Francisco Antonio Doria – författare

Current mathematical models are notoriously unreliable in describing the time evolution of unexpected social phenomena, from financial crashes to revolution. Can such events be forecast? Can we compute probabilities about them? Can we model them? This book investigates and attempts to answer these questions through Gödel's two incompleteness theorems, and in doing so demonstrates how influential Gödel is in modern logical and mathematical thinking. Many mathematical models are applied to economics and social theory, while Gödel's theorems are able to predict their limitations for more accurate analysis and understanding of national and international events.This unique discussion is written for graduate level mathematicians applying their research to the social sciences, including economics, social studies and philosophy, and also for formal logicians and philosophers of science.

This book explores the premise that a physical theory is an interpretation of the analytico–canonical formalism. Throughout the text, the investigation stresses that classical mechanics in its Lagrangian formulation is the formal backbone of theoretical physics. The authors start from a presentation of the analytico–canonical formalism for classical mechanics, and its applications in electromagnetism, Schrödinger's quantum mechanics, and field theories such as general relativity and gauge field theories, up to the Higgs mechanism.The analysis uses the main criterion used by physicists for a theory: to formulate a physical theory we write down a Lagrangian for it. A physical theory is a particular instance of the Lagrangian functional. So, there is already an unified physical theory. One only has to specify the corresponding Lagrangian (or Lagrangian density); the dynamical equations are the associated Euler–Lagrange equations. The theory of Suppes predicates as the main tool inthe axiomatization and examples from the usual theories in physics. For applications, a whole plethora of results from logic that lead to interesting, and sometimes unexpected, consequences.This volume looks at where our physics happen and which mathematical universe we require for the description of our concrete physical events. It also explores if we use the constructive universe or if we need set–theoretically generic spacetimes.

This book explores the premise that a physical theory is an interpretation of the analytico–canonical formalism. Throughout the text, the investigation stresses that classical mechanics in its Lagrangian formulation is the formal backbone of theoretical physics. The authors start from a presentation of the analytico–canonical formalism for classical mechanics, and its applications in electromagnetism, Schrödinger''s quantum mechanics, and field theories such as general relativity and gauge field theories, up to the Higgs mechanism.

The analysis uses the main criterion used by physicists for a theory: to formulate a physical theory we write down a Lagrangian for it. A physical theory is a particular instance of the Lagrangian functional. So, there is already an unified physical theory. One only has to specify the corresponding Lagrangian (or Lagrangian density); the dynamical equations are the associated Euler–Lagrange equations. The theory of Suppes predicates as the main tool inthe axiomatization and examples from the usual theories in physics. For applications, a whole plethora of results from logic that lead to interesting, and sometimes unexpected, consequences.

This volume looks at where our physics happen and which mathematical universe we require for the description of our concrete physical events. It also explores if we use the constructive universe or if we need set–theoretically generic spacetimes.

This book explores the premise that a physical theory is an interpretation of the analytico–canonical formalism. Throughout the text, the investigation stresses that classical mechanics in its Lagrangian formulation is the formal backbone of theoretical physics. The authors start from a presentation of the analytico–canonical formalism for classical mechanics, and its applications in electromagnetism, Schrödinger's quantum mechanics, and field theories such as general relativity and gauge field theories, up to the Higgs mechanism.The analysis uses the main criterion used by physicists for a theory: to formulate a physical theory we write down a Lagrangian for it. A physical theory is a particular instance of the Lagrangian functional. So, there is already an unified physical theory. One only has to specify the corresponding Lagrangian (or Lagrangian density); the dynamical equations are the associated Euler–Lagrange equations. The theory of Suppes predicates as the main tool inthe axiomatization and examples from the usual theories in physics. For applications, a whole plethora of results from logic that lead to interesting, and sometimes unexpected, consequences.This volume looks at where our physics happen and which mathematical universe we require for the description of our concrete physical events. It also explores if we use the constructive universe or if we need set–theoretically generic spacetimes.

