Newton C. A. da Costa – författare

In the past thirty years, two fundamental issues have emerged in the philosophy of science. One concerns the appropriate attitude we should take towards scientific theories--whether we should regard them as true or merely empirically adequate, for example. The other concerns the nature of scientific theories and models and how these might best be represented. In this ambitious book, da Costa and French bring these two issues together by arguing that theories and models should be regarded as partially rather than wholly true. They adopt a framework that sheds new light on issues to do with belief, theory acceptance, and the realism-antirealism debate. The new machinery of "partial structures" that they develop offers a new perspective from which to view the nature of scientific models and their heuristic development. Their conclusions will be of wide interest to philosophers and historians of science.

Da Costa and French explore the consequences of adopting a "pragmatic" notion of truth in the philosophy of science--in other words, accepting a theory as valid when it may only be partially true rather than wholly true. Their framework sheds new light on issues dealing with belief, theory acceptance, and the realism-antirealism debate, as well as the nature of scientific models and their heuristic development.

In the past thirty years, two fundamental issues have emerged in the philosophy of science. One concerns the appropriate attitude we should take towards scientific theories--whether we should regard them as true or merely empirically adequate, for example. The other concerns the nature of scientific theories and models and how these might best be represented. In this ambitious book, da Costa and French bring these two issues together by arguing that theories and models should be regarded as partially rather than wholly true. They adopt a framework that sheds new light on issues to do with belief, theory acceptance, and the realism-antirealism debate. The new machinery of "partial structures" that they develop offers a new perspective from which to view the nature of scientific models and their heuristic development. Their conclusions will be of wide interest to philosophers and historians of science.

This book explores the premise that a physical theory is an interpretation of the analytico–canonical formalism. Throughout the text, the investigation stresses that classical mechanics in its Lagrangian formulation is the formal backbone of theoretical physics. The authors start from a presentation of the analytico–canonical formalism for classical mechanics, and its applications in electromagnetism, Schrödinger's quantum mechanics, and field theories such as general relativity and gauge field theories, up to the Higgs mechanism.The analysis uses the main criterion used by physicists for a theory: to formulate a physical theory we write down a Lagrangian for it. A physical theory is a particular instance of the Lagrangian functional. So, there is already an unified physical theory. One only has to specify the corresponding Lagrangian (or Lagrangian density); the dynamical equations are the associated Euler–Lagrange equations. The theory of Suppes predicates as the main tool inthe axiomatization and examples from the usual theories in physics. For applications, a whole plethora of results from logic that lead to interesting, and sometimes unexpected, consequences.This volume looks at where our physics happen and which mathematical universe we require for the description of our concrete physical events. It also explores if we use the constructive universe or if we need set–theoretically generic spacetimes.

This book explores the premise that a physical theory is an interpretation of the analytico–canonical formalism. Throughout the text, the investigation stresses that classical mechanics in its Lagrangian formulation is the formal backbone of theoretical physics. The authors start from a presentation of the analytico–canonical formalism for classical mechanics, and its applications in electromagnetism, Schrödinger''s quantum mechanics, and field theories such as general relativity and gauge field theories, up to the Higgs mechanism.

The analysis uses the main criterion used by physicists for a theory: to formulate a physical theory we write down a Lagrangian for it. A physical theory is a particular instance of the Lagrangian functional. So, there is already an unified physical theory. One only has to specify the corresponding Lagrangian (or Lagrangian density); the dynamical equations are the associated Euler–Lagrange equations. The theory of Suppes predicates as the main tool inthe axiomatization and examples from the usual theories in physics. For applications, a whole plethora of results from logic that lead to interesting, and sometimes unexpected, consequences.

This volume looks at where our physics happen and which mathematical universe we require for the description of our concrete physical events. It also explores if we use the constructive universe or if we need set–theoretically generic spacetimes.