Robert J. Fogelin – författare

This work, first published in 1985, offers a general interpretation of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Most Hume scholarship has either neglected or downplayed an important aspect of Hume’s position – his scepticism. This book puts that right, examining in close detail the sceptical arguments in Hume’s philosophy.

This work, first published in 1985, offers a general interpretation of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Most Hume scholarship has either neglected or downplayed an important aspect of Hume’s position – his scepticism. This book puts that right, examining in close detail the sceptical arguments in Hume’s philosophy.

No serious philosopher or student of philosophy can afford to neglect Wittgenstein''s work. Professor Fogelin provides an authoritative critical evaluation of both the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, enabling the reader to come to grips with these difficult yet key works.Fogelin explains Wittgenstein''s attempt in the Tractatus to combine a picture theory of propositional structure, and also explores Wittgenstein''s own criticisms of the Tractarian synthesis. He gives particular attention to topics in the philosophy of language, logic, psychology and the foundations of mathematics, examining Wittgenstein''s work on these fields and arguing that Wittgenstein''s criticisms in these areas form the basis for a radically new standpoint in philosophy.

No serious philosopher or student of philosophy can afford to neglect Wittgenstein''s work. Professor Fogelin provides an authoritative critical evaluation of both the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, enabling the reader to come to grips with these difficult yet key works.Fogelin explains Wittgenstein''s attempt in the Tractatus to combine a picture theory of propositional structure, and also explores Wittgenstein''s own criticisms of the Tractarian synthesis. He gives particular attention to topics in the philosophy of language, logic, psychology and the foundations of mathematics, examining Wittgenstein''s work on these fields and arguing that Wittgenstein''s criticisms in these areas form the basis for a radically new standpoint in philosophy.

Originally published in 1967. This is an examination of warrant statements – statements which indicated something about the grounds on behalf of some further judgement, choice or action. The first part of the study is concerned with the role of warrant statements in theoretical discourse; while the second part concerns their role in practical discourse. Also examined are necessity, probability, knowing, seeing and the complex of terms which allow us to introduce an argumentative structure into discourse.

Originally published in 1967. This is an examination of warrant statements – statements which indicated something about the grounds on behalf of some further judgement, choice or action. The first part of the study is concerned with the role of warrant statements in theoretical discourse; while the second part concerns their role in practical discourse. Also examined are necessity, probability, knowing, seeing and the complex of terms which allow us to introduce an argumentative structure into discourse.

Since its publication in the mid-eighteenth century, Hume''s discussion of miracles has been the target of severe and often ill-tempered attacks. In this book, one of our leading historians of philosophy offers a systematic response to these attacks. Arguing that these criticisms have--from the very start--rested on misreadings, Robert Fogelin begins by providing a narrative of the way Hume''s argument actually unfolds. What Hume''s critics (and even some of his defenders) have failed to see is that Hume''s primary argument depends on fixing the appropriate standards of evaluating testimony presented on behalf of a miracle. Given the definition of a miracle, Hume quite reasonably argues that the standards for evaluating such testimony must be extremely high. Hume then argues that, as a matter of fact, no testimony on behalf of a religious miracle has even come close to meeting the appropriate standards for acceptance. Fogelin illustrates that Hume''s critics have consistently misunderstood the structure of this argument--and have saddled Hume with perfectly awful arguments not found in the text. He responds first to some early critics of Hume''s argument and then to two recent critics, David Johnson and John Earman. Fogelin''s goal, however, is not to "bash the bashers," but rather to show that Hume''s treatment of miracles has a coherence, depth, and power that makes it still the best work on the subject.