Joel Marks – författare

Reason and Ethics defends the theoretical claim that all values are subjective and the practical claim that human affairs can be conducted fruitfully in full awareness of this.Joel Marks goes beyond his previous work defending moral skepticism to question the existence of all objective values. This leads him to suggest a novel answer to the Companions in Guilt argument that the denial of morality would mean relinquishing rationality as well. Marks disarms the argument by conceding the irreality of both morality and logic, but is still able to rescue rationality while dispensing with morality on pragmatic grounds. He then offers a positive account of how life may be lived productively without recourse to attributions and assertions of right and wrong, good and bad, and even truth and falsity.Written in an accessible and engaging style, Reason and Ethics will be of interest to scholars and students working in metaethics as well as to the generally intellectually curious.

Reason and Ethics defends the theoretical claim that all values are subjective and the practical claim that human affairs can be conducted fruitfully in full awareness of this.Joel Marks goes beyond his previous work defending moral skepticism to question the existence of all objective values. This leads him to suggest a novel answer to the Companions in Guilt argument that the denial of morality would mean relinquishing rationality as well. Marks disarms the argument by conceding the irreality of both morality and logic, but is still able to rescue rationality while dispensing with morality on pragmatic grounds. He then offers a positive account of how life may be lived productively without recourse to attributions and assertions of right and wrong, good and bad, and even truth and falsity.Written in an accessible and engaging style, Reason and Ethics will be of interest to scholars and students working in metaethics as well as to the generally intellectually curious.

In this volume, Marks offers a defense of amorality as both philosophically justified and practicably livable. In so doing, the book marks a radical departure from both the new atheism and the mainstream of modern ethical philosophy. While in synch with their underlying aim of grounding human existence in a naturalistic metaphysics, the book takes both to task for maintaining a complacent embrace of morality. Marks advocates wiping the slate clean of outdated connotations by replacing the language of morality with a language of desire.The book begins with an analysis of what morality is and then argues that the concept is not instantiated in reality. Following this, the question of belief in morality is addressed: How would human life be affected if we accepted that morality does not exist? Marks argues that at the very least, a moralist would have little to complain about in an amoral world, and at best we might hope for a world that was more to our liking overall. An extended look at the human encounter with nonhuman animals serves as an illustration of amorality’s potential to make both theoretical and practical headway in resolving heretofore intractable ethical problems.

Ought Implies Kant offers an original defense of the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant, and develops an extension of that theory’s account of moral duty to include direct duties to nonhuman animals. The discussion centers on a critical examination of consequentialism, the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined solely by its consequences. Kantianism, by contrast, claims that the core of ethics is to treat all persons—or, in Joel Marks’s view, all living beings—as ends-in-themselves. The consequentialist criterion would seem to permit, indeed require, violating the dignity of persons (not to mention the dignity of other animals) if this would result in a better outcome. This volume treats the consequentialist challenge to Kantian ethics in several novel ways. To begin with, the utilitarian version of consequentialism is delineated and defended by means of a conceptual device dubbed by the author as the Consequentialist Continuum. Marks then provides an exhaustive and definitive exposition of the relatively neglected Epistemic Objection to utilitarianism. While acknowledging the intuitive appeal of utilitarianism’s core conviction—that we should always do what is for the best—Marks argues that this is an impossible injunction to fulfill, or even to attempt to fulfill, because all of the relevant results of our actions can never be known. Kantianism is then introduced as a viable alternative account of our ethical obligations. Marks argues that Kantianism is well within the scope of normal human competence and conforms equally well to our ethical intuitions once the theory’s proper interpretation is appreciated. However, Kant’s own version must be extended to accommodate the rightful moral consideration we owe to nonhuman animals. Finally, Marks employs the notion of a Consequentialist Illusion to explain utilitarianism’s hold on our moral intuitions, while developing a form of Consequentialist Kantianism to address them.An original and penetrating examination of a central debate

Originally designed for the author's introductory college-course in Ethics, Moral Moments provides an accessible, yet philosophical, study of Ethics. The book's thirty-three short essays focus on the following themes: ethics is not subjective, ethics is relevant to business and everyday life, and 'What is ethics?'. The unique format includes some previously published newspaper op-ed columns that cover everything from everyday life to headline news. The culmination of these essays is a work that argues, against the social scientific spirit of the age, that ethics has a distinct role to play in contemporary decision making. Students and the general public will find Moral Moments' personal and conversational tone refreshing, while teachers will find helpful the many classroom episodes depicted, as well as the accompanying website www.moralmoments.com.

Treats the nature and ethical significance of emotions from a comparative cultural perspective emphasizing Asian traditions.This book broadens the inquiry into emotion to comprehend a comparative cultural outlook. It begins with an overview of recent work in the West, and then proceeds to the main business of scrutinizing various relevant issues from both Asian and comparative perspectives. Finally, Robert Solomon comments and summarizes.

This volume marks the coming into its own of a discipline in philosophy: theory of desire. It presents discussions whose primary focus is on desire, with secondary mention of its implications for ethics, action, emotion, mind, and so forth.

This volume marks the coming into its own of a discipline in philosophy: theory of desire. It presents discussions whose primary focus is on desire, with secondary mention of its implications for ethics, action, emotion, mind, and so forth.

This book argues that moralism is a troublesome emotion of the sort one might seek help with from a psychotherapist. Its focus is on how to disabuse ourselves of the illusion that our values are objective, as well as how to manage the manifestations of its residual presence.This thesis may seem odd at first blush because morality is commonly conceived as an antidote to our baser impulses. Desire makes us want to do something, but the voice of conscience urges us not to. If morality is conceived as a myth, as the author contends, then how shall we conduct our lives? The form of abolitionism put forward by the author goes beyond proposing the mere elimination of moral beliefs, attitudes, vocabulary, and institutions to encouraging their replacement by the rational vetting of our desires. He suggests that moralism, conceived as being motivated by belief in objective values, be treated similarly to, or even as, an emotional problem, akin to, or perhaps even identical to, the sort addressed by anger management programs in psychotherapy. By exposing our beliefs and desires to rational scrutiny, we can achieve our rational goals without the adverse side effects engendered by a fictitious moral overlay.Ethical Health will principally appeal to scholars and students working in meta-ethics and moral psychology and will also be of interest to clinical practitioners and inquiring laypersons.

In this volume, Marks offers a defense of amorality as both philosophically justified and practicably livable. In so doing, the book marks a radical departure from both the new atheism and the mainstream of modern ethical philosophy. While in synch with their underlying aim of grounding human existence in a naturalistic metaphysics, the book takes both to task for maintaining a complacent embrace of morality. Marks advocates wiping the slate clean of outdated connotations by replacing the language of morality with a language of desire.The book begins with an analysis of what morality is and then argues that the concept is not instantiated in reality. Following this, the question of belief in morality is addressed: How would human life be affected if we accepted that morality does not exist? Marks argues that at the very least, a moralist would have little to complain about in an amoral world, and at best we might hope for a world that was more to our liking overall. An extended look at the human encounter with nonhuman animals serves as an illustration of amorality’s potential to make both theoretical and practical headway in resolving heretofore intractable ethical problems.

Calling it “desirism”, Marks illustrates what life and the world would be like if we lived in accordance with our rational desires rather than the dictates of any actual or pretend morality, neither overlaying our desires with moral sanction nor attempting to override them with moral strictures.