Maximilian Kiener – författare

The philosophical inquiry of responsibility is a major and fast-growing field. It not only features questions around free will and moral agency but also addresses various challenges in the social, institutional, and legal contexts in which people are being held responsible.The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility is an outstanding survey and exploration of these issues. Comprised of forty-one chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook is divided into three clear parts – on the history, the theory, and the practice of responsibility – within which the following key topics are examined:responsibility and wrongdoingresponsibility and determinismthe scope of responsibilitythe responsibility of individuals within societythe concepts of responsibilitythe conditions and challenges of responsibilitythe practices of being and holding responsiblethe ethics and politics of responsibilityresponsibility in the lawIncluding suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility provides an extremely useful guide to the topic. It will be valuable reading for students and researchers in philosophy and applied ethics, as well as for those in related fields such as politics, law, and policymaking.

The philosophical inquiry of responsibility is a major and fast-growing field. It not only features questions around free will and moral agency but also addresses various challenges in the social, institutional, and legal contexts in which people are being held responsible.The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility is an outstanding survey and exploration of these issues. Comprised of forty-one chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook is divided into three clear parts – on the history, the theory, and the practice of responsibility – within which the following key topics are examined:responsibility and wrongdoingresponsibility and determinismthe scope of responsibilitythe responsibility of individuals within societythe concepts of responsibilitythe conditions and challenges of responsibilitythe practices of being and holding responsiblethe ethics and politics of responsibilityresponsibility in the lawIncluding suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility provides an extremely useful guide to the topic. It will be valuable reading for students and researchers in philosophy and applied ethics, as well as for those in related fields such as politics, law, and policymaking.

Voluntariness is a necessary condition of valid consent. But determining whether a person consented voluntarily can be difficult, especially when people are subjected to coercion or manipulation, placed in a situation with no acceptable alternative other than to consent to something, or find themselves in an abusive relationship.This book presents a novel view on the voluntariness of consent, especially medical consent, which the author calls Interpersonal Consenter-Consentee Justification (ICCJ). According to this view, consent is voluntary if and only if the process by which it has been obtained aligns with specific principles of interpersonal justification. ICCJ is distinctive because it explains voluntary consent neither as a ‘psychological’ concept indicative of the inner states of a person’s mind (e.g. willingness or reluctance) nor as a ‘circumstantial’ concept indicative of a person’s set of options. Rather, ICCJ explains the voluntariness of consent as an ‘interpersonal’ concept focusing on the interaction between the person giving consent and the person receiving it and requiring the absence of illegitimate control by the consent-receiver. In so doing, ICCJ further develops the notion of interpersonal justification, known from contractualist theories in moral philosophy, and introduces it to the debate on consent. The author employs a top-down approach, defending ICCJ’s key characteristics on the basis of general theoretical arguments, as well as a bottom-up approach, supporting ICCJ in its application to clinical challenges such as nudging and manipulation, living organ donation, and clinical trials.Voluntary Consent will appeal to researchers and advanced students in normative ethics, bioethics, philosophy of law, behavioural psychology, and medicine.

Voluntariness is a necessary condition of valid consent. But determining whether a person consented voluntarily can be difficult, especially when people are subjected to coercion or manipulation, placed in a situation with no acceptable alternative other than to consent to something, or find themselves in an abusive relationship.This book presents a novel view on the voluntariness of consent, especially medical consent, which the author calls Interpersonal Consenter-Consentee Justification (ICCJ). According to this view, consent is voluntary if and only if the process by which it has been obtained aligns with specific principles of interpersonal justification. ICCJ is distinctive because it explains voluntary consent neither as a ‘psychological’ concept indicative of the inner states of a person’s mind (e.g. willingness or reluctance) nor as a ‘circumstantial’ concept indicative of a person’s set of options. Rather, ICCJ explains the voluntariness of consent as an ‘interpersonal’ concept focusing on the interaction between the person giving consent and the person receiving it and requiring the absence of illegitimate control by the consent-receiver. In so doing, ICCJ further develops the notion of interpersonal justification, known from contractualist theories in moral philosophy, and introduces it to the debate on consent. The author employs a top-down approach, defending ICCJ’s key characteristics on the basis of general theoretical arguments, as well as a bottom-up approach, supporting ICCJ in its application to clinical challenges such as nudging and manipulation, living organ donation, and clinical trials.Voluntary Consent will appeal to researchers and advanced students in normative ethics, bioethics, philosophy of law, behavioural psychology, and medicine.

This book introduces a novel puzzle, the 'Lorry Driver Paradox', to advance our understanding of moral responsibility beyond current paradigms, to connect moral philosophy and legal scholarship in new ways, and to break new ground in the ethics of AI. Part 1 introduces the Lorry Driver Paradox as a set of three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. It then develops and defends the concept of strict moral answerability as the most effective solution, making it the central idea of the book, alongside an account of how ‘taking responsibility’ could amount to a new, hitherto neglected normative power and an exploration of the significance of apologies in our social practices.Part 2 extends this discussion to the context of artificial intelligence, proposing a major shift in how we currently think about responsibility and AI. It challenges the conventional notion of AI-generated ‘responsibility gaps’ and, instead, proposes the idea of ‘responsibility abundance’. This reframing, it is argued, offers distinct theoretical, dialectical, and practical advantages.Significant parts of these arguments draw on legal scholarship, particularly considerations about reverse burdens of proof in criminal law and the waiving of state immunity in public international law. On these grounds, the book also pursues the methodological idea of a ‘legal lead’, that is, the idea that we can advance our understanding of moral responsibility by investigating (selected aspects of) legal responsibility, and not just the other way around.