Tim Saunders – författare

'He who holds Hill 112, holds Normandy' said a German general, while the British regarded the hill as 'the Key to Normandy'. During the battle in June and July 1944, both sides were to fight hard for its dominating views over the surrounding area.This book tells of Hill 112's seizure by 11th Armoured Division and their subsequent withdrawal after ULTRA decryptions warned Montgomery of II SS Panzer Corps's approach. Ten days later soldiers from the West Country, Scotland and the Royal Tank Regiment struggled to take Hill 112 for a second time.The controversial Major General Thomas earned the nickname 'Butcher' in one of the Normandy campaign's bloodiest battles, fought against four SS panzer divisions. This guide depicts in vivid detail the desperate fighting during the hot July days on the slopes of Hill 112 and in the surrounding villages that remain largely unchanged today.

The race by Montgomery's ground forces, principally 30 (British) Corps, to relieve the US & UK airborne troops at Nijmegen and Arnhem respectively has been the subject of fierce controversy since that dramatic summer of 1944. In the first of three books covering the Battles on the road to Arnhem, experienced author and tourguide, Tim Saunders, describes the US 82nd Airborne Division's daring seizure of the Grave Bridge and their battles for the Grossbeck Heights, and the struggle for the vital Nijmegen Bridge. At the same time he covers the Guards Armoured Division's desperate efforts to link up on the ground. This is a thrilling story of a major chapter in the Allie's advance in 1944.

Hell's Highway is the dramatic name given to the vital stretch of road that the British 3rd Guards Armoured Division had to advance down rapidly on their route to relieve the American Paras (83rd Airborne) at Nijmegen and the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. It should have been easy as The Screaming Eagles (101st Airborne) had been dropped to hold it. The reasons for the ensuing delay which led to disaster at Arnhem remain controversial and make for gripping reading. Adopting the clear and successful style of Battleground works this book relies on personal accounts to embellish this dramatic story.

Having fought their way up fifty miles of Hell's Highway and through Nijmegen, XXX Corps was just ten miles from Arnhem and 1st British Airborne Division. The Island is flat land between the Waal at Nijmegen and the Rhine at Arnhem. The situation was increasingly bad with the remainder of II SS Panzer Corps in the area and German counter attacks on Hell's Highway preventing the Allies applying their material superiority. The Guards Armoured and then 43rd Wessex Infantry Division took turns to lead before reaching the Rhine opposite the paratroopers in the Oosterbeek Perimeter.Attempts to cross the Rhine by the Polish Paras and the Dorset Regiment had little success but, meanwhile, the guns of XXX Corps ensured the survival of the Perimeter. After some desperate fighting on the island, 43 Wessex Division evacuated just two thousand members of the elite Airborne Division who had landed eight days earlier.

When Napoleon overreached himself by usurping the Burbon throne of Spain in early 1808, the resulting Spanish resentment and the brutal suppression of the Dos di Mayo Rebellion in Madrid turned Spain, a long-term enemy of Britain, into an ally. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s expedition to South America was promptly cancelled and redirected to the Peninsular.Eventually landing in Portugal at the mouth of the Rio Mondego, the army found itself with little transport, but by keeping close to the coast and with logistical support from the Royal Navy, Wellesley set off south to confront Marshal Junot and liberate Lisbon. The first clash of arms was at Obidos and, days later, at the Combat of Roliça, Wellesley achieved his first victory in battle against the willey General Delaborde.With word that reinforcements were expected to arrive at Maceira Bay, the army was deployed at Vimiero to protect their landing. Meanwhile, Junot had assembled his army and decided to attack at Vimiero. In a short but hard-fought battle, Wellesley was victorious, however an opportunity for total defeat of the French was squandered in succession by generals Burrard and Dalrymple, who instead accepted an armistice. This eventually became the notorious Convention of Cintra.

