James B. Wood – författare

Historians have long ignored the military aspect of the wars of religion which raged in France during the late sixteenth century, dismissing the conflicts as aimless or hopelessly confused. In contrast, this meticulously researched analysis of the royal army and its operations during the early civil wars brings warfare back to the centre of the picture. James B. Wood explains the reasons for the initial failure of the monarchy to defeat the Huguenots, and examines how that failure prolonged the conflict. He argues that the nature and outcome of the civil wars can only be explained by the fusion of religious rebellion and incomplete military revolution. This study makes an important contribution to the history of military forces, warfare and society, and will be of great interest to those engaged in the debate over the 'Military Revolution' in early modern Europe.

Historians have long ignored the military aspect of the wars of religion which raged in France during the late sixteenth century, dismissing the conflicts as aimless or hopelessly confused. In contrast, this meticulously researched analysis of the royal army and its operations during the early civil wars brings warfare back to the centre of the picture. James B. Wood explains the reasons for the initial failure of the monarchy to defeat the Huguenots, and examines how that failure prolonged the conflict. He argues that the nature and outcome of the civil wars can only be explained by the fusion of religious rebellion and incomplete military revolution. This study makes an important contribution to the history of military forces, warfare and society, and will be of great interest to those engaged in the debate over the 'Military Revolution' in early modern Europe.

Reconstructing the collective experience of an entire provincial nobility over a period of more than two centuries, James Wood finds current theories about the early modernFrench nobility inadequate. Concentrating on socio-economic structures and changes, he analyzes the composition and way of life of all the nobles--poor and prosperous, obscure and notable--who lived in the election of Bayeux between the mid-fifteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries. Combining a regional historical perspective with the methods of quantitative social history, Professor Wood demonstrates the broader significance of his findings for general historical interpretations of the nobility and of early modern France as well. Originally published in 1980. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions.The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Reconstructing the collective experience of an entire provincial nobility over a period of more than two centuries, James Wood finds current theories about the early modernFrench nobility inadequate. Concentrating on socio-economic structures and changes, he analyzes the composition and way of life of all the nobles--poor and prosperous, obscure and notable--who lived in the election of Bayeux between the mid-fifteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries. Combining a regional historical perspective with the methods of quantitative social history, Professor Wood demonstrates the broader significance of his findings for general historical interpretations of the nobility and of early modern France as well. Originally published in 1980. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions.The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In this provocative history, James B. Wood challenges the received wisdom that Japan's defeat in the Pacific was historically inevitable. He argues instead that it was only when the Japanese military prematurely abandoned its original sound strategic plan—to secure the resources Japan needed and establish a viable defensible perimeter for the Empire—that the Allies were able to regain the initiative and lock Japanese forces into a war of attrition they were not prepared to fight. The book persuasively shows how the Japanese army and navy had both the opportunity and the capability to have fought a different and more successful war in the Pacific that could have influenced the course and outcome of World War II. It is therefore a study both of Japanese defeat and of what was needed to achieve a potential Japanese victory, or at the very least, to avoid total ruin. Wood's argument does not depend on signal individual historical events or dramatic accidents. Instead it examines how familiar events could have become more complicated or problematic under different, but nevertheless historically possible, conditions due to changes in the complex interaction of strategic and operational factors over time. Wood concludes that fighting a different war was well within the capacities of imperial Japan. He underscores the fact that the enormous task of achieving total military victory over Japan would have been even more difficult, perhaps too difficult, if the Japanese had waged a different war and the Allies had not fought as skillfully as they did. If Japan had traveled that alternate military road, the outcome of the Pacific War could have differed significantly from that we know so well—and, perhaps a little too complacently, accept.

In this provocative history, James B. Wood challenges the received wisdom that Japan's defeat in the Pacific was historically inevitable. He argues instead that it was only when the Japanese military prematurely abandoned its original sound strategic plan—to secure the resources Japan needed and establish a viable defensible perimeter for the Empire—that the Allies were able to regain the initiative and lock Japanese forces into a war of attrition they were not prepared to fight. The book persuasively shows how the Japanese army and navy had both the opportunity and the capability to have fought a different and more successful war in the Pacific that could have influenced the course and outcome of World War II. It is therefore a study both of Japanese defeat and of what was needed to achieve a potential Japanese victory, or at the very least, to avoid total ruin. Wood's argument does not depend on signal individual historical events or dramatic accidents. Instead it examines how familiar events could have become more complicated or problematic under different, but nevertheless historically possible, conditions due to changes in the complex interaction of strategic and operational factors over time. Wood concludes that fighting a different war was well within the capacities of imperial Japan. He underscores the fact that the enormous task of achieving total military victory over Japan would have been even more difficult, perhaps too difficult, if the Japanese had waged a different war and the Allies had not fought as skillfully as they did. If Japan had traveled that alternate military road, the outcome of the Pacific War could have differed significantly from that we know so well—and, perhaps a little too complacently, accept.

Reconstructing the collective experience of an entire provincial nobility over a period of more than two centuries, James Wood finds current theories about the early modernFrench nobility inadequate. Concentrating on socio-economic structures and changes, he analyzes the composition and way of life of all the nobles--poor and prosperous, obscure and notable--who lived in the election of Bayeux between the mid-fifteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries. Combining a regional historical perspective with the methods of quantitative social history, Professor Wood demonstrates the broader significance of his findings for general historical interpretations of the nobility and of early modern France as well.Originally published in 1980.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In this provocative history, James B. Wood challenges the received wisdom that Japan''s defeat in the Pacific was historically inevitable. He argues instead that it was only when the Japanese military prematurely abandoned its original sound strategic plan—to secure the resources Japan needed and establish a viable defensible perimeter for the Empire—that the Allies were able to regain the initiative and lock Japanese forces into a war of attrition they were not prepared to fight. The book persuasively shows how the Japanese army and navy had both the opportunity and the capability to have fought a different and more successful war in the Pacific that could have influenced the course and outcome of World War II. It is therefore a study both of Japanese defeat and of what was needed to achieve a potential Japanese victory, or at the very least, to avoid total ruin. Wood''s argument does not depend on signal individual historical events or dramatic accidents. Instead it examines how familiar events could have become more complicated or problematic under different, but nevertheless historically possible, conditions due to changes in the complex interaction of strategic and operational factors over time. Wood concludes that fighting a different war was well within the capacities of imperial Japan. He underscores the fact that the enormous task of achieving total military victory over Japan would have been even more difficult, perhaps too difficult, if the Japanese had waged a different war and the Allies had not fought as skillfully as they did. If Japan had traveled that alternate military road, the outcome of the Pacific War could have differed significantly from that we know so well—and, perhaps a little too complacently, accept.