Kevin Jung – författare

It is often assumed that the law and religion address different spheres of human life. Religion and ethics articulate complex systems of moral reasoning that concern norms, deliberation of ends, cultivation of disposition, and transformation of moral agency. Law, in contrast, seeks to govern human conduct through procedural justice, rights, and public good. Doing Justice to Mercy challenges this assumption by presenting the reader with an urgent conversation between the law and religion that yields a constructive approach, both theoretically and practically, to the complex role of mercy in our legal process.

Authored by legal practitioners, activists, and theorists in addition to theologians and ethicists, the essays collected here are informed by timeless principles, and yet they could not be timelier. The trend in sentencing moves toward an increased severity, and the number of incarcerated people in the United States is at an all-time high. In the half-decade since 9/11, moreover, homeland security has established itself as a permanent fixture in our lives. In this atmosphere, the current volume seeks initially to clarify how justice and mercy intertwine in relation to a number of issues, such as rehabilitation, the death penalty, domestic violence, and war crimes. Exploring the legal, philosophical, and theological grounds for mercy in our courts, the discussion then moves to the practical ways in which mercy may be implemented.

Contributors:Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project * Lois Gehr Livezey, McCormick Theological Seminary * Ernie Lewis, Public Advocate, Commonwealth of Kentucky * Jonathan Rothchild, Loyola Marymount University * Albert W. Alschuler, Northwestern University School of Law * David Scheffer, Northwestern University School of Law * David Little, Harvard Divinity School * Matthew Myer Boulton, Andover Newton Theological School * Mark Lewis Taylor, Princeton Theological Seminary * Sarah Coakley, Cambridge University * William Schweiker, University of Chicago Divinity School * Kevin Jung, College of William and Mary * Peter J. Paris, Princeton Theological Seminary * W. Clark Gilpin, University of Chicago Divinity School * William C. Placher, Wabash College

Christian Ethics and Commonsense Morality goes against the grain of various postmodern approaches to morality in contemporary religious ethics. In this book, Jung seeks to provide a new framework in which the nature of common Christian moral beliefs and practices can be given a new meaning. He suggests that, once major philosophical assumptions behind postmodern theories of morality are called into question, we may look at Christian morality in quite a different light. On his account, Christian morality is a historical morality insofar as it is rooted in the rich historical traditions of the Christian church. Yet this kind of historical dependence does not entail the evidential dependence of all moral beliefs on historical traditions. It is possible to argue for the epistemic autonomy of moral beliefs, according to which Christian and other moral beliefs can be justified independently of their historical sources. The particularity of Christian morality lies not in its particular historical sources that also function as the grounds of justification, but rather in its explanatory and motivational capacity to further articulate the kind of moral knowledge that is readily available to most human beings and to enable people to act upon their moral knowledge.

Christian Ethics and Commonsense Morality goes against the grain of various postmodern approaches to morality in contemporary religious ethics. In this book, Jung seeks to provide a new framework in which the nature of common Christian moral beliefs and practices can be given a new meaning. He suggests that, once major philosophical assumptions behind postmodern theories of morality are called into question, we may look at Christian morality in quite a different light. On his account, Christian morality is a historical morality insofar as it is rooted in the rich historical traditions of the Christian church. Yet this kind of historical dependence does not entail the evidential dependence of all moral beliefs on historical traditions. It is possible to argue for the epistemic autonomy of moral beliefs, according to which Christian and other moral beliefs can be justified independently of their historical sources. The particularity of Christian morality lies not in its particular historical sources that also function as the grounds of justification, but rather in its explanatory and motivational capacity to further articulate the kind of moral knowledge that is readily available to most human beings and to enable people to act upon their moral knowledge.

In metaethics, there is a divide between those who believe that there exist moral facts independently of human interests and attitudes (i.e., moral realists) and those who don’t (i.e., antirealists). In the last half century, the field of religious ethics has been inundated with various antirealist schools of moral thought. Though there is a wide spectrum of different positons within antirealism, a majority of antirealist religious ethicists tend to see moral belief as an historically dependent social construction. This has created an environment where doing religious ethics in any metaphysically substantial sense is often seen not only as out of fashion but also as philosophically implausible.

However, there is a lack of clarity as to what antirealists exactly mean by "construction" and what arguments they would use to support their views. Religious Ethics and Constructivism brings together a diverse group of scholars who represent different philosophical and theological outlooks to discuss the merits of constructivism vis-à-vis religious ethics. The essays explore four different kinds of constructivism in metaethics: social (or Hegelian) constructivism, Kantian constructivism, Humean constructivism, and theological constructivism. The overall aim of these essays is to foster dialogue between religious ethicists and moral philosophers, and to open the field religious ethics to the insights that can be provided by contemporary metaethics.

In metaethics, there is a divide between those who believe that there exist moral facts independently of human interests and attitudes (i.e., moral realists) and those who don’t (i.e., antirealists). In the last half century, the field of religious ethics has been inundated with various antirealist schools of moral thought. Though there is a wide spectrum of different positons within antirealism, a majority of antirealist religious ethicists tend to see moral belief as an historically dependent social construction. This has created an environment where doing religious ethics in any metaphysically substantial sense is often seen not only as out of fashion but also as philosophically implausible.

However, there is a lack of clarity as to what antirealists exactly mean by "construction" and what arguments they would use to support their views. Religious Ethics and Constructivism brings together a diverse group of scholars who represent different philosophical and theological outlooks to discuss the merits of constructivism vis-à-vis religious ethics. The essays explore four different kinds of constructivism in metaethics: social (or Hegelian) constructivism, Kantian constructivism, Humean constructivism, and theological constructivism. The overall aim of these essays is to foster dialogue between religious ethicists and moral philosophers, and to open the field religious ethics to the insights that can be provided by contemporary metaethics.