Robert M. Whaples – författare

Jac C. Heckelman, John C. Moorhouse and Robert Whaples The eight chapters of this volume are revised versions of papers originally presented at the "Applications of Public Choice Theory to Economic History" conference held at Wake Forest University, April 9-10, 1999. They all apply the tools of public choice theory to the types of questions which economic historians have traditionally addressed. By adding the insights of public choice economics to the traditional tools used to understand economic actors and institutions, the authors are able to provide fresh insights about many important issues of American history. 1. DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY Economists have historically sought to develop policies to improve social welfare by correcting perceived market failures due to monopoly power, externalities, and other departures from the textbook case of the purely competitive model. An underlying assumption is that the public sector, upon recognizing the market failure, will act to correct it. Applied work often develops the conditions under which these policies will be optimal. The public choice movement has questioned the false dichotomy established by welfare economists. Economists of all persuasions assume traditional private market actors, such as entrepreneurs, managers, and consumers, are self-interested rational maximizers. Why should this not hold for all economic agents? The innovation of public choice analysis is to show what happens when public sector actors, such as politicians, bureaucrats, and voters, also behave as rational self-interested maximizers.

Jac C. Heckelman, John C. Moorhouse and Robert Whaples The eight chapters of this volume are revised versions of papers originally presented at the "Applications of Public Choice Theory to Economic History" conference held at Wake Forest University, April 9-10, 1999. They all apply the tools of public choice theory to the types of questions which economic historians have traditionally addressed. By adding the insights of public choice economics to the traditional tools used to understand economic actors and institutions, the authors are able to provide fresh insights about many important issues of American history. 1. DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY Economists have historically sought to develop policies to improve social welfare by correcting perceived market failures due to monopoly power, externalities, and other departures from the textbook case of the purely competitive model. An underlying assumption is that the public sector, upon recognizing the market failure, will act to correct it. Applied work often develops the conditions under which these policies will be optimal. The public choice movement has questioned the false dichotomy established by welfare economists. Economists of all persuasions assume traditional private market actors, such as entrepreneurs, managers, and consumers, are self-interested rational maximizers. Why should this not hold for all economic agents? The innovation of public choice analysis is to show what happens when public sector actors, such as politicians, bureaucrats, and voters, also behave as rational self-interested maximizers.

Jac C. Heckelman, John C. Moorhouse and Robert Whaples The eight chapters of this volume are revised versions of papers originally presented at the "Applications of Public Choice Theory to Economic History" conference held at Wake Forest University, April 9-10, 1999. They all apply the tools of public choice theory to the types of questions which economic historians have traditionally addressed. By adding the insights of public choice economics to the traditional tools used to understand economic actors and institutions, the authors are able to provide fresh insights about many important issues of American history. 1. DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY Economists have historically sought to develop policies to improve social welfare by correcting perceived market failures due to monopoly power, externalities, and other departures from the textbook case of the purely competitive model. An underlying assumption is that the public sector, upon recognizing the market failure, will act to correct it. Applied work often develops the conditions under which these policies will be optimal. The public choice movement has questioned the false dichotomy established by welfare economists. Economists of all persuasions assume traditional private market actors, such as entrepreneurs, managers, and consumers, are self-interested rational maximizers. Why should this not hold for all economic agents? The innovation of public choice analysis is to show what happens when public sector actors, such as politicians, bureaucrats, and voters, also behave as rational self-interested maximizers.

Celebrate 30 years of The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy with the acclaimed magazine's highest caliber scholarship by some of the world's leading experts.For over thirty years, The Independent Review has been a beacon of clear, fearless, and wide-ranging scholarshipbringing together some of the sharpest minds in economics, history, law, philosophy, and political thought. Now, for the first time, the most influential and enduring essays from the first 30 years are collected in one volume, offering readers a guided tour of the ideas that continue to shape debates on liberty, markets, and the role of government. Edited by Robert Whaples (Wake Forest University) with contributions from a distinguished team of co-editors, this anthology highlights groundbreaking works from Nobel laureates, renowned scholars, and unorthodox, trailblazing thinkers. From Robert Higgs's seminal essay on ';Regime Uncertainty' to James Buchanan's ';The Soul of Classical Liberalism,' this book boldly tackles timeless questions about human flourishing, political economy, and the struggle between state power and civil society. Whether you are a student discovering these ideas for the first time, a teacher seeking to inspire your classroom, or a lifelong reader of The Independent Review, this collection provides a front-row seat to three decades of intellectual innovation.

As the United States continues its slow recovery from the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians, policymakers and academics are increasingly turning to the lessons of history to gain insight into how we might address both current and future economic challenges. This volume offers contributions by eminent economists and historians, each commenting on the theories of a particular 20th century economist and the ways in which those theories apply to modern economic thought.Presented in rough chronological order of the lives of the featured economists, these chapters tackle a number of major economic issues, including the role of central banks, monetary and fiscal policy, government spending, entrepreneurship and financial innovation. The contributors apply the theories of Walter Bagehot, Thorstein Veblen, John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek to these and other crucial topics, offering both comprehensive historical analysis and vital insights into the modern US and world economies. Two additional chapters on the Great Depression and US monetary and fiscal history round out this critical collection.Students and professors of all economic disciplines will find much to admire in this fascinating volume, as will anyone with an interest in economics both past and present.Contributors: B. Bateman, B. Caldwell, R.N. Langlois, P. Mehrling, R. Prasch, T.J. Sargent, P. Temin, G.P. West III, R.M. Whaples