Stephen Kershnar is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia and the author of Desert, Retribution, and Torture.

"This is an important and serious critique of both affirmative action and reparations for slavery. Despite the provocative nature of the subject matter, Kershnar writes coolly and objectively." — Michael Levin, author of Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean"Civil rights, affirmative action, and reparations for slavery are burning issues today. Kershnar's bold, clearly reasoned arguments are fresh, insightful, and cogent." — Louis P. Pojman, United States Military Academy, West Point"Although I strongly disagree with his views, Kershnar provides the most coherent set of arguments against reparations available in the philosophical literature." — Albert Mosley, coauthor of Affirmative Action: Social Justice or Unfair Preference?

• Acknowledgments SECTION 1 Introduction SECTION 2: Civil Rights Laws 1. The Most Qualified Applicant Part 1. The Job QualificationPart 2. The Best Conception of a Job Qualification Yields at Most a Very Weak Reason to Favor a MeritocracyPart 3. Antidiscrimination Laws Cannot Be Justified by Meritocratic ConcernsPart 4. Qualifications for Educational InstitutionsPart 5. Conclusion SECTION 3: Strong Affirmative Action 2. Strong Affirmative-Action Programs at State Institutions Part 1. IntroductionPart 2. The Duty to Judge Persons according to Their Interests and DesertPart 3. Strong Affirmative-Action Programs at State Educational Institutions Cannot Be Justified via Compensatory JusticePart 4. Conclusion 3. Uncertain Damages to Racial Minorities and Strong Affirmative Action Part 1. The Hypothetical Imperative to Distribute Resources in a Just MannerPart 2. Compensatory Justice and the Assessment of DamagesPart 3. Compensatory Justice and Inadequate Knowledge of DamagesPart 4. We Do Not Have Adequate Knowledge of the Amount of Compensable Injury to Current Members of Some Racial Minority GroupsPart 5. Conclusion SECTION 4: Reparations for Slavery 4. The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations Part 1. IntroductionPart 2. Slavery Did Not Harm the Descendants of SlavesPart 3. Compensation May Be Owed to the Descendants of Slaves As a Result of a Legitimate Inheritance ClaimPart 4. Conclusion 5. Reject the Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations Part 1. Objections to the Inheritance-Based Claim to ReparationsPart 2. Who Owes Compensation?Part 3. Conclusion SECTION 5: Proper Respect 6. Intrinsic Moral Value and Racial Differences Part 1. The Expression of Equal Moral ValuePart 2. The ArgumentPart 3. Implications of the ArgumentPart 4. Conclusion SECTION 6: Educational Diversity 7. Experiential Diversity Part 1. Grutter and BakkePart 2. Experiential Diversity and TruthPart 3. A More General Approach to DiversityPart 4. Equal-Opportunity ArgumentsPart 5. Conclusion Notes Index

Stephen Kershnar is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia and the author of Desert, Retribution, and Torture.

"This is an important and serious critique of both affirmative action and reparations for slavery. Despite the provocative nature of the subject matter, Kershnar writes coolly and objectively." — Michael Levin, author of Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean"Civil rights, affirmative action, and reparations for slavery are burning issues today. Kershnar's bold, clearly reasoned arguments are fresh, insightful, and cogent." — Louis P. Pojman, United States Military Academy, West Point"Although I strongly disagree with his views, Kershnar provides the most coherent set of arguments against reparations available in the philosophical literature." — Albert Mosley, coauthor of Affirmative Action: Social Justice or Unfair Preference?

