Per Anders Rudling – författare
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3 produkter
3 produkter
Häftad, Engelska, 2014
794 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Modern Belarusian nationalism emerged in the early twentieth century during a dramatic period that included a mass exodus, multiple occupations, seven years of warfare, and the partition of the Belarusian lands. In this original history, Per Anders Rudling traces the evolution of modern Belarusian nationalism from its origins in late imperial Russia to the early 1930s.The revolution of 1905 opened a window of opportunity, and debates swirled around definitions of ethnic, racial, or cultural belonging. By March of 1918, a small group of nationalists had declared the formation of a Belarusian People’s Republic (BNR), with territories based on ethnographic claims. Less than a year later, the Soviets claimed roughly the same area for a Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR). Belarusian statehood was declared no less than six times between 1918 and 1920. In 1921, the treaty of Riga officially divided the Belarusian lands between Poland and the Soviet Union. Polish authorities subjected Western Belarus to policies of assimilation, alienating much of the population. At the same time, the Soviet establishment of Belarusian-language cultural and educational institutions in Eastern Belarus stimulated national activism in Western Belarus. Sporadic partisan warfare against Polish authorities occurred until the mid-1920s, with Lithuanian and Soviet support. On both sides of the border, Belarusian activists engaged in a process of mythmaking and national mobilization. By 1926, Belarusian political activism had peaked, but then waned when coups d’états brought authoritarian rule to Poland and Lithuania. The year 1927 saw a crackdown on the Western Belarusian national movement, and in Eastern Belarus, Stalin’s consolidation of power led to a brutal transformation of society and the uprooting of Belarusian national communists.As a small group of elites, Belarusian nationalists had been dependent on German, Lithuanian, Polish, and Soviet sponsors since 1915. The geopolitical rivalry provided opportunities, but also liabilities. After 1926, maneuvering this complex and progressively hostile landscape became difficult. Support from Kaunas and Moscow for the Western Belarusian nationalists attracted the interest of the Polish authorities, and the increasingly autonomous republican institutions in Minsk became a concern for the central government in the Kremlin.As Rudling shows, Belarus was a historic battleground that served as a political tool, borderland, and buffer zone between greater powers. Nationalism arrived late, was limited to a relatively small elite, and was suppressed in its early stages. The tumultuous process, however, established the idea of Belarusian statehood, left behind a modern foundation myth, and bequeathed the institutional framework of a proto-state, all of which resurfaced as building blocks for national consolidation when Belarus gained independence in 1991.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2025
2 212 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This volume charts the history of transnational and transatlantic fascism in East Central and Southeastern Europe, a lesser-known phenomenon that occurred throughout the twentieth century into the present.Organizations and individuals in this part of the continent, under the influences of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, conceptualized their own forms of fascism in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Due to the heterogenous nature of East Central Europe, fascism took various forms in the territories that prior to 1918 had belonged to the Habsburg, German, Russian, and Ottoman Empires. As a result, East Central Europe became a mosaic of fascist parties, organizations, and movements. During World War II, East Central and Southeastern European fascisms substantially contributed to collaboration with the Nazis and the genocide of the Jews. During the Cold War, East Central and Southeastern European fascists underwent multifaced aesthetic and ideological transformations in the Soviet Union and its satellites as well as in exile in the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the legacy of fascism re-emerged in the region, informing parts of the ideologies of various neo-fascist, radical nationalist, anti-Semitic, and national conservative parties and movements, as well as motivating communal politicians to erect monuments to fascists, war criminals, and anti-Semites.With comprehensive coverage through a range of essays, this book is a helpful resource to scholars in European history, political history, and the study of fascism.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2026
1 153 kr
Kommande
The end of what the GDR called “real existierender Sozialismus” in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s dramatically changed the geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Five states ceased to exist, whereas 22 new states have been recognized, accompanied by a host of internationally unrecognized states. Nearly half a century of relative stability in Europe was replaced by volatility and insecurity.These geopolitical transformations were accompanied by a fundamental revalorization of political space and the rehabilitation of long-forgotten spatial symbolisms and geopolitical imaginations, from legacies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, concepts of Mitteleuropa, the Saisonsstaaten of 1918, to neo-imperial concepts of the “Russian world” and pan-Turkic neo-Ottomanism. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale assault on Ukraine in 2022 constitute a return of massive imperial violence, rhetorically justified by an intensely political rewriting of history, invoking the imperial past to justify aggression. Legacies of the historical past, which until recently were curiosities, little known beyond smaller groups of specialists, now formed a casus belli.The volume, addressing scholars and others concerned with today’s Europe, contains four sections: its opening section on imperial spaces engages Russia’s attempts at “renegotiate” the international political order, an end of liminality in a Russia which “knows no boundaries” (thus Putin). It is followed by a section on the construction of spatial identities on the basis of the Russian Federation leadership’s “renegoting” its liminality. Section three engages the repositioning of Eastern Europe in the wake of Russia’s departure from the international, rule-based legal order. The final section inquiries into the ideological underpinnings of “re-negotiated” geopolitical imaginaries of both perpetrators and victims of this re-imagination of empires.