This volume presents essays by pioneering thinkers including Tyler Burge, Gregory Chaitin, Daniel Dennett, Barry Mazur, Nicholas Humphrey, John Searle and Ian Stewart. Together they illuminate the Map/Territory Distinction that underlies at the foundation of the scientific method, thought and the very reality itself. It is imperative to distinguish Map from the Territory while analyzing any subject but we often mistake map for the territory. Meaning for the Reference. Computational tool for what it computes. Representations are handy and tempting that we often end up committing the category error of over-marrying the representation with what is represented, so much so that the distinction between the former and the latter is lost. This error that has its roots in the pedagogy often generates a plethora of paradoxes/confusions which hinder the proper understanding of the subject. What are wave functions? Fields? Forces? Numbers? Sets? Classes? Operators? Functions? Alphabets and Sentences? Are they a part of our map (theory/representation)? Or do they actually belong to the territory (Reality)? Researcher, like a cartographer, clothes (or creates?) the reality by stitching multitudes of maps that simultaneously co-exist. A simple apple, for example, can be analyzed from several viewpoints beginning with evolution and biology, all the way down its microscopic quantum mechanical components. Is there a reality (or a real apple) out there apart from these maps? How do these various maps interact/intermingle with each other to produce a coherent reality that we interact with? Or do they not?Does our brain uses its own internal maps to facilitate “physicist/mathematician” in us to construct the maps about the external territories in turn? If so, what is the nature of these internal maps? Are there meta-maps? Evolution definitely fences our perception and thereby our ability to construct maps, revealing to us only those aspects beneficial for our survival. But the question is, to what extent? Is there a way out of the metaphorical Platonic cave erected around us by the nature? While “Map is not the territory” as Alfred Korzybski remarked, join us in this journey to know more, while we inquire on the nature and the reality of the maps which try to map the reality out there. The book also includes a foreword by Sir Roger Penrose and an afterword by Dagfinn Follesdal.

This volume presents essays by pioneering thinkers including Tyler Burge, Gregory Chaitin, Daniel Dennett, Barry Mazur, Nicholas Humphrey, John Searle and Ian Stewart. Together they illuminate the Map/Territory Distinction that underlies at the foundation of the scientific method, thought and the very reality itself. It is imperative to distinguish Map from the Territory while analyzing any subject but we often mistake map for the territory. Meaning for the Reference. Computational tool for what it computes. Representations are handy and tempting that we often end up committing the category error of over-marrying the representation with what is represented, so much so that the distinction between the former and the latter is lost. This error that has its roots in the pedagogy often generates a plethora of paradoxes/confusions which hinder the proper understanding of the subject. What are wave functions? Fields? Forces? Numbers? Sets? Classes? Operators? Functions? Alphabets and Sentences? Are they a part of our map (theory/representation)? Or do they actually belong to the territory (Reality)? Researcher, like a cartographer, clothes (or creates?) the reality by stitching multitudes of maps that simultaneously co-exist. A simple apple, for example, can be analyzed from several viewpoints beginning with evolution and biology, all the way down its microscopic quantum mechanical components. Is there a reality (or a real apple) out there apart from these maps? How do these various maps interact/intermingle with each other to produce a coherent reality that we interact with? Or do they not?Does our brain uses its own internal maps to facilitate “physicist/mathematician” in us to construct the maps about the external territories in turn? If so, what is the nature of these internal maps? Are there meta-maps? Evolution definitely fences our perception and thereby our ability to construct maps, revealing to us only those aspects beneficial for our survival. But the question is, to what extent? Is there a way out of the metaphorical Platonic cave erected around us by the nature? While “Map is not the territory” as Alfred Korzybski remarked, join us in this journey to know more, while we inquire on the nature and the reality of the maps which try to map the reality out there. The book also includes a foreword by Sir Roger Penrose and an afterword by Dagfinn Follesdal.