Stephen Kershnar - Böcker

People consider desert part of our moral world. It structures how we think about important areas such as love, punishment, and work. This book argues that no one deserves anything. If this is correct, then claims that people deserve general and specific things are false.At the heart of desert is the notion of moral credit or discredit. People deserve good things (credit) when they are good people or do desirable things. These desirable things might be right, good, or virtuous acts. People deserve bad things (discredit) when they are bad people or do undesirable things. On some theories, people deserve credit in general terms. For instance, they deserve a good life. On other theories, people deserve credit in specific terms. For instance, they deserve specific incomes, jobs, punishments, relationships, or reputations. The author’s argument against desert rests on three claims:There is no adequate theory of what desert is.Even if there were an adequate theory of what desert is, nothing grounds (justifies) desert.Even if there were an adequate theory of what desert is and something were to ground it, there is no plausible account of what people deserve.Desert Collapses will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in ethics and political philosophy.

People consider desert part of our moral world. It structures how we think about important areas such as love, punishment, and work. This book argues that no one deserves anything. If this is correct, then claims that people deserve general and specific things are false.At the heart of desert is the notion of moral credit or discredit. People deserve good things (credit) when they are good people or do desirable things. These desirable things might be right, good, or virtuous acts. People deserve bad things (discredit) when they are bad people or do undesirable things. On some theories, people deserve credit in general terms. For instance, they deserve a good life. On other theories, people deserve credit in specific terms. For instance, they deserve specific incomes, jobs, punishments, relationships, or reputations. The author’s argument against desert rests on three claims:There is no adequate theory of what desert is.Even if there were an adequate theory of what desert is, nothing grounds (justifies) desert.Even if there were an adequate theory of what desert is and something were to ground it, there is no plausible account of what people deserve.Desert Collapses will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in ethics and political philosophy.

This book looks at a family of views involving the pro-life view of abortion and Christianity. These issues are important because major religious branches (for example, Catholicism and some large branches of Evangelicalism) and leading politicians assert, or are committed to, the following: (a) it is permissible to prevent some people from going to hell, (b) abortion prevents some people from going to hell, and (c) abortion is wrong. They also assert, or are committed to, the following: (d) it is permissible to use defensive violence to prevent people from killing innocents, (e) doctors who perform abortions kill innocents, and (f) it is wrong to use defensive violence against doctors who perform abortions. Stephen Kershnar argues that these and other principles are inconsistent. Along the way, he explores the ways in which theories of hell, right forfeiture, and good consequences relate to each other and the above inconsistencies.

Desert and Virtue: A Theory of Intrinsic Value presents a comprehensive examination of desert and what makes people deserve things. Stephen Kershnar demonstrates how desert relates to virtue, good deeds, moral responsibility, and personal change and growth through the life process. He persuasively argues that desert is a function that relates well-being, intrinsic value, and a "ground," which is defined as a person's character or act. Kershnar also explores whether his theory is consistent with the limited responsibility people have for who they are. Desert and Virtue's insightful analysis will be particularly useful for those interested in philosophy, religion, and other fields that touch on value theory.

Stephen Kershnar’s take on torture is unique for four reasons. First, it provides a distinct analysis of what torture is. Second, it argues that on non-consequentialist grounds, specifically rights-based ones, torture is sometimes permissible. Third, it argues that torturers are not always vicious. Fourth, it argues that it is plausible that these conclusions apply to some real world cases. In short, it fills the following gap: it evaluates torture from a rights-based perspective and finds that in some cases it is permissible.Kershnar’s moral evaluation of torture sharply differs from the rest of the literature. The evaluation focuses on the non-consequentialist approach to morality, that is, it assumes that what makes an action right is not solely whether it brings about the best results. Using the central feature of non-consequentialism, moral rights, Kershnar argues that torture is justified in a number of theoretical contexts, including defense, punishment, and when the person to be tortured consents. He then looks at the actual world and argue that it is plausible to think that there are real-world cases where torture is justified. Kershnar’s analysis also looks at whether torture is virtuous in an attempt to get at what intuitively repels us about torture. His analysis is not only the first look at the issue, but it also ties in with recent developments in virtue theory. As in the analysis of the permissibility of torture, he tries to show that my findings with regard to virtue are not merely of theoretical interest, but are plausible given some real-world cases.

