James Harold – författare

Dangerous Art takes up the problem of judging works of art using moral standards. When we think that a work is racist, or morally dangerous, what do we mean? James Harold approaches the topic from two angles. First, he takes up the moral question on its own. What could it mean to say that a work of art (rather than, say, a human being) is immoral? He then steps back and examines how moral evaluation fits into the larger task of evaluating artworks. If an artwork is immoral, what does that tell us about how to value the artwork?By tackling the issue from both sides, Harold demonstrates how many of the reasons previously given for thinking that works of art are immoral do not stand up to careful scrutiny. While many philosophers of art have simply assumed that artworks can be evaluated morally and proceeded as though such assessments were unproblematic, Harold highlights the complexities and difficulties inherent in such evaluations. He argues that even when works of art are rightly condemned from a moral point of view, the relationship between that moral flaw and their value as artworks is complex. He instead defends a moderate, skeptic version of autonomism between morality and aesthetics. Employing figures and ideas from ancient Greece, classical China, and the Harlem Renaissance, as well as William Styron's novel The Confessions of Nat Turner, he argues that we cannot judge artworks in the same way that we judge people on moral grounds. In this sense, we can judge an artwork to be both wicked and beautiful; nothing requires us to judge an artwork more or less valuable aesthetically just because we judge it to be morally bad or good. Taking up complex issues at the intersection of art and ethics, Dangerous Art will appeal to philosophers and students interested in art, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of mind.

Dangerous Art takes up the problem of judging works of art using moral standards. When we think that a work is racist, or morally dangerous, what do we mean? James Harold approaches the topic from two angles. First, he takes up the moral question on its own. What could it mean to say that a work of art (rather than, say, a human being) is immoral? He then steps back and examines how moral evaluation fits into the larger task of evaluating artworks. If an artwork is immoral, what does that tell us about how to value the artwork?By tackling the issue from both sides, Harold demonstrates how many of the reasons previously given for thinking that works of art are immoral do not stand up to careful scrutiny. While many philosophers of art have simply assumed that artworks can be evaluated morally and proceeded as though such assessments were unproblematic, Harold highlights the complexities and difficulties inherent in such evaluations. He argues that even when works of art are rightly condemned from a moral point of view, the relationship between that moral flaw and their value as artworks is complex. He instead defends a moderate, skeptic version of autonomism between morality and aesthetics. Employing figures and ideas from ancient Greece, classical China, and the Harlem Renaissance, as well as William Styron''s novel The Confessions of Nat Turner, he argues that we cannot judge artworks in the same way that we judge people on moral grounds. In this sense, we can judge an artwork to be both wicked and beautiful; nothing requires us to judge an artwork more or less valuable aesthetically just because we judge it to be morally bad or good. Taking up complex issues at the intersection of art and ethics, Dangerous Art will appeal to philosophers and students interested in art, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of mind.

Dangerous Art takes up the problem of judging works of art using moral standards. When we think that a work is racist, or morally dangerous, what do we mean? James Harold approaches the topic from two angles. First, he takes up the moral question on its own. What could it mean to say that a work of art (rather than, say, a human being) is immoral? He then steps back and examines how moral evaluation fits into the larger task of evaluating artworks. If an artwork is immoral, what does that tell us about how to value the artwork?By tackling the issue from both sides, Harold demonstrates how many of the reasons previously given for thinking that works of art are immoral do not stand up to careful scrutiny. While many philosophers of art have simply assumed that artworks can be evaluated morally and proceeded as though such assessments were unproblematic, Harold highlights the complexities and difficulties inherent in such evaluations. He argues that even when works of art are rightly condemned from a moral point of view, the relationship between that moral flaw and their value as artworks is complex. He instead defends a moderate, skeptic version of autonomism between morality and aesthetics. Employing figures and ideas from ancient Greece, classical China, and the Harlem Renaissance, as well as William Styron''s novel The Confessions of Nat Turner, he argues that we cannot judge artworks in the same way that we judge people on moral grounds. In this sense, we can judge an artwork to be both wicked and beautiful; nothing requires us to judge an artwork more or less valuable aesthetically just because we judge it to be morally bad or good. Taking up complex issues at the intersection of art and ethics, Dangerous Art will appeal to philosophers and students interested in art, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of mind.

This volume is about how and whether art can be morally bad (or morally good). Politicians, media pundits, and others frequently complain that particular works of art are morally dangerous, or, sometimes, that particular works are morally edifying (the "great works" of literature, for example). But little attention is often given to the question of what makes art morally good in the first place. This comprehensive volume of forty-five new essays explores a wide variety of historical and theoretical perspectives, looking at different art forms and different problems.Each section of the volume samples a mix of topics that have been widely discussed alongside those that have been less noticed by philosophers. What emerges is a sense of the great variety of different problems and approaches as well as some recurring and overlapping themes. The essays in this volume put forth a deliberate effort to stretch beyond some of the debates and problems most familiar to Anglophone philosophers. Familiar topics and positions have been placed side by side in the volume with new and neglected ones, sometimes suggesting surprising connections and conflicts. The volume is divided into four sections: Historical Perspectives, Theoretical Approaches, Individual Arts, and Problems. Chapters in "Historical Perspectives" cover significant historical and cultural periods in which philosophical debates about ethics and art became salient, from ancient Greece and China to Japan, the Harlem Renaissance, and beyond. These chapters show the wide variety of different concrete practices that were associated with the idea of "art," as well as the great range of approaches to thinking about what constitutes an "ethical" concern. The section on "Theoretical Approaches" takes up questions about the relationship between moral and aesthetic evaluation, moral theories, and the familiar debate between "moralists," "autonomists," and others. The section on "Individual Arts" considers how moral questions arise in distinctive ways for different art forms, including traditional arts such as music, literature, and painting, and newer art forms such as video games. The final section, "Problems," takes up a variety of special ethical problems that arise in the arts, such as forgery, cultural appropriation, and moral learning.

This volume is about how and whether art can be morally bad (or morally good). Politicians, media pundits, and others frequently complain that particular works of art are morally dangerous, or, sometimes, that particular works are morally edifying (the "great works" of literature, for example). But little attention is often given to the question of what makes art morally good in the first place. This comprehensive volume of forty-five new essays explores a wide variety of historical and theoretical perspectives, looking at different art forms and different problems.Each section of the volume samples a mix of topics that have been widely discussed alongside those that have been less noticed by philosophers. What emerges is a sense of the great variety of different problems and approaches as well as some recurring and overlapping themes. The essays in this volume put forth a deliberate effort to stretch beyond some of the debates and problems most familiar to Anglophone philosophers. Familiar topics and positions have been placed side by side in the volume with new and neglected ones, sometimes suggesting surprising connections and conflicts. The volume is divided into four sections: Historical Perspectives, Theoretical Approaches, Individual Arts, and Problems. Chapters in "Historical Perspectives" cover significant historical and cultural periods in which philosophical debates about ethics and art became salient, from ancient Greece and China to Japan, the Harlem Renaissance, and beyond. These chapters show the wide variety of different concrete practices that were associated with the idea of "art," as well as the great range of approaches to thinking about what constitutes an "ethical" concern. The section on "Theoretical Approaches" takes up questions about the relationship between moral and aesthetic evaluation, moral theories, and the familiar debate between "moralists," "autonomists," and others. The section on "Individual Arts" considers how moral questions arise in distinctive ways for different art forms, including traditional arts such as music, literature, and painting, and newer art forms such as video games. The final section, "Problems," takes up a variety of special ethical problems that arise in the arts, such as forgery, cultural appropriation, and moral learning.