• Acknowledgments SECTION 1 Introduction SECTION 2: Civil Rights Laws 1. The Most Qualified Applicant Part 1. The Job QualificationPart 2. The Best Conception of a Job Qualification Yields at Most a Very Weak Reason to Favor a MeritocracyPart 3. Antidiscrimination Laws Cannot Be Justified by Meritocratic ConcernsPart 4. Qualifications for Educational InstitutionsPart 5. Conclusion SECTION 3: Strong Affirmative Action 2. Strong Affirmative-Action Programs at State Institutions Part 1. IntroductionPart 2. The Duty to Judge Persons according to Their Interests and DesertPart 3. Strong Affirmative-Action Programs at State Educational Institutions Cannot Be Justified via Compensatory JusticePart 4. Conclusion 3. Uncertain Damages to Racial Minorities and Strong Affirmative Action Part 1. The Hypothetical Imperative to Distribute Resources in a Just MannerPart 2. Compensatory Justice and the Assessment of DamagesPart 3. Compensatory Justice and Inadequate Knowledge of DamagesPart 4. We Do Not Have Adequate Knowledge of the Amount of Compensable Injury to Current Members of Some Racial Minority GroupsPart 5. Conclusion SECTION 4: Reparations for Slavery 4. The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations Part 1. IntroductionPart 2. Slavery Did Not Harm the Descendants of SlavesPart 3. Compensation May Be Owed to the Descendants of Slaves As a Result of a Legitimate Inheritance ClaimPart 4. Conclusion 5. Reject the Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations Part 1. Objections to the Inheritance-Based Claim to ReparationsPart 2. Who Owes Compensation?Part 3. Conclusion SECTION 5: Proper Respect 6. Intrinsic Moral Value and Racial Differences Part 1. The Expression of Equal Moral ValuePart 2. The ArgumentPart 3. Implications of the ArgumentPart 4. Conclusion SECTION 6: Educational Diversity 7. Experiential Diversity Part 1. Grutter and BakkePart 2. Experiential Diversity and TruthPart 3. A More General Approach to DiversityPart 4. Equal-Opportunity ArgumentsPart 5. Conclusion Notes Index

Stephen Kershnar is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia and the author of Desert, Retribution, and Torture.

"This is an important and serious critique of both affirmative action and reparations for slavery. Despite the provocative nature of the subject matter, Kershnar writes coolly and objectively." — Michael Levin, author of Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean"Civil rights, affirmative action, and reparations for slavery are burning issues today. Kershnar's bold, clearly reasoned arguments are fresh, insightful, and cogent." — Louis P. Pojman, United States Military Academy, West Point"Although I strongly disagree with his views, Kershnar provides the most coherent set of arguments against reparations available in the philosophical literature." — Albert Mosley, coauthor of Affirmative Action: Social Justice or Unfair Preference?

• Acknowledgments SECTION 1 Introduction SECTION 2: Civil Rights Laws 1. The Most Qualified Applicant Part 1. The Job QualificationPart 2. The Best Conception of a Job Qualification Yields at Most a Very Weak Reason to Favor a MeritocracyPart 3. Antidiscrimination Laws Cannot Be Justified by Meritocratic ConcernsPart 4. Qualifications for Educational InstitutionsPart 5. Conclusion SECTION 3: Strong Affirmative Action 2. Strong Affirmative-Action Programs at State Institutions Part 1. IntroductionPart 2. The Duty to Judge Persons according to Their Interests and DesertPart 3. Strong Affirmative-Action Programs at State Educational Institutions Cannot Be Justified via Compensatory JusticePart 4. Conclusion 3. Uncertain Damages to Racial Minorities and Strong Affirmative Action Part 1. The Hypothetical Imperative to Distribute Resources in a Just MannerPart 2. Compensatory Justice and the Assessment of DamagesPart 3. Compensatory Justice and Inadequate Knowledge of DamagesPart 4. We Do Not Have Adequate Knowledge of the Amount of Compensable Injury to Current Members of Some Racial Minority GroupsPart 5. Conclusion SECTION 4: Reparations for Slavery 4. The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations Part 1. IntroductionPart 2. Slavery Did Not Harm the Descendants of SlavesPart 3. Compensation May Be Owed to the Descendants of Slaves As a Result of a Legitimate Inheritance ClaimPart 4. Conclusion 5. Reject the Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations Part 1. Objections to the Inheritance-Based Claim to ReparationsPart 2. Who Owes Compensation?Part 3. Conclusion SECTION 5: Proper Respect 6. Intrinsic Moral Value and Racial Differences Part 1. The Expression of Equal Moral ValuePart 2. The ArgumentPart 3. Implications of the ArgumentPart 4. Conclusion SECTION 6: Educational Diversity 7. Experiential Diversity Part 1. Grutter and BakkePart 2. Experiential Diversity and TruthPart 3. A More General Approach to DiversityPart 4. Equal-Opportunity ArgumentsPart 5. Conclusion Notes Index