Janina Boughey – författare

It is commonly asserted that bills of rights have had a ‘righting’ effect on the principles of judicial review of administrative action and have been a key driver of the modern expansion in judicial oversight of the executive arm of government. A number of commentators have pointed to Australian administrative law as evidence for this ‘righting’ hypothesis. They have suggested that the fact that Australia is an outlier among common law jurisdictions in having neither a statutory nor a constitutional framework to expressly protect human rights explains why Australia alone continues to take an apparently ‘formalist’, ‘legalist’ and ‘conservative’ approach to administrative law. Other commentators and judges, including a number in Canada, have argued the opposite: that bills of rights have the effect of stifling the development of the common law. However, for the most part, all these claims remain just that – there has been limited detailed analysis of the issue, and no detailed comparative analysis of the veracity of the claims. This book analyses in detail the interaction between administrative and human rights law in Australia and Canada, arguing that both jurisdictions have reached remarkably similar positions regarding the balance between judicial and executive power, and between broader fundamental principles including the rule of law, parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching judicial review and human rights.

It is commonly asserted that bills of rights have had a ''righting'' effect on the principles of judicial review of administrative action and have been a key driver of the modern expansion in judicial oversight of the executive arm of government. A number of commentators have pointed to Australian administrative law as evidence for this ''righting'' hypothesis. They have suggested that the fact that Australia is an outlier among common law jurisdictions in having neither a statutory nor a constitutional framework to expressly protect human rights explains why Australia alone continues to take an apparently ''formalist'', ''legalist'' and ''conservative'' approach to administrative law. Other commentators and judges, including a number in Canada, have argued the opposite: that bills of rights have the effect of stifling the development of the common law. However, for the most part, all these claims remain just that – there has been limited detailed analysis of the issue, and no detailed comparative analysis of the veracity of the claims. This book analyses in detail the interaction between administrative and human rights law in Australia and Canada, arguing that both jurisdictions have reached remarkably similar positions regarding the balance between judicial and executive power, and between broader fundamental principles including the rule of law, parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching judicial review and human rights.

It is commonly asserted that bills of rights have had a ''righting'' effect on the principles of judicial review of administrative action and have been a key driver of the modern expansion in judicial oversight of the executive arm of government. A number of commentators have pointed to Australian administrative law as evidence for this ''righting'' hypothesis. They have suggested that the fact that Australia is an outlier among common law jurisdictions in having neither a statutory nor a constitutional framework to expressly protect human rights explains why Australia alone continues to take an apparently ''formalist'', ''legalist'' and ''conservative'' approach to administrative law. Other commentators and judges, including a number in Canada, have argued the opposite: that bills of rights have the effect of stifling the development of the common law. However, for the most part, all these claims remain just that – there has been limited detailed analysis of the issue, and no detailed comparative analysis of the veracity of the claims. This book analyses in detail the interaction between administrative and human rights law in Australia and Canada, arguing that both jurisdictions have reached remarkably similar positions regarding the balance between judicial and executive power, and between broader fundamental principles including the rule of law, parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching judicial review and human rights.

How do you protect rights without a Bill of Rights? Australia does not have a national bill or charter of rights and looks further away than ever from adopting one. But it does have a range of individual elements sourced from common law, statute and the Constitution which, though unsystematic, do provide Australians with some meaningful rights protection. This book outlines and explains the unique human rights journey of Australia. It moves beyond the criticisms long made of the Australian position – that its ''formalism'', ''legalism'' and ''exceptionalism'' compromise its capacity for rights protection – to consider how the many elements of its novel legal structure operate. This book analyses the interlocking legal framework for the protection of rights in Australia. A key theme of the book is that the many different elements of a fragmented scheme can add up to something significant, albeit with significant gaps and flaws like any other legal rights protection framework. It shows how the jumbled influences of a common law heritage, a written constitution, differing paths taken by jurisdictions within a single federal state, statutory and common law innovations and a strong dose of comparative legal influences have led to the unique patchwork of rights protection in Australia. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching in human rights, constitutional and comparative law.

How do you protect rights without a Bill of Rights? Australia does not have a national bill or charter of rights and looks further away than ever from adopting one. But it does have a range of individual elements sourced from common law, statute and the Constitution which, though unsystematic, do provide Australians with some meaningful rights protection. This book outlines and explains the unique human rights journey of Australia. It moves beyond the criticisms long made of the Australian position – that its ‘formalism’, ‘legalism’ and ‘exceptionalism’ compromise its capacity for rights protection – to consider how the many elements of its novel legal structure operate. This book analyses the interlocking legal framework for the protection of rights in Australia. A key theme of the book is that the many different elements of a fragmented scheme can add up to something significant, albeit with significant gaps and flaws like any other legal rights protection framework. It shows how the jumbled influences of a common law heritage, a written constitution, differing paths taken by jurisdictions within a single federal state, statutory and common law innovations and a strong dose of comparative legal influences have led to the unique patchwork of rights protection in Australia. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching in human rights, constitutional and comparative law.

How do you protect rights without a Bill of Rights? Australia does not have a national bill or charter of rights and looks further away than ever from adopting one. But it does have a range of individual elements sourced from common law, statute and the Constitution which, though unsystematic, do provide Australians with some meaningful rights protection. This book outlines and explains the unique human rights journey of Australia. It moves beyond the criticisms long made of the Australian position – that its ''formalism'', ''legalism'' and ''exceptionalism'' compromise its capacity for rights protection – to consider how the many elements of its novel legal structure operate. This book analyses the interlocking legal framework for the protection of rights in Australia. A key theme of the book is that the many different elements of a fragmented scheme can add up to something significant, albeit with significant gaps and flaws like any other legal rights protection framework. It shows how the jumbled influences of a common law heritage, a written constitution, differing paths taken by jurisdictions within a single federal state, statutory and common law innovations and a strong dose of comparative legal influences have led to the unique patchwork of rights protection in Australia. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching in human rights, constitutional and comparative law.

It is commonly asserted that bills of rights have had a ‘righting’ effect on the principles of judicial review of administrative action and have been a key driver of the modern expansion in judicial oversight of the executive arm of government. A number of commentators have pointed to Australian administrative law as evidence for this ‘righting’ hypothesis. They have suggested that the fact that Australia is an outlier among common law jurisdictions in having neither a statutory nor a constitutional framework to expressly protect human rights explains why Australia alone continues to take an apparently ‘formalist’, ‘legalist’ and ‘conservative’ approach to administrative law. Other commentators and judges, including a number in Canada, have argued the opposite: that bills of rights have the effect of stifling the development of the common law. However, for the most part, all these claims remain just that – there has been limited detailed analysis of the issue, and no detailed comparative analysis of the veracity of the claims. This book analyses in detail the interaction between administrative and human rights law in Australia and Canada, arguing that both jurisdictions have reached remarkably similar positions regarding the balance between judicial and executive power, and between broader fundamental principles including the rule of law, parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching judicial review and human rights.

How do you protect rights without a Bill of Rights? Australia does not have a national bill or charter of rights and looks further away than ever from adopting one. But it does have a range of individual elements sourced from common law, statute and the Constitution which, though unsystematic, do provide Australians with some meaningful rights protection. This book outlines and explains the unique human rights journey of Australia. It moves beyond the criticisms long made of the Australian position – that its ‘formalism’, ‘legalism’ and ‘exceptionalism’ compromise its capacity for rights protection – to consider how the many elements of its novel legal structure operate. This book analyses the interlocking legal framework for the protection of rights in Australia. A key theme of the book is that the many different elements of a fragmented scheme can add up to something significant, albeit with significant gaps and flaws like any other legal rights protection framework. It shows how the jumbled influences of a common law heritage, a written constitution, differing paths taken by jurisdictions within a single federal state, statutory and common law innovations and a strong dose of comparative legal influences have led to the unique patchwork of rights protection in Australia. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching in human rights, constitutional and comparative law.