Stathis Psillos - Böcker

Causal powers are returning to the forefront of realist philosophy of science. Once central features of philosophical thinking about the natures of substances and causes, they were banished during the early modern era and the Scientific Revolution. In this volume, distinguished scholars revisit the fortunes of causal powers as scientific explanatory principles within the theories of substance and cause across history. Each chapter focuses on the philosophical roles causal powers were thought to play at the time, and the reasons offered in support, or against, their coherence and ability to perform these roles. By placing rigorous philosophical analyses of thinking about causal powers within their historical contexts, features of their natures which might remain hidden to contemporary practitioners can be more readily identified and more carefully analyzed. The thoughts of such prominent philosophers as Aristotle, Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan are explored, then on through Suarez, Descartes, and Malebranche, to Locke and Hume, and ultimately to contemporary figures like the logical positivists Goodman and Lewis.

Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it . In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, to instrumentalism and to modern sceptical empiricism.Scientific Realism explains that the history of science does not undermine the arguments for scientific realism, but instead makes it reasonable to accept scientific realism as the best philosophical account of science, its empirical success, its progress and its practice.Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the state of modern science and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book.

Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it . In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, to instrumentalism and to modern sceptical empiricism.Scientific Realism explains that the history of science does not undermine the arguments for scientific realism, but instead makes it reasonable to accept scientific realism as the best philosophical account of science, its empirical success, its progress and its practice.Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the state of modern science and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is an indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science. It contains sixty-two specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers: historical and philosophical context debates concepts the individual sciences.The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science addresses all of the essential topics that students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including chapters on individual sciences (such as biology, chemistry, physics and psychology), further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter.Expanded and revised throughout, this second edition includes new chapters on Conventionalism, Social Epistemology, Computer Simulation, Thought Experiments, Pseudoscience, Species and Taxonomy, and Cosmology.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is an indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science. It contains sixty-two specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers: historical and philosophical context debates concepts the individual sciences.The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science addresses all of the essential topics that students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including chapters on individual sciences (such as biology, chemistry, physics and psychology), further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter.Expanded and revised throughout, this second edition includes new chapters on Conventionalism, Social Epistemology, Computer Simulation, Thought Experiments, Pseudoscience, Species and Taxonomy, and Cosmology.

An alphabetically arranged guide to the philosophy of science.While philosophy of science has always been an integral part of philosophy, since the beginning of the twentieth century it has developed its own structure and its fair share of technical vocabulary and problems. Philosophy of Science A-Z gives concise, accurate and illuminating accounts of key positions, concepts, arguments and figures in the philosophy of science. It aids understanding of current debates, explains their historical development and connects them with broader philosophical issues. It presupposes little prior knowledge of philosophy of science and is equally useful to the beginner, the more advanced student and the general reader. Readers will find in it illuminating explanations, careful analysis, relevant examples, open problems and, last but not least, precise arguments. Philosophy of science is a flourishing discipline and Philosophy of Science A to Z is a practical and imaginative way into and through it.

An alphabetically arranged guide to the philosophy of science.While philosophy of science has always been an integral part of philosophy, since the beginning of the twentieth century it has developed its own structure and its fair share of technical vocabulary and problems. Philosophy of Science A-Z gives concise, accurate and illuminating accounts of key positions, concepts, arguments and figures in the philosophy of science. It aids understanding of current debates, explains their historical development and connects them with broader philosophical issues. It presupposes little prior knowledge of philosophy of science and is equally useful to the beginner, the more advanced student and the general reader. Readers will find in it illuminating explanations, careful analysis, relevant examples, open problems and, last but not least, precise arguments. Philosophy of science is a flourishing discipline and Philosophy of Science A to Z is a practical and imaginative way into and through it.