The COSSAC planners in 1943 outlined a strategy to capture the city of Caen, some 10 miles in-land from the coastline with an airborne division. On assumption of command of 21st Army Group, General Montgomery up-scaled the invasion and inserting SWORD Beach, gave the task of capturing the city to the 3rd Division on D Day or shortly afterwards. The Germans, however, seeing the number of Allied divisions, many fictional, multiplying on their situation maps, believed that a secondary landing would be made in Normandy. In April 1944, they therefore made significant reinforcements including moving the 21st Panzer Division to the important transport node of Caen that, if held, barred the way onto the more open country south to Falaise.Though aware of the German reinforcement thanks to ULTRA, the Allied aspiration remained to capture Caen and fix the Germans against the British Second Army on the eastern flank of the lodgement. In doing so, it became obvious that the city would not be captured as quickly or cleanly as originally envisaged.On D Day, the 3rd Division faced not just the coastal crust of defences, but German formations deployed in depth, including the 21st Panzer Division barring the way to Caen. Beset with difficulties resulting from Eisenhower’s decision to ‘go’ in less-than-ideal conditions, the landing was slow and the division could not develop the necessary momentum to carry them to the city.

As the Second World War loomed, the Territorial Army was doubled and 2nd Battalion, The London Rifle Brigade was formed. This title was short lived and 8th Rifle Brigade joined the newly raised 11th Armoured Division in the spring of 1941. Three years of training followed, with regular changes of tactics and developments in weapons and equipment. Some of these were still being implemented at the last moment before the invasion of North West Europe, including the issue of a mix of Lend Lease US halftracks.Deploying to Normandy, 8 RB’s companies were attached to their respective Sherman regiments of 29 Armoured Brigade and were well prepared for their part in Operation EPSOM. At the tip of the salient driven across the Odon, the Riflemen fought their first bloody action on Hill 112. Operation GOODWOOD followed in mid-July, with successful infantry assaults on villages before tank casualties and heavy rain brought a halt to the battle.At the end of the month, with the American breakout gaining momentum, the 11th Armoured Division was transferred west into the Bocage in Operation BLUECOAT. In very different terrain the Riflemen played a leading part in the advance south. Having reached Preseles, again at the tip of an advance, 8 RB fought a desperate defensive battle against an SS panzer division. But by now the Germans were becoming exhausted and over two weeks, the pattern was an advance 10 miles or so against delaying positions before facing a serious German position, usually based on an obstacle as dusk settled. Overnight the enemy withdrew again, and the process was repeated daily to Falaise and beyond.The distances covered in the pursuit to the Seine were greater but with the seizure of a crossing at Venon, the division was rushed forward and in a remarkable advance of many miles against disorganised German formations, the division took Amiens and secured bridges over the River Somme, forestalling enemy attempts to form a defensive line.

The 12th Battalion The Devonshire Regiment was raised for coastal defence in the West Country during the invasion scare of 1940, but when infantry brigades were reorganised in 1943, the Devons became ‘spare’. Confidently expecting to be disbanded, it was a surprise for the battalion - and for General Gale as well - to be posted to Bulford on Salisbury Plain to join the 6th Airborne Division.The transformation into glider infantry, wearing the maroon beret of Airborne Forces, was a period of turbulence, but the ‘Swede Bashers’ retained its distinct West Country flavour. However, despite training hard there were simply not enough aircraft to fly more than a company of Devons into Normandy. Nevertheless, on the evening of D+1 they were pitched into battle, but losses to the division during D Day and subsequent attacks meant that there was little scope for a gentle introduction to fighting.Coming of age, 12 Devons fought in the bocage on the British left flank and the pursuit to the Seine, but expectation of an early operation to cross the Rhine was dashed after Arnhem. An autumn of training culminated with an unexpected deployment over Christmas to face Hitler’s last great offensive, followed by a return to the UK and hasty preparations for the battalion’s first airborne operation, Operation VARSITY.

With the German reinforcement of Normandy in April 1944, the chance of I Corps capturing Caen on D Day or shortly thereafter had become increasingly unlikely. And so it was, during D+1, the 21st Panzer Division were joined by the Hitlerjugend Panzer Division in a defensive wall around the north and west of the city, while the Allied main effort was transferred west to XXX Corps.This left 3rd British and 3rd Canadian divisions on the Caen front in a period of ‘active defence’, with patrolling and a series of remarkably bloody actions, in the shadow of other operations such as EPSOM, that were fought to nibble away at the German positions.In July, with the Second Army’s build up complete and rising criticism of General Montgomery’s conduct of the campaign in Normandy, attention returned to Caen with the Canadians taking part in Operation WINDSOR: the attack on the heavily defended Carpiquet Airfield. This was a necessary precursor to I Corps’ Operation CHARNWOOD. The final battle for Caen opened on the evening of 7 July 1944 with the controversial bombing of the northern part of the city, and at dawn the established British and Canadian divisions attacked having been joined by the newly arrived 59th Staffordshire Division in their first battle. By the following evening the Lutwaffefeldt Division had collapsed, and the Hitlerjugend were withdrawing to the south of the River Orne.

