consideration? In the essays collected in this volume, Hilary Kornblith considers this and other questions about self-knowledge and the nature of human reason. The essays draw extensively on work in social psychology to illuminate traditional epistemological issues: in contrast with traditional Cartesian approaches to these issues, Kornblith engages with empirically motivated skeptical problems, and shows how they may be constructively addressed in practical and theoretical terms. As well as bringing together ten previously published essays, the volume contains two entirely new pieces that engage with ideas of self and rational nature. Kornblith's approach lays the foundations for further development in epistemology that will benefit from advances in our understanding of human psychology.

What happens when we have second thoughts about the epistemic standing of our beliefs, when we stop to check on beliefs which we have already formed or hypotheses which we have under consideration? In the essays collected in this volume, Hilary Kornblith considers this and other questions about self-knowledge and the nature of human reason. The essays draw extensively on work in social psychology to illuminate traditional epistemological issues: in contrast with traditional Cartesian approaches to these issues, Kornblith engages with empirically motivated skeptical problems, and shows how they may be constructively addressed in practical and theoretical terms. As well as bringing together ten previously published essays, the volume contains two entirely new pieces that engage with ideas of self and rational nature. Kornblith's approach lays the foundations for further development in epistemology that will benefit from advances in our understanding of human psychology.