J. T. M. Miller – författare

Metaphysical and ontological debates, concerning what exists and the nature of reality, are perennial features of the philosophical landscape. However, some have argued that ontological debates are non-substantive, pointless, trivial, incoherent, or impossible. Debates about whether tables exist, for example, or about the nature of reality, are taken to be in some way deficient. This has led to a burgeoning literature studying the nature of metaphysical and ontological disputes themselves. One major debate within this context concerns the language of ontology. The central question is whether the nature of language influences or limits our ability to engage productively in ontological disputes. While we typically think that our language describes the world, or at least can accurately describe the world, there have been many who have argued that the nature of language inherently influences and limits our attempts to understand the nature of reality-that our claims about what exists are, in fact, merely a reflection of how we happen to speak or think. The Language of Ontology collects chapters from established participants in the debate alongside new voices, to explore the range of issues relating to our ability or inability to get beyond the limits of our language.

Metaphysical and ontological debates, concerning what exists and the nature of reality, are perennial features of the philosophical landscape. However, some have argued that ontological debates are non-substantive, pointless, trivial, incoherent, or impossible. Debates about whether tables exist, for example, or about the nature of reality, are taken to be in some way deficient. This has led to a burgeoning literature studying the nature of metaphysical and ontological disputes themselves. One major debate within this context concerns the language of ontology. The central question is whether the nature of language influences or limits our ability to engage productively in ontological disputes. While we typically think that our language describes the world, or at least can accurately describe the world, there have been many who have argued that the nature of language inherently influences and limits our attempts to understand the nature of reality-that our claims about what exists are, in fact, merely a reflection of how we happen to speak or think. The Language of Ontology collects chapters from established participants in the debate alongside new voices, to explore the range of issues relating to our ability or inability to get beyond the limits of our language.

Metaphysical and ontological debates, concerning what exists and the nature of reality, are perennial features of the philosophical landscape. However, some have argued that ontological debates are non-substantive, pointless, trivial, incoherent, or impossible. Debates about whether tables exist, for example, or about the nature of reality, are taken to be in some way deficient. This has led to a burgeoning literature studying the nature of metaphysical and ontological disputes themselves. One major debate within this context concerns the language of ontology. The central question is whether the nature of language influences or limits our ability to engage productively in ontological disputes. While we typically think that our language describes the world, or at least can accurately describe the world, there have been many who have argued that the nature of language inherently influences and limits our attempts to understand the nature of reality-that our claims about what exists are, in fact, merely a reflection of how we happen to speak or think. The Language of Ontology collects chapters from established participants in the debate alongside new voices, to explore the range of issues relating to our ability or inability to get beyond the limits of our language.

Linguistic entities play a major part in almost all elements of our lives. Despite this, relatively little work exists in philosophy that considers what such entities are. In the work that does focus specifically on the metaphysics of words, the dominant view is type-realism, which posits that words are abstract types, instantiated by concrete tokens. This book argues, however, that type-realism faces a range of problems and that positing abstract types cannot help us to explain a range of ordinary everyday linguistic phenomena.In its place, this book argues in favour of a novel version of nominalism about words, holding that ordinary claims about words are in fact claims about collections of word-tokens only. Through combining nominalism with a trope-bundle metaphysics, this book proposes a 'bundle-nominalist' metaphysics of words, in which word-tokens are analysed as bundles of particular properties, which cluster in repeatable and predictable ways due to the acting of various homeostatic mechanisms. This view is then extended to other linguistic entities, such as morphemes, phonemes, sentences, and languages. The result is a unified metaphysics of linguistic entities, which is argued to be both consistent with linguistic theorising and highly explanatory. Words and Other Linguistic Entities outlines how this 'bundle-nominalist' metaphysics can provide new insights into a range of linguistic phenomena, including linguistic mistakes, linguistic change, and the nature of offensive language, and can help illuminate ongoing debates over the subject matter of linguistics and the evolution of language.

Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also (tend to) hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those who reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments. This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: such as (radical) scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.

Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also (tend to) hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those who reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments. This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: such as (radical) scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.