The 1810 French invasion of Portugal, commanded by the veteran marshal Andre Massena, who was known to Napoleon as the 'Spoilt Child of Victory' has been well covered by historians. Conversely, the shock revelation of the presence of the Lines of Torres Vedras baring the French Army of Portugal's way to their objective of Lisbon, and numerous combats through to the Battle of Funtes de Onoro, has been frequently and unjustifiably glossed over.This book, starting with the occupation of the Lines of Torres Vedras, which were at the heart of Wellington's Peninsular strategy from October 1809-1812, is the story of Wellington's pursuit of Massena back to Spain. This was a time when the Peninsular Army was still being forged and Wellington was refining his own art of war. In addition, 1810-1811 was a period when the outcome of the struggle in Iberia was still far from certain, and Wellington could not manoeuvre with the same confidence in the outcome as he could in future years.The series of combats fought at Pombal, Redhina, Foz da Arounce and Sabugal while Massena was at bay, though not categorised as 'general actions', were of the same scale and significance as those of 1808; Rolica and Vimiero. The general action at Funtes de Onoro was one of the most significant of Wellington's victories, but he confessed that 'If Bony had been here we would have been beat'.

The 1810 French invasion of Portugal, commanded by the veteran marshal André Masséna, who was known to Napoleon as the ‘Spoilt Child of Victory’ has been well covered by historians. Conversely, the shock revelation of the presence of the Lines of Torres Vedras baring the French Army of Portugal’s way to their objective of Lisbon, and numerous combats through to the Battle of Funtes de Oñoro, has been frequently and unjustifiably glossed over. This book, starting with the occupation of the Lines of Torres Vedras, which were at the heart of Wellington’s Peninsular strategy from October 1809-1812, is the story of Wellington’s pursuit of Masséna back to Spain. This was a time when the Peninsular Army was still being forged and Wellington was refining his own art of war. In addition, 1810-1811 was a period when the outcome of the struggle in Iberia was still far from certain, and Wellington could not manoeuvre with the same confidence in the outcome as he could in future years. The series of combats fought at Pombal, Redhina, Foz da Arounce and Sabugal while Masséna was at bay, though not categorised as ‘general actions’, were of the same scale and significance as those of 1808; Roliça and Vimiero. The general action at Funtes de Oñoro was one of the most significant of Wellington’s victories, but he confessed that ‘If Bony had been here we would have been beat’.

After a gap of two years, the 1812 Salamanca Campaign saw Wellington taking the offensive in Spain against Marshal Marmont’s Army of Portugal. Marching from the border fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo which fell to the Allies in January, neither commander was willing to take the risk of a general action without a clear tactical advantage. The result were stand-offs as Wellington offered battle on the San Christóbal Heights, but once the small French-garrisoned forts left behind in Salamanca fell, Marmont withdrew to the Douro. For over a week the two armies shared cooling waters of the river before Marmont ‘humbugged’ Wellington and fell on the Allied left flank at Castrejón. Wellington rushed to the aid of the Light and 4th divisions with the heavy cavalry. Over the following days Marmont dexterously manoeuvred Wellington back towards Salamanca, with both armies within cannon shot still not risking battle. When it seemed Wellington would have to march back to the safety of Portugal, Marmont finally made a mistake on the plains south of Salamanca on 22 July 1812, by allowing his army to become over extended. Wellington saw what was happening and after weeks of marching and counter marching, the battle the soldiers earnestly hoped for was on. In the past it has been difficult to place the fighting on the ground in the centre of the Salamanca battlefield, where ‘vast clouds of smoke and dust that rolled along the basin’ obscured vision even for those fighting. Supplementing their letters, diaries and memoires with modern geographical aids, archaeology and a stout pair of boots, it is now possible to reconcile the sequence of the battle with locations, in a way in which it was not feasible even a few years ago.