In recent years what has come to be called the 'New Mechanism' has emerged as a framework for thinking about the philosophical assumptions underlying many areas of science, especially in sciences such as biology, neuroscience, and psychology. This book offers a fresh look at the role of mechanisms, by situating novel analyses of central philosophical issues related to mechanisms within a rich historical perspective of the concept of mechanism as well as detailed case studies of biological mechanisms (such as apoptosis). It develops a new position, Methodological Mechanism, according to which mechanisms are to be viewed as causal pathways that are theoretically described and are underpinned by networks of difference-making relations. In contrast to metaphysically inflated accounts, this study characterises mechanism as a concept-in-use in science that is deflationary and metaphysically neutral, but still methodologically useful and central to scientific practice.

In this book, Stathis Psillos and Thodoris Dimitrakos explore the question: how is empirical, and in particular scientific, knowledge possible? Most philosophers have accepted that some restrictions must be placed on empirical knowledge in order for it to be possible. Yet considerable debate has revolved around the precise nature of such restrictions, above all how knowledge can be said to be a priori.The book traces the development of the concept of the a priori in the philosophy of science, beginning with the Descartes-Newton controversy. The discussion then turns to Leibniz and Hume, Kant’s conception of synthetic a priori principles, and Mill’s radical empiricism, which sought to eliminate the a priori altogether. The book also examines later transformations of the debate, including the emergence of non-Euclidean geometries and their challenge to the Kantian view, Poincaré’s conventionalism, the development of the relativised a priori within logical positivism, and the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity.Building on these historical and philosophical discussions, the authors develop and defend a novel functional conception of the a priori - captured by the idea that "the a priori is as the a priori does" - according to which a priori principles are those that play a constitutive role in scientific theorising while remaining open to revision.An engaging and wide-ranging philosophical investigation of the a priori, this book will be of great interest to students and researchers in philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology and the history of the philosophy of science.

In this book, Stathis Psillos and Thodoris Dimitrakos explore the question: how is empirical, and in particular scientific, knowledge possible? Most philosophers have accepted that some restrictions must be placed on empirical knowledge in order for it to be possible. Yet considerable debate has revolved around the precise nature of such restrictions, above all how knowledge can be said to be a priori.The book traces the development of the concept of the a priori in the philosophy of science, beginning with the Descartes-Newton controversy. The discussion then turns to Leibniz and Hume, Kant’s conception of synthetic a priori principles, and Mill’s radical empiricism, which sought to eliminate the a priori altogether. The book also examines later transformations of the debate, including the emergence of non-Euclidean geometries and their challenge to the Kantian view, Poincaré’s conventionalism, the development of the relativised a priori within logical positivism, and the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity.Building on these historical and philosophical discussions, the authors develop and defend a novel functional conception of the a priori - captured by the idea that "the a priori is as the a priori does" - according to which a priori principles are those that play a constitutive role in scientific theorising while remaining open to revision.An engaging and wide-ranging philosophical investigation of the a priori, this book will be of great interest to students and researchers in philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology and the history of the philosophy of science.

In recent years what has come to be called the 'New Mechanism' has emerged as a framework for thinking about the philosophical assumptions underlying many areas of science, especially in sciences such as biology, neuroscience, and psychology. This book offers a fresh look at the role of mechanisms, by situating novel analyses of central philosophical issues related to mechanisms within a rich historical perspective of the concept of mechanism as well as detailed case studies of biological mechanisms (such as apoptosis). It develops a new position, Methodological Mechanism, according to which mechanisms are to be viewed as causal pathways that are theoretically described and are underpinned by networks of difference-making relations. In contrast to metaphysically inflated accounts, this study characterises mechanism as a concept-in-use in science that is deflationary and metaphysically neutral, but still methodologically useful and central to scientific practice.

What is the nature of causation? How is causation linked with explanation? And can there be an adequate theory of explanation? These questions and many others are addressed in this unified and rigorous examination of the philosophical problems surrounding causation, laws and explanation. Part 1 of this book explores Hume's views on causation, theories of singular causation, and counterfactual and mechanistic approaches. Part 2 considers the regularity view of laws and laws as relations among universals, as well as recent alternative approaches to laws. Part 3 examines the issues arising from deductive-nomological explanation, statistical explanation, the explanation of laws and the metaphysics of explanation. Accessible to readers of all levels, this book provides an excellent introduction to one of the most enduring problems of philosophy.