Americans are very grateful to veterans. Veterans are celebrated via speeches, statues, memorials, holidays, and affirmative action. They are lavishly praised in public gatherings and private conversations. Contrary to this widespread attitude, Stephen Kershnar argues that U.S. citizens should not be very grateful to veterans. In evaluating whether the significant gratitude toward veterans is justified, Kershnar begins by exploring the nature of gratitude. He argues that one person should be very grateful to a second person only when the second person reasonably attempted to provide a significant benefit to the first and was primarily motivated by concern for the first’s well-being. Gratitude toward Veterans: Why Americans Should Not Be Very Grateful to Veterans looks at whether veterans typically satisfy these conditions and argues that they do not. The book should be taken seriously not only by scholars in military ethics and ethics in general, but also by anyone interested in the question of how much gratitude is owed to people holding different roles.

On some accounts, punishment is justified by the good results that it brings about. In particular, punishment deters, incapacitates, and may, in some cases, rehabilitate criminals. On a retributivist theory, punishment is not justified on the basis of these desirable results, but rather on the fact that the wrongdoer has done something that deserves punishment. In Desert, Retribution, and Torture, Stephen Kershnar provides an in-depth defense of retributivism. Kershnar then uses this theory to provide support for the notion that very harsh forms of punishment, including torture, are morally justified.

Sex, Discrimination, and Violence is about how the systematic application of some basic principles of applied ethics yields some surprising and very unpopular results. In particular, Stephen Kershnar investigates three areas: sex, discrimination, and violence. In his discussion of sex, he concludes that adult-child sex is not always wrong and that it is not clear that watching rape pornography is bad for the viewer. When discussing discrimination, Kershnar argues for the following startling conclusions: persons of different races on average differ in their value, professional schools may and probably should discriminate against women, and equal opportunity is not worth pursuing. In his discussion of violence, he contends that in some cases governments are morally permitted to use torture in order to interrogate suspected terrorists and may assassinate foreign leaders. These controversial conclusions will no doubt spur animated and thoughtful discussion amongst readers.

Examines whether race-based programs and slavery reparations are justified.Among the most controversial issues in the United States is the question of whether public or private agencies should adopt preferential treatment programs or be required to pay reparations for slavery. Using a carefully reasoned philosophical approach, Stephen Kershnar argues that programs such as affirmative action and calls for slavery reparations are unjust for three reasons. First, the state has a duty to direct resources to those persons who, through their abilities, will benefit most from them. Second, he argues that, in the case of slavery, past injustice-where both the victims and perpetrators are long dead-cannot ground current claims to compensation. As terrible as slavery was, those who claim a right to compensation today owe their existence to it, he reasons, and since the events that bring about a person's existence are normally thought to be beneficial, past injustices do not warrant compensation. Finally, even if past injustices were allowed to serve as the basis of compensation in the present, other variables prevent a reasonable estimation of the amount owed.

Examines whether race-based programs and slavery reparations are justified.Among the most controversial issues in the United States is the question of whether public or private agencies should adopt preferential treatment programs or be required to pay reparations for slavery. Using a carefully reasoned philosophical approach, Stephen Kershnar argues that programs such as affirmative action and calls for slavery reparations are unjust for three reasons. First, the state has a duty to direct resources to those persons who, through their abilities, will benefit most from them. Second, he argues that, in the case of slavery, past injustice-where both the victims and perpetrators are long dead-cannot ground current claims to compensation. As terrible as slavery was, those who claim a right to compensation today owe their existence to it, he reasons, and since the events that bring about a person's existence are normally thought to be beneficial, past injustices do not warrant compensation. Finally, even if past injustices were allowed to serve as the basis of compensation in the present, other variables prevent a reasonable estimation of the amount owed.