After a gap of two years, the 1812 Salamanca Campaign saw Wellington taking the offensive in Spain against Marshal Marmont’s Army of Portugal. Marching from the border fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo which fell to the Allies in January, neither commander was willing to take the risk of a general action without a clear tactical advantage. The result were stand-offs as Wellington offered battle on the San Christóbal Heights, but once the small French-garrisoned forts left behind in Salamanca fell, Marmont withdrew to the Douro. For over a week the two armies shared cooling waters of the river before Marmont ‘humbugged’ Wellington and fell on the Allied left flank at Castrejón. Wellington rushed to the aid of the Light and 4th divisions with the heavy cavalry. Over the following days Marmont dexterously manoeuvred Wellington back towards Salamanca, with both armies within cannon shot still not risking battle.When it seemed Wellington would have to march back to the safety of Portugal, Marmont finally made a mistake on the plains south of Salamanca on 22 July 1812, by allowing his army to become over extended. Wellington saw what was happening and after weeks of marching and counter marching, the battle the soldiers earnestly hoped for was on.In the past it has been difficult to place the fighting on the ground in the centre of the Salamanca battlefield, where ‘vast clouds of smoke and dust that rolled along the basin’ obscured vision even for those fighting. Supplementing their letters, diaries and memoires with modern geographical aids, archaeology and a stout pair of boots, it is now possible to reconcile the sequence of the battle with locations, in a way in which it was not feasible even a few years ago.

By the middle of 1811, Brigadier General Robert Craufurd's Light Division was emerging as the elite of the Peninsular Army and Wellington was seeking opportunities to go over to the offensive, following the expulsion of Marshal Mass na from Portugal.After a period of outpost duty for the Light Division on the familiar ground of the Spanish borders, Wellington seized the keys to Spain' in the epic sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Still reeling from the loss of General Craufurd, The Division' led the army against Marshal Marmont and after a protracted period of marching and counter marching, the French were finally brought to battle at Salamanca. As a result of King Joseph being driven out of Madrid, the French marshals united and in the autumn of 1812, the British were driven back to Ciudad Rodrigo in another gruelling retreat.With news of Napoleon's disaster in Russia and with reinforcements from Britain, Wellington prepared his army to drive the French from the Peninsular. A lightening march across Spain to cut the Great Road found King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan at Vitoria and the resulting battle, in which the Light Division fought their way into the heart of the French position, was a triumph of arms for Wellington's light troops.The pursuit into the Pyrenees, had a sting in the tail when Marshal Soult mounted counter offensives in an attempt to relieve San Sebastian and Pamplona. Having thrown the French back and with the Sixth Coalition intact, the Light Division fought their way through the mountains and into Napoleon's France.With the allies closing in on all sides, the French fought on into 1814 and the Light Bobs had further fighting before the spoils of peace in a war-weary France could be enjoyed.

Histories of the Light Division have tended to be incomplete, being based on memoirs of a few well known diarists, principally from the 95th Rifles. The authors of this book, the first volume of two, have sought memoirs from across the division, including the artillery, the King's German Hussars and others to complete a broader history of Wellington's elite division.Light infantry was not new a concept in 1803, but at Shorncliffe Camp Sir John Moore developed a progressive ethos, set of tactics and training for the newly converted light infantry regiments. With the 95th Rifles they were melded into a brigade that was to form the basis of the incomparable Light Division.From the outset of the Peninsular campaigns in 1808 they delivered results way beyond their scant numbers, but it was during the epic winter retreat to La Corunna that they showed their metal. Returning to the Peninsular months later, the irascible Brigadier Craufurd led the Light Brigade in terrible march to reach Wellington at Talavera; heavily laden and in the heat of summer.Over the winter of 1809/10, Craufurd,s battalions, now elevated to the status of a division, provided the army's outposts. This was work that Craufurd excelled in and actions abounded, including the Combat on the Coa, where the division fought hard to escape Marshal Ney's trap.In 1810, with Wellington withdrawing to the Lines of Torres Vedra, the Light Division played a significant part in the battle of Bucaco Ridge, while the following year they drove Marshal Massena's army back into Spain having fought almost daily actions en route.This history of the Light Division is not simply a series of set piece battles but provides a wider picture of campaigning and what it was to be a light infantry soldier.

