William E. Nelson - Böcker

In a projected four-volume series, The Common Law in Colonial America, William E. Nelson will show how the legal systems of Britain's thirteen North American colonies, which were initially established in response to divergent political, economic, and religