Jeremy Edwards – författare

This book was originally published in 1986. During the decade preceding publication there were a number of significant developments in financial economics and major contributions made both by individuals who could be classified as conventional financial economists and by others who do not fit easily into this category - theoretical microeconomists, public and industrial economists. This volume contains a selection from the papers presented at a conference in Oxford in September 1985 which aimed to bring together a number of the leading participants in this field. The papers in the volume cover a wide range of topics - the efficiency of financial markets, new equity issues, asymmetric corporate taxation and investment, credit rationing, international investment, the foundations of banking theory - but they clearly reflect the main themes in financial economics at the time: the importance of informational asymmetries and of taxation.

This book was originally published in 1986. During the decade preceding publication there were a number of significant developments in financial economics and major contributions made both by individuals who could be classified as conventional financial economists and by others who do not fit easily into this category - theoretical microeconomists, public and industrial economists. This volume contains a selection from the papers presented at a conference in Oxford in September 1985 which aimed to bring together a number of the leading participants in this field. The papers in the volume cover a wide range of topics - the efficiency of financial markets, new equity issues, asymmetric corporate taxation and investment, credit rationing, international investment, the foundations of banking theory - but they clearly reflect the main themes in financial economics at the time: the importance of informational asymmetries and of taxation.

This book analyses the widely-held view of the merits of the 'bank-based' German system of finance for investment, and shows that this view is not supported by evidence from the post-war period. The institutional features of the German system are such that universal banks have control of voting rights at shareholders' meetings due to proxy votes, and they also have representation on companies' supervisory boards. These features are claimed to have two main benefits. One is that the German system reduces asymmetric information problems, enabling banks to supply more external finance to firms at a lower cost, and thus increasing investment. The other is that German banks are able to mould and control managements of firms on behalf of shareholders, and thus ensure that firms are run efficiently. This book assesses whether empirical evidence backs up these claims, and shows that the merits of the German system are largely myths.