He who holds Hill 112 holds Normandy' seemed an unlikely maxim when the hill is viewed from a distance, but on reaching its plateau, the vistas unfold in every direction across a huge swath of Normandy. For the Germans it was their vital defensive ground, but for the British it was an essential steppingstone en route to the River Orne and access to the open country south to Falaise.The Hitlerjugend SS Panzer Division lost Hill 112 to 4th Armoured Brigade when the Scots captured the Tourmauville Bridge intact, but the essence of Hill 112's tactical problem soon became clear. It was impossible for armour to survive on its broad plateau, while the infantry could only hold the skeletal orchards and woods at the cost of crushing casualties. With II SS Panzer Corps preparing to attack the British, the toe hold was given up and 11th Armoured Division was left holding a bridgehead across the River Odon.Ten days later, 43rd Wessex Division was ordered to resume the advance to the Orne with Hill 112 its first objective. As the west countrymen and tanks rose to advance, they met withering fire from the stronghold that Hill 112 had become. The scene was set for one of the grimmest battles of the campaign.For six weeks from the end of June into August, when the Allied advances finally gained momentum, Hill 112 was far too important to let the opposition hold and exploit it. Consequently, it was regularly shelled and mortared, and shrouded with smoke and dust, while soldiers of both sides clung to their respective rims of the plateau.By the end, Hill 112 had developed a reputation as evil as that of any spot on the First World War's Western Front.

A history of the relentless fighting between British and German forces in the French villages of Eterville and Maltot during World War II.‘He who holds Hill 112 holds Normandy’ seemed an unlikely maxim when the hill is viewed from a distance, but on reaching its plateau, the vistas unfold in every direction across a huge swath of Normandy. For the Germans it was their vital defensive ground, but for the British it was an essential steppingstone en route to the River Orne and access to the open country south to Falaise.The Hitlerjugend SS Panzer Division lost Hill 112 to 4th Armoured Brigade when the Scots captured the Tourmauville Bridge intact, but the essence of Hill 112’s tactical problem soon became clear. It was impossible for armour to survive on its broad plateau, while the infantry could only hold the skeletal orchards and woods at the cost of crushing casualties. With II SS Panzer Corps preparing to attack the British, the toe hold was given up and 11th Armoured Division was left holding a bridgehead across the River Odon.Ten days later, 43rd Wessex Division was ordered to resume the advance to the Orne with Hill 112 its first objective. As the west countrymen and tanks rose to advance, they met withering fire from the stronghold that Hill 112 had become. The scene was set for one of the grimmest battles of the campaign.For six weeks from the end of June into August, when the Allied advances finally gained momentum, Hill 112 was far too important to let the opposition hold and exploit it. Consequently, it was regularly shelled and mortared, and shrouded with smoke and dust, while soldiers of both sides clung to their respective rims of the plateau.By the end, Hill 112 had developed a reputation as evil as that of any spot on the First World War’s Western Front.Praise for Hill 112“This reads like one of those cover stories from one of the 1950s/1960s golden age British comics. Superb detail.” —Books Monthly“Tim has provided us, general buffs or serious scholars, earnest research enthusiasts or casual page-a-week armchair perusers, with an enthralling almost day by day account.” —ARGunners.com“Adds the bones to the meat of the story of Hill 112.” —Armorama

A history of the relentless fighting between British and German forces in the French villages of Eterville and Maltot during World War II.‘He who holds Hill 112 holds Normandy’ seemed an unlikely maxim when the hill is viewed from a distance, but on reaching its plateau, the vistas unfold in every direction across a huge swath of Normandy. For the Germans it was their vital defensive ground, but for the British it was an essential steppingstone en route to the River Orne and access to the open country south to Falaise.The Hitlerjugend SS Panzer Division lost Hill 112 to 4th Armoured Brigade when the Scots captured the Tourmauville Bridge intact, but the essence of Hill 112’s tactical problem soon became clear. It was impossible for armour to survive on its broad plateau, while the infantry could only hold the skeletal orchards and woods at the cost of crushing casualties. With II SS Panzer Corps preparing to attack the British, the toe hold was given up and 11th Armoured Division was left holding a bridgehead across the River Odon.Ten days later, 43rd Wessex Division was ordered to resume the advance to the Orne with Hill 112 its first objective. As the west countrymen and tanks rose to advance, they met withering fire from the stronghold that Hill 112 had become. The scene was set for one of the grimmest battles of the campaign.For six weeks from the end of June into August, when the Allied advances finally gained momentum, Hill 112 was far too important to let the opposition hold and exploit it. Consequently, it was regularly shelled and mortared, and shrouded with smoke and dust, while soldiers of both sides clung to their respective rims of the plateau.By the end, Hill 112 had developed a reputation as evil as that of any spot on the First World War’s Western Front.Praise for Hill 112“This reads like one of those cover stories from one of the 1950s/1960s golden age British comics. Superb detail.” —Books Monthly“Tim has provided us, general buffs or serious scholars, earnest research enthusiasts or casual page-a-week armchair perusers, with an enthralling almost day by day account.” —ARGunners.com“Adds the bones to the meat of the story of Hill 112.” —Armorama

