Johannes Engelkamp – författare

The book presents in eight chapters our actual knowledge on memory for actions and it gives room to the proponents of the opposing models to develop their view for explaining action memory. In Chapter one, Hubert Zimmer and Ronald Cohen summarize the results of laboratory research on action, i. e. memory for self-performed actions. In Chapter two, Melissa Guynn, Mark McDaniel and Gilles Einstein extend this field on memory for intended actions. They present their view on the prospective memory of actions, and they demonstrate the importance of automatic retrieval in prospective memory. In the following chapter, Johannes Engelkamp presents his motor oriented explanation of action memory. He claims that output processes strongly contribute to memory for performed actions, and that the information which is critical for memory is closely related to the information used in the motor control of overt performance. Reza Kormi-Nouri and Lars-Göran Nilsson (Chapter four) completely disagree with this position. They argue that performing actions may cause specific processes, but that nevertheless action memory is part of a unique episodic memory which stores all types of episodes in a similar way. In the following chapter, Mary Ann Foley and Hilary Ratner put action memory in the broader context of activity memory. Everyday actions are usually performed in social contexts and they are goal-oriented. This aspect is seldom relevant in laboratory research, but the authors show that it is of importance for everyday memory. Then two brief chapters follow in which Nilsson and Kormi-Nouri on the one hand, and Engelkamp on the other hand mutually comment on each others position. In the closing chapter, Hubert Zimmer discusses the presented different attempts in parallel. He is doing this by taking into account the different processes and brain modules which are necessary for a successful control of actions.

Psychological experiments demonstrate that we remember self-performed actions better and more easily than actions performed by others, which we only perceived, or actions which were only reported to us. In everyday life, we remember whether or not we have already performed certain actions. Questions such as "e;Did you get some petrol?"e;, "e;Did you pay the waiter?"e;, "e;Have you posted the letter?"e; as a rule can be answered without difficulty. It would be embarrassing if we could not remember whether or not we had done something. Imagine forgetting that you had just put petrol in the car, and immediately driving to the next gas station to fill up again, or forgetting that you had paid the waiter in a restaurant and trying to pay again.Originally published in 1998. the aim of this book is to explain why we remember our own actions so well. In doing so, it offers a comprehensive survey of research and theory in this field of memory psychology. The author describes the development of this research in the light of recent theory.The broader objective of the book is to contribute to a theory of episodic memory. Although the study of memory for actions was derived from general assumptions about episodic memory, the studies quickly revealed new and surprising memory phenomena. Specific findings of memory for self-performed actions are discussed, which are entirely distinct from the laws of verbal learning. Through the discussion of these new memory phenomena, Memory for Actions makes an important contribution to the development of a general theory of episodic memory.

Psychological experiments demonstrate that we remember self-performed actions better and more easily than actions performed by others, which we only perceived, or actions which were only reported to us. In everyday life, we remember whether or not we have already performed certain actions. Questions such as "e;Did you get some petrol?"e;, "e;Did you pay the waiter?"e;, "e;Have you posted the letter?"e; as a rule can be answered without difficulty. It would be embarrassing if we could not remember whether or not we had done something. Imagine forgetting that you had just put petrol in the car, and immediately driving to the next gas station to fill up again, or forgetting that you had paid the waiter in a restaurant and trying to pay again.Originally published in 1998. the aim of this book is to explain why we remember our own actions so well. In doing so, it offers a comprehensive survey of research and theory in this field of memory psychology. The author describes the development of this research in the light of recent theory.The broader objective of the book is to contribute to a theory of episodic memory. Although the study of memory for actions was derived from general assumptions about episodic memory, the studies quickly revealed new and surprising memory phenomena. Specific findings of memory for self-performed actions are discussed, which are entirely distinct from the laws of verbal learning. Through the discussion of these new memory phenomena, Memory for Actions makes an important contribution to the development of a general theory of episodic memory.

Psychological experiments demonstrate that we remember self-performed actions better and more easily than actions performed by others, which we only perceived, or actions which were only reported to us. In everyday life, we remember whether or not we have already performed certain actions. Questions such as “Did you get some petrol?”, “Did you pay the waiter?”, “Have you posted the letter?” as a rule can be answered without difficulty. It would be embarrassing if we could not remember whether or not we had done something. Imagine forgetting that you had just put petrol in the car, and immediately driving to the next gas station to fill up again, or forgetting that you had paid the waiter in a restaurant and trying to pay again.Originally published in 1998. the aim of this book is to explain why we remember our own actions so well. In doing so, it offers a comprehensive survey of research and theory in this field of memory psychology. The author describes the development of this research in the light of recent theory.The broader objective of the book is to contribute to a theory of episodic memory. Although the study of memory for actions was derived from general assumptions about episodic memory, the studies quickly revealed new and surprising memory phenomena. Specific findings of memory for self-performed actions are discussed, which are entirely distinct from the laws of verbal learning. Through the discussion of these new memory phenomena, Memory for Actions makes an important contribution to the development of a general theory of episodic memory.

