M. Denis – författare

This book represents the research efforts of individuals whose scientific expertise lies in reflection on what Sartre described as reflective acts. Theory in the cognitive psychology of mental imagery, endeavors not only being able to describe the contents and nature of mental imagery, but also being able to understand the underlying functional cognition. Psychologists need not solely rely on the techniques of introspection, and the last two decades have seen highly creative developments in techniques for eliciting behavioural data to be complemented by introspective reports.This level of sophistication has provided singular insights into the relationship between imagery and other consequential and universal aspects of human cognition: perception, memory, verbal processes and problem solving. The recognition that imagery, despite its ubiquitous nature, differs between individuals both in prevalence and in kind, and the dramatic rise in cognitive science has provided the additional potential for integrating our understanding of cognitive function with our understanding of neuroanatomy and of computer science. All of these relationships, developments and issues are dealt with in detail in this book, by some of the most distinguished authors in imagery research, working at present in both Europe and the USA.

This book represents the research efforts of individuals whose scientific expertise lies in reflection on what Sartre described as reflective acts. Theory in the cognitive psychology of mental imagery, endeavors not only being able to describe the contents and nature of mental imagery, but also being able to understand the underlying functional cognition. Psychologists need not solely rely on the techniques of introspection, and the last two decades have seen highly creative developments in techniques for eliciting behavioural data to be complemented by introspective reports.

This level of sophistication has provided singular insights into the relationship between imagery and other consequential and universal aspects of human cognition: perception, memory, verbal processes and problem solving. The recognition that imagery, despite its ubiquitous nature, differs between individuals both in prevalence and in kind, and the dramatic rise in cognitive science has provided the additional potential for integrating our understanding of cognitive function with our understanding of neuroanatomy and of computer science. All of these relationships, developments and issues are dealt with in detail in this book, by some of the most distinguished authors in imagery research, working at present in both Europe and the USA.

The locus of concreteness effects in memory for verbal materials has been described here in terms of the processing of shared and distinctive information. This theoretical view is consistent with a variety of findings previously taken as support for dual coding, insofar as both verbal and perceptual information may be involved in comprehending high-imagery sentences and in learning lists of concrete words. But going beyond previous accounts of imagery, this view also can provide explanations for several findings that appear contradictory to the thesis that concrete and abstract materials differ in the form of their storage in long-term memory. Although this does not rule out a role for imagery in list learning or text comprehension, it is clear that the complex processes involved in comprehension and memory for language go beyond mechanisms supplied by a theory based on the availability of modality-specific mental representations. The task now is to determine the viability of the theory in other domains. Several domains of imagery research presented at EWIC provided fertile ground for evaluating my theoretical viewpoint. Although not all provide a basis for distinguishing representational theories of imagery from the imagery as process view, there are data in several areas that are more consistent with the latter than the former. In other cases, there are at least potential sources of evidence that would allow such a distinction.