‘He who holds Hill 112 holds Normandy’ seemed an unlikely maxim when the hill is viewed from a distance, but on reaching its plateau, the vistas unfold in every direction across a huge swath of Normandy. For the Germans it was their vital defensive ground, but for the British it was an essential steppingstone en route to the River Orne and access to the open country south to Falaise.The Hitlerjugend SS Panzer Division lost Hill 112 to 4th Armoured Brigade when the Scots captured the Tourmauville Bridge intact, but the essence of Hill 112’s tactical problem soon became clear. It was impossible for armour to survive on its broad plateau, while the infantry could only hold the skeletal orchards and woods at the cost of crushing casualties. With II SS Panzer Corps preparing to attack the British, the toe hold was given up and 11th Armoured Division was left holding a bridgehead across the River Odon.Ten days later, 43rd Wessex Division was ordered to resume the advance to the Orne with Hill 112 its first objective. As the west countrymen and tanks rose to advance, they met withering fire from the stronghold that Hill 112 had become. The scene was set for one of the grimmest battles of the campaign.For six weeks from the end of June into August, when the Allied advances finally gained momentum, Hill 112 was far too important to let the opposition hold and exploit it. Consequently, it was regularly shelled and mortared, and shrouded with smoke and dust, while soldiers of both sides clung to their respective rims of the plateau.By the end, Hill 112 had developed a reputation as evil as that of any spot on the First World War’s Western Front.

During winter 1944/45 few German officers believed that the Allies would attack the wooded Reichswald Plug on the narrow neck of land between the rivers Rhine and Maas. Consequently, relying on the natural defences of the forest, the vaunted Siegfried Line had been allowed to peter out. The 84th Infantry Division held field defences that had been worked on all autumn, but the defenders were thinly spread, and most German soldiers now faced the certainty of defeat.Originally hoping to use the frozen winter ground for a speedy assault, days before Operation VERITABLE began a thaw set in and the Allies faced attacking in the worst possible ground conditions. On the morning of 8 February, after protracted bombardment, delays multiplied as vehicles became bogged in saturated fields and shell holes, and roads broke up under heavy armour. However, just enough assault engineer equipment reached the outer German defences, where they found the enemy infantry largely stunned by the bombardment.It took all of the first day to break through the mud and defences into the Reichswald, while to the north, Canadians and Scots struggled across equally sodden open country with the Rhine floods rising fast. Despite the conditions, overnight the Canadians took to the flood waters to seize what were now island villages and the Scots dashed to capture the vital Materborn, which overlooked Kleve.With heavy rain compounding difficulties, mud and flood waters made movement of men and supplies increasingly difficult. Despite this and the arrival of German reinforcements, the Allies fought their way forward, forcing the Reichswald Plug and opening the way into the Rhineland and the final phases of the war.

Raised in 1943 with seventeen-year-olds from the Hitler Youth movement, and following the twin disasters of Stalingrad and Tunisgrad', the Hitlerjugend Panzer Division emerged as the most effective German division fighting in the West. The core of the division was a cadre of offices and NCOs provided by Hitler's bodyguard division, the elite Leibstandarte, with the aim of producing a division of equal value' to fight alongside them in I SS Panzer Corps.During the fighting in Normandy, the Hitlerjugend proved to be implacable foes to both the British and the Canadians, repeatedly blunting Montgomery's offensives, fighting with skill and a degree of determination well beyond the norm. This they did from D+1 through to the final battle to escape from the Falaise Pocket, despite huge disadvantages, namely constant Allied air attack, highly destructive naval gunfire and a chronic lack of combat supplies and replacements of men and equipment.Written with the advantage of new materials from archives in the former Eastern Bloc, this book is no whitewash of a Waffen SS division and it does not shy away from confronting unpalatable facts or controversies.