Our worldview assumes that people are morally responsible. Our emotions, beliefs, and values assume that a person is responsible for what she thinks and does, and that this is a good thing. This book argues that this worldview is false. It provides four arguments for this conclusion that build on the free will and responsibility literatures in original and insightful ways:Foundation: No one is responsible because there is no foundation for responsibility. A foundation for responsibility is something for which a person is responsible but not by being responsible for something elseEpistemic Condition: No one is responsible because no one fulfills the epistemic condition necessary for blameworthinessInternalism: If a person were responsible, then she would be responsible for, and only for, what goes on in her head. Most of the evidence for responsibility says the oppositeAmount: No one is responsible because we cannot make sense of what makes a person more or less praiseworthy (or blameworthy)There is no other book that argues against moral responsibility based on foundationalism, the epistemic condition, and internalism and shows that these arguments cohere. The book’s arguments for internalism and quantifying responsibility are new to the literature. Ultimately, the book’s conclusions undermine our commonsense view of the world and the most common philosophical understanding of God, morality, and relationships.Responsibility Collapses: Why Moral Responsibility Is Impossible is essential reading for scholars and advanced students in philosophy, religious studies, and political science who are interested in debates about agency, free will, and moral responsibility.

Our worldview assumes that people are morally responsible. Our emotions, beliefs, and values assume that a person is responsible for what she thinks and does, and that this is a good thing. This book argues that this worldview is false. It provides four arguments for this conclusion that build on the free will and responsibility literatures in original and insightful ways:Foundation: No one is responsible because there is no foundation for responsibility. A foundation for responsibility is something for which a person is responsible but not by being responsible for something elseEpistemic Condition: No one is responsible because no one fulfills the epistemic condition necessary for blameworthinessInternalism: If a person were responsible, then she would be responsible for, and only for, what goes on in her head. Most of the evidence for responsibility says the oppositeAmount: No one is responsible because we cannot make sense of what makes a person more or less praiseworthy (or blameworthy)There is no other book that argues against moral responsibility based on foundationalism, the epistemic condition, and internalism and shows that these arguments cohere. The book’s arguments for internalism and quantifying responsibility are new to the literature. Ultimately, the book’s conclusions undermine our commonsense view of the world and the most common philosophical understanding of God, morality, and relationships.Responsibility Collapses: Why Moral Responsibility Is Impossible is essential reading for scholars and advanced students in philosophy, religious studies, and political science who are interested in debates about agency, free will, and moral responsibility.

This book argues that consequentialism and non-consequentialism are false because they face metaphysical and intuitional problems. The two theories exhaust the theories of the right, so there is no rightness.This result matters because it requires us to give up widely held beliefs regarding knowledge, moral responsibility, and reasons for action. The author’s argument is unique because it focuses on applied-ethical arguments rather than metaethical issues. Specifically, it avoids metaethical discussions of whether morality explains our thoughts and actions, how we know about morality, and whether the denial of morality is self-defeating. The author specifically argues against consequentialism and non-consequentialism in the following ways:Metaphysical Problems: Consequentialism and non-consequentialism are false because they need a theory of counterfactuals and backtracking that they cannot haveRights Problems: Non-consequentialism is false because non-consequentialism depends on rights, and people do not have rights. They do not have rights because of problems regarding moral responsibility, right-grounding, and self-ownershipCircularity: Non-consequentialism is false because the basic building blocks of non-consequentialism—desert, rights, and virtue—are circularMorality Collapses will be of interest to researchers and graduate students working in normative ethics, metaethics, moral responsibility, and political philosophy.

This book looks at a family of views involving the pro-life view of abortion and Christianity. These issues are important because major religious branches (for example, Catholicism and some large branches of Evangelicalism) and leading politicians assert, or are committed to, the following: (a) it is permissible to prevent some people from going to hell, (b) abortion prevents some people from going to hell, and (c) abortion is wrong. They also assert, or are committed to, the following: (d) it is permissible to use defensive violence to prevent people from killing innocents, (e) doctors who perform abortions kill innocents, and (f) it is wrong to use defensive violence against doctors who perform abortions. Stephen Kershnar argues that these and other principles are inconsistent. Along the way, he explores the ways in which theories of hell, right forfeiture, and good consequences relate to each other and the above inconsistencies.

This book provides a philosophical analysis of adult–child sex and pedophilia. It looks at how the law should respond to such sex given the above analyses.

This book provides a philosophical analysis of adult–child sex and pedophilia. It looks at how the law should respond to such sex given the above analyses.

This book argues that there is no morality and that people are not morally responsible for what they do. Morality and moral responsibility lie at the heart of how we view the world. The philosophical costs of denying moral responsibility and morality are enormous.