This book deals with the conditions and the consequences of the production of different syntactic sentence structures. During the sixties the syntactic structure of sentences was one of the most intensively studied topics in psycholinguistic research. The dominant interest did not, however, lie in the function of syntactic structures but in the ability to understand and to utter them. Later, in the seventies the interest shifted to the semantic structure of sentences. Many studies centred around the structural aspects of the repre­ sentation of knowledge. The leading question was: how can the meaning of an utterance be described? The widely accepted answer was: the central unit of meaning is the proposition. From this point of view, the aim of an utter­ ance is to transmit propositional meaning, and syntactic structure is of inter­ est only insofar as it influences the comprehension of propositional meaning. In this book both aspects, i. e. the syntactic and the semantic structure of sentences have been considered. The dynamic aspects of knowledge use and its relationship to the syntactic structure of sentences are thoroughly analysed and studied empirically. The main question is how semantic knowledge is communicated through syntactic structure. Syntactic structure has causes and consequences. In general we assume that the syntactic structure reflects dynamic aspects of the knowledge base of the speaker and determines dynamic states in the listener.

This book deals with the conditions and the consequences of the production of different syntactic sentence structures. During the sixties the syntactic structure of sentences was one of the most intensively studied topics in psycholinguistic research. The dominant interest did not, however, lie in the function of syntactic structures but in the ability to understand and to utter them. Later, in the seventies the interest shifted to the semantic structure of sentences. Many studies centred around the structural aspects of the repre­ sentation of knowledge. The leading question was: how can the meaning of an utterance be described? The widely accepted answer was: the central unit of meaning is the proposition. From this point of view, the aim of an utter­ ance is to transmit propositional meaning, and syntactic structure is of inter­ est only insofar as it influences the comprehension of propositional meaning. In this book both aspects, i. e. the syntactic and the semantic structure of sentences have been considered. The dynamic aspects of knowledge use and its relationship to the syntactic structure of sentences are thoroughly analysed and studied empirically. The main question is how semantic knowledge is communicated through syntactic structure. Syntactic structure has causes and consequences. In general we assume that the syntactic structure reflects dynamic aspects of the knowledge base of the speaker and determines dynamic states in the listener.

Dieses Lehrbuch gibt einen Überblick über „klassische“ Theorien, Modelle und Studien der Lern- und Gedächtnispsychologie. Darüber hinaus behandelt es das Thema „zielgerichtetes Verhalten“ und wie dieses mit Lern- und Gedächtnisprozessen zusammenhängt. Es dient damit als Einführung in die für das Psychologiestudium zentrale Grundlagenforschung zu Lern- und Gedächtnisprozessen, als Vertiefungslektüre in einigen ausgewählten Teilgebieten sowie als Fundament für die Anwendungsgebiete der Psychologie. Eine Begleit-Website auf www.lehrbuch-psychologie.de bietet Lern-Tools für Studierende und Materialien für Dozenten.

Dieses Lehrbuch gibt einen Überblick über „klassische“ Theorien, Modelle und Studien der Lern- und Gedächtnispsychologie. Darüber hinaus behandelt es das Thema „zielgerichtetes Verhalten“ und wie dieses mit Lern- und Gedächtnisprozessen zusammenhängt. Es dient damit als Einführung in die für das Psychologiestudium zentrale Grundlagenforschung zu Lern- und Gedächtnisprozessen, als Vertiefungslektüre in einigen ausgewählten Teilgebieten sowie als Fundament für die Anwendungsgebiete der Psychologie. Eine Begleit-Website auf www.lehrbuch-psychologie.de bietet Lern-Tools für Studierende und Materialien für Dozenten.

The locus of concreteness effects in memory for verbal materials has been described here in terms of the processing of shared and distinctive information. This theoretical view is consistent with a variety of findings previously taken as support for dual coding, insofar as both verbal and perceptual information may be involved in comprehending high-imagery sentences and in learning lists of concrete words. But going beyond previous accounts of imagery, this view also can provide explanations for several findings that appear contradictory to the thesis that concrete and abstract materials differ in the form of their storage in long-term memory. Although this does not rule out a role for imagery in list learning or text comprehension, it is clear that the complex processes involved in comprehension and memory for language go beyond mechanisms supplied by a theory based on the availability of modality-specific mental representations. The task now is to determine the viability of the theory in other domains. Several domains of imagery research presented at EWIC provided fertile ground for evaluating my theoretical viewpoint. Although not all provide a basis for distinguishing representational theories of imagery from the imagery as process view, there are data in several areas that are more consistent with the latter than the former. In other cases, there are at least potential sources of evidence that would allow such a distinction.