During winter 1944/45 few German officers believed that the Allies would attack the wooded Reichswald Plug on the narrow neck of land between the rivers Rhine and Maas. Consequently, relying on the natural defences of the forest, the vaunted Siegfried Line had been allowed to peter out. The 84th Infantry Division held field defences that had been worked on all autumn, but the defenders were thinly spread, and most German soldiers now faced the certainty of defeat.Originally hoping to use the frozen winter ground for a speedy assault, days before Operation VERITABLE began a thaw set in and the Allies faced attacking in the worst possible ground conditions. On the morning of 8 February, after protracted bombardment, delays multiplied as vehicles became bogged in saturated fields and shell holes, and roads broke up under heavy armour. However, just enough assault engineer equipment reached the outer German defences, where they found the enemy infantry largely stunned by the bombardment.It took all of the first day to break through the mud and defences into the Reichswald, while to the north, Canadians and Scots struggled across equally sodden open country with the Rhine floods rising fast. Despite the conditions, overnight the Canadians took to the flood waters to seize what were now island villages and the Scots dashed to capture the vital Materborn, which overlooked Kleve.With heavy rain compounding difficulties, mud and flood waters made movement of men and supplies increasingly difficult. Despite this and the arrival of German reinforcements, the Allies fought their way forward, forcing the Reichswald Plug and opening the way into the Rhineland and the final phases of the war.

The British Army started the development of flame throwers in 1938, but progress was slow and interest was side-lined after Dunkirk while the army reequipped. Investment in a flame-throwing tank only returned to the agenda thanks to interest by General Percy Hobart when he developed ‘funnies’ for 79th Armoured Division and the concept gained the support of General Sir Alan Brooke.141 (The Buffs) Regiment RAC had been converted to Churchill Tanks at the end of 1941 and in early 1944 they were earmarked for another change of role to the Crocodile conversion of the new Mk VII Churchill tank. This flame throwing system was secret and started to arrive with the regiment in April 1944. By D-Day only one squadron was equipped and trained, with space on the landing craft only available for two troops to land in support of 50th Division.The rest of the regiment arrived by the end of June and were in action with various formations across the front. There followed a period of misuse by those they supported and learning on the job by the regiment’s squadrons, but by the middle of the campaign a clear doctrine for the use of the Crocodile had emerged and they were in great demand.

The British Army started the development of flame throwers in 1938, but progress was slow and interest was side-lined after Dunkirk while the army reequipped. Investment in a flame-throwing tank only returned to the agenda thanks to interest by General Percy Hobart when he developed ‘funnies’ for 79th armored Division and the concept gained the support of General Sir Alan Brooke.141 (The Buffs) Regiment RAC had been converted to Churchill Tanks at the end of 1941 and in early 1944 they were earmarked for another change of role to the Crocodile conversion of the new Mk VII Churchill tank. This flame throwing system was secret and started to arrive with the regiment in April 1944. By D-Day only one squadron was equipped and trained, with space on the landing craft only available for two troops to land in support of 50th Division.The rest of the regiment arrived by the end of June and were in action with various formations across the front. There followed a period of misuse by those they supported and learning on the job by the regiment’s squadrons, but by the middle of the campaign a clear doctrine for the use of the Crocodile had emerged and they were in great demand.

Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to the Peninsular in 1809 convinced that the country could be held against the French. His audacious crossing of the Duoro and speedy victory at Oporto in May, followed by the deceptively easy ejection of Marshal Soult's corps, confirmed this view, giving him the confidence to plan a campaign with General Cuesta's Army of Extremadura to advance on French-held Madrid via the Tagus Valley.From the outset relations between the two allied generals were poor, not to mention the divisions and enmity within the Spanish juntas and army. Matters only got worse once Wellesley's army entered Spain, thanks to a failure to provide supplies and missed opportunities. Finally, the French army, with King Joseph at its head, marched to confront the allies at Talavera.The fighting did not start well for the British, who were taken by surprise and had to fight hard to extricate themselves from trouble, before inexperienced staff officers and commanders mis-deployed divisions and brigades, nearly resulting in disaster for the Allies when Marshal Victor launched a night attack. The Peninsular Army still had much to learn.The following day, the French attacked again with the full force of a Napoleonic army infantry, cavalry and artillery, but the two-deep British line held and with their confidence shattered, the French withdrew. It was a hard-fought victory for the British commander, who was soon to be ennobled as the Duke of Wellington.

Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to the Peninsular in 1809 convinced that the country could be held against the French. His audacious crossing of the Duoro and speedy victory at Oporto in May, followed by the deceptively easy ejection of Marshal Soult’s corps, confirmed this view, giving him the confidence to plan a campaign with General Cuesta’s Army of Extremadura to advance on French-held Madrid via the Tagus Valley.From the outset relations between the two allied generals were poor, not to mention the divisions and enmity within the Spanish juntas and army. Matters only got worse once Wellesley’s army entered Spain, thanks to a failure to provide supplies and missed opportunities. Finally, the French army, with King Joseph at its head, marched to confront the allies at Talavera.The fighting did not start well for the British, who were taken by surprise and had to fight hard to extricate themselves from trouble, before inexperienced staff officers and commanders mis-deployed divisions and brigades, nearly resulting in disaster for the Allies when Marshal Victor launched a night attack. The Peninsular Army still had much to learn.The following day, the French attacked again with the full force of a Napoleonic army infantry, cavalry and artillery, but the two-deep British line held and with their confidence shattered, the French withdrew. It was a hard-fought victory for the British commander, who was soon to be ennobled as the Duke of Wellington.

Dive into the tactics behind the Battle of Talavera as British and Spanish armies clashed against France in the opening engagements of Spain''s late 1809 campaign.Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to the Peninsular in 1809 convinced that the country could be held against the French. His audacious crossing of the Duoro and speedy victory at Oporto in May, followed by the deceptively easy ejection of Marshal Soult’s corps, confirmed this view, giving him the confidence to plan a campaign with General Cuesta’s Army of Extremadura to advance on French-held Madrid via the Tagus Valley.From the outset relations between the two allied generals were poor, not to mention the divisions and enmity within the Spanish juntas and army. Matters only got worse once Wellesley’s army entered Spain, thanks to a failure to provide supplies and missed opportunities. Finally, the French army, with King Joseph at its head, marched to confront the allies at Talavera.The fighting did not start well for the British, who were taken by surprise and had to fight hard to extricate themselves from trouble, before inexperienced staff officers and commanders mis-deployed divisions and brigades, nearly resulting in disaster for the Allies when Marshal Victor launched a night attack. The Peninsular Army still had much to learn.The following day, the French attacked again with the full force of a Napoleonic army infantry, cavalry and artillery, but the two-deep British line held and with their confidence shattered, the French withdrew. It was a hard-fought victory for the British commander, who was soon to be ennobled as the Duke of Wellington.

In this second of Tim Saunders’ volumes on the opening stage of the 1945 Rhineland Campaign, the focus is to the north of the Reichswald, on the flood plain of the River Rhine and a narrow strip of slightly higher ground.Amidst the rapidly rising flood waters, 3rd Canadian Division earned the nickname ‘The Water Rats’ as they fought to clear villages and dykes, while on their right, the 15th Scottish Division fought through the Germans’ outer defences with tanks becoming deeply bogged before facing the Siegfried Line defences. Even though deceived by a faulty estimate of allied intent, German resistance to the Guards Armoured Brigade, the specialist assault vehicles of 79th Armoured Division and the Scottish infantry, was stiff as they broke through the anti-tank ditches and bunkers.Aiming to maintain momentum, General Horrocks, the commander of XXX Corps, released 43rd Wessex Division and 8 Armoured Brigade into the narrow corridor between the floods and the Reichswald, which resulted in a terrible traffic jam. Despite this, the West Country soldiers and tanks were soon in the badly bombed ruins of Kleve, the first substantial German city to be taken by the British.German reaction to the attack on the ‘Reichswald plug’ was to send their surviving panzer and panzergrenadier formations south into counter attacks to blunt the allied offensive that was poised to spill out into the Rhineland.