Thomas Bustamante - Böcker

This edited collection considers the work of one of the most important legal philosophers of our time, Professor Gerald J Postema. It includes contributions from expert philosophers of law. The chapters dig deep into important camps of Postema’s rich theoretical project including:- the value of the rule of law;- the ideal of integrity in adjudication; - his works on analogical reasoning;- the methodology of jurisprudence; - dialogues with Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Frederick Schauer and HLA Hart.The collection includes an original article by Professor Postema, in which he develops his conception of the rule of law and replies to some objections to previous works, and an interview in which he provides a fascinating and unique insight into his philosophy of law.

This edited collection considers the work of one of the most important legal philosophers of our time, Professor Gerald J Postema. It includes contributions from expert philosophers of law. The chapters dig deep into important camps of Postema’s rich theoretical project including:- the value of the rule of law;- the ideal of integrity in adjudication; - his works on analogical reasoning;- the methodology of jurisprudence; - dialogues with Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Frederick Schauer and HLA Hart.The collection includes an original article by Professor Postema, in which he develops his conception of the rule of law and replies to some objections to previous works, and an interview in which he provides a fascinating and unique insight into his philosophy of law.

This book considers the seminal debate in jurisprudence between Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish. It looks at the exchange between Dworkin and Fish, initiated in the 1980s, and analyses the role the exchange has played in the development of contemporary theories of interpretation, legal reasoning, and the nature of law. The book encompasses 4 key themes of the debate between these authors: legal theory and its critical role, interpretation and critical constraints, pragmatism and interpretive communities, and some general implications of the debate for issues like the nature of legal theory and the possibility of objectivity. The collection brings together prominent legal theorists and one of the protagonists of the debate: Professor Stanley Fish, who concludes the collection with an interview in which he discusses the main topics discussed in the collection.

This book considers the seminal debate in jurisprudence between Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish. It looks at the exchange between Dworkin and Fish, initiated in the 1980s, and analyses the role the exchange has played in the development of contemporary theories of interpretation, legal reasoning, and the nature of law. The book encompasses 4 key themes of the debate between these authors: legal theory and its critical role, interpretation and critical constraints, pragmatism and interpretive communities, and some general implications of the debate for issues like the nature of legal theory and the possibility of objectivity. The collection brings together prominent legal theorists and one of the protagonists of the debate: Professor Stanley Fish, who concludes the collection with an interview in which he discusses the main topics discussed in the collection.

This book provides a critical outlook on, and an inquiry into the practical implications of, the works of Professor W.J. Waluchow, one of the most important jurisprudence scholars of the early twenty-first century, while also reflecting on the interconnections between his legal theory and his theory of constitutional interpretation. It also features an interview with Waluchow, in which he responds to some of the chapters and shares a first-person perspective on his main philosophical ideas, how they emerged, and how they can be further developed and applied.The book makes a valuable contribution to contemporary legal philosophy by asking and providing different answers (from prominent legal philosophers and newer scholars in the field) to questions such as ‘How does Waluchow’s jurisprudence relate to his theories of legal reasoning and constitutional interpretation?’, ‘On what terms should we understand inclusive legal positivism?’, ‘Can inclusive legal positivism be reconciled with an interpretivist theory of adjudication?’, ‘How does it compare with Raz’s model of legal authority?’, ‘Can Waluchow’s notion of “community constitutional morality” be applied to contexts such as international law, pluralist legal communities, and indigenous laws?’, and ‘Is Waluchow’s methodology equipped to provide interpretive directives in unstable and extremely unequal legal systems?’.The chapters, all written by experts on jurisprudence (including some of the scholars who helped develop the tradition known as inclusive legal positivism), offer a unique analysis of Waluchow’s most complex and intriguing theses, providing not only a valuable exegetical analysis of his work but also a range of answers to the challenge of interpreting legal and constitutional values, as well as practical resolutions to persisting controversies in the philosophy of law.

This book provides theoretical tools for evaluating the soundness of arguments in the context of legal argumentation. It deals with a number of general argument types and their particular use in legal argumentation. It provides detailed analyses of argument from authority, argument ad hominem, argument from ignorance, slippery slope argument and other general argument types. Each of these argument types can be used to construct arguments that are sound as well as arguments that are unsound. To evaluate an argument correctly one must be able to distinguish the sound instances of a certain argument type from its unsound instances. This book promotes the development of theoretical tools for this task.

This volume critically discusses therelationship between democracy and constitutionalism. It does so with a view torespond to objections raised by legal and political philosophers who aresceptical of judicial review based on the assumption that judicial review is anundemocratic institution. The book builds on earlier literature on the moraljustification of the authority of constitutional courts, and on the currentattempts to develop a system on “weak judicial review”. Although different intheir approach, the chapters all focus on devising institutions, proceduresand, in a more abstract way, normative conceptions to democratizeconstitutional law. These democratizing strategies may vary from a radicalobjection to the institution of judicial review, to a more modest proposal tojustify the authority of constitutional courts in their “deliberativeperformance” or to create constitutional juries that may be more aware of acommunity’s constitutional morality than constitutional courts are.  The book connects abstract theoreticaldiscussions about the moral justification of constitutionalism with concreteproblems, such as the relation between constitutional adjudication anddeliberative democracy, the legitimacy of judicial review in internationalinstitutions, the need to create new institutions to democratizeconstitutionalism, the connections between philosophical conceptions andconstitutional practices, the judicial review of constitutional amendments, andthe criticism on strong judicial review.

This book provides theoretical tools for evaluating the soundness of arguments in the context of legal argumentation. It deals with a number of general argument types and their particular use in legal argumentation. It provides detailed analyses of argument from authority, argument ad hominem, argument from ignorance, slippery slope argument and other general argument types. Each of these argument types can be used to construct arguments that are sound as well as arguments that are unsound. To evaluate an argument correctly one must be able to distinguish the sound instances of a certain argument type from its unsound instances. This book promotes the development of theoretical tools for this task.

This volume critically discusses therelationship between democracy and constitutionalism. It does so with a view torespond to objections raised by legal and political philosophers who aresceptical of judicial review based on the assumption that judicial review is anundemocratic institution. The book builds on earlier literature on the moraljustification of the authority of constitutional courts, and on the currentattempts to develop a system on “weak judicial review”. Although different intheir approach, the chapters all focus on devising institutions, proceduresand, in a more abstract way, normative conceptions to democratizeconstitutional law. These democratizing strategies may vary from a radicalobjection to the institution of judicial review, to a more modest proposal tojustify the authority of constitutional courts in their “deliberativeperformance” or to create constitutional juries that may be more aware of acommunity’s constitutional morality than constitutional courts are.  The book connects abstract theoreticaldiscussions about the moral justification of constitutionalism with concreteproblems, such as the relation between constitutional adjudication anddeliberative democracy, the legitimacy of judicial review in internationalinstitutions, the need to create new institutions to democratizeconstitutionalism, the connections between philosophical conceptions andconstitutional practices, the judicial review of constitutional amendments, andthe criticism on strong judicial review.