Philosophers across many traditions have long theorized about the relationship between prudence and morality. Few clear answers have emerged, however, in large part because of the inherently speculative nature of traditional philosophical methods. This book aims to forge a bold new path forward, outlining a theory of prudence and morality that unifies a wide variety of findings in neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing.

The author summarizes the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality, showing how human moral and prudential cognition and motivation are known to involve over a dozen brain regions and capacities. He then outlines a detailed philosophical theory of prudence and morality based on neuroscience and lived human experience. The result demonstrates how this theory coheres with and explains the behavioral neuroscience, showing how each brain region and capacity interact to give rise to prudential and moral behavior.

Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory will be of interest to philosophers and psychologists working in moral psychology, neuroethics, and decision theory.

Chapter 3 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Philosophers across many traditions have long theorized about the relationship between prudence and morality. Few clear answers have emerged, however, in large part because of the inherently speculative nature of traditional philosophical methods. This book aims to forge a bold new path forward, outlining a theory of prudence and morality that unifies a wide variety of findings in neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing.

The author summarizes the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality, showing how human moral and prudential cognition and motivation are known to involve over a dozen brain regions and capacities. He then outlines a detailed philosophical theory of prudence and morality based on neuroscience and lived human experience. The result demonstrates how this theory coheres with and explains the behavioral neuroscience, showing how each brain region and capacity interact to give rise to prudential and moral behavior.

Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory will be of interest to philosophers and psychologists working in moral psychology, neuroethics, and decision theory.

Chapter 3 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Conservatives and progressives rarely agree on much—but one thing many agree upon is that it’s not OK to be a moderate. This book shows they are wrong.

In Why It’s OK to be a Moderate, Marcus Arvan shows how many of history’s worst evils have resulted from far-right and far-left radicalism, how escalating conflicts between conservatives and progressives are undermining democracy, and how many widely hailed social and political achievements have been achieved by moderates and radicals working in constructive tension with each other.

Using philosophy, science, and historical analysis, Arvan shows that critics of moderates tend to equate them with spineless centrists, but that most moderates aren’t centrists, falling into diverse categories across the political spectrum. Arvan then shows that although radicals tend to be popular in their era, many of them have gone down in infamy, while many moderates, like Abraham Lincoln or Clement Attlee, have endured short-term unpopularity to “make history.”

Arvan shows that it’s OK to be a moderate precisely because not everyone should be one. He makes this case to you, showing that whatever your reasonable political ideology may be, things tend to go best politically when radicals and moderates effectively complement each other’s virtues while counterbalancing the other’s vices.

Key Features

Conservatives and progressives rarely agree on much—but one thing many agree upon is that it’s not OK to be a moderate. This book shows they are wrong.

In Why It’s OK to be a Moderate, Marcus Arvan shows how many of history’s worst evils have resulted from far-right and far-left radicalism, how escalating conflicts between conservatives and progressives are undermining democracy, and how many widely hailed social and political achievements have been achieved by moderates and radicals working in constructive tension with each other.

Using philosophy, science, and historical analysis, Arvan shows that critics of moderates tend to equate them with spineless centrists, but that most moderates aren’t centrists, falling into diverse categories across the political spectrum. Arvan then shows that although radicals tend to be popular in their era, many of them have gone down in infamy, while many moderates, like Abraham Lincoln or Clement Attlee, have endured short-term unpopularity to “make history.”

Arvan shows that it’s OK to be a moderate precisely because not everyone should be one. He makes this case to you, showing that whatever your reasonable political ideology may be, things tend to go best politically when radicals and moderates effectively complement each other’s virtues while counterbalancing the other’s vices.

Key Features

Philosophers across many traditions have long theorized about the relationship between prudence and morality. Few clear answers have emerged, however, in large part because of the inherently speculative nature of traditional philosophical methods. This book aims to forge a bold new path forward, outlining a theory of prudence and morality that unifies a wide variety of findings in neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing.

The author summarizes the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality, showing how human moral and prudential cognition and motivation are known to involve over a dozen brain regions and capacities. He then outlines a detailed philosophical theory of prudence and morality based on neuroscience and lived human experience. The result demonstrates how this theory coheres with and explains the behavioral neuroscience, showing how each brain region and capacity interact to give rise to prudential and moral behavior.

Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory will be of interest to philosophers and psychologists working in moral psychology, neuroethics, and decision theory.

Chapter 3 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Philosophers across many traditions have long theorized about the relationship between prudence and morality. Few clear answers have emerged, however, in large part because of the inherently speculative nature of traditional philosophical methods. This book aims to forge a bold new path forward, outlining a theory of prudence and morality that unifies a wide variety of findings in neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing.

The author summarizes the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality, showing how human moral and prudential cognition and motivation are known to involve over a dozen brain regions and capacities. He then outlines a detailed philosophical theory of prudence and morality based on neuroscience and lived human experience. The result demonstrates how this theory coheres with and explains the behavioral neuroscience, showing how each brain region and capacity interact to give rise to prudential and moral behavior.

Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory will be of interest to philosophers and psychologists working in moral psychology, neuroethics, and decision theory.

Chapter 3 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Conservatives and progressives rarely agree on much—but one thing many agree upon is that it’s not OK to be a moderate. This book shows they are wrong.

In Why It’s OK to be a Moderate, Marcus Arvan shows how many of history’s worst evils have resulted from far-right and far-left radicalism, how escalating conflicts between conservatives and progressives are undermining democracy, and how many widely hailed social and political achievements have been achieved by moderates and radicals working in constructive tension with each other.

Using philosophy, science, and historical analysis, Arvan shows that critics of moderates tend to equate them with spineless centrists, but that most moderates aren’t centrists, falling into diverse categories across the political spectrum. Arvan then shows that although radicals tend to be popular in their era, many of them have gone down in infamy, while many moderates, like Abraham Lincoln or Clement Attlee, have endured short-term unpopularity to “make history.”

Arvan shows that it’s OK to be a moderate precisely because not everyone should be one. He makes this case to you, showing that whatever your reasonable political ideology may be, things tend to go best politically when radicals and moderates effectively complement each other’s virtues while counterbalancing the other’s vices.

Key Features

Conservatives and progressives rarely agree on much—but one thing many agree upon is that it’s not OK to be a moderate. This book shows they are wrong.

In Why It’s OK to be a Moderate, Marcus Arvan shows how many of history’s worst evils have resulted from far-right and far-left radicalism, how escalating conflicts between conservatives and progressives are undermining democracy, and how many widely hailed social and political achievements have been achieved by moderates and radicals working in constructive tension with each other.

Using philosophy, science, and historical analysis, Arvan shows that critics of moderates tend to equate them with spineless centrists, but that most moderates aren’t centrists, falling into diverse categories across the political spectrum. Arvan then shows that although radicals tend to be popular in their era, many of them have gone down in infamy, while many moderates, like Abraham Lincoln or Clement Attlee, have endured short-term unpopularity to “make history.”

Arvan shows that it’s OK to be a moderate precisely because not everyone should be one. He makes this case to you, showing that whatever your reasonable political ideology may be, things tend to go best politically when radicals and moderates effectively complement each other’s virtues while counterbalancing the other’s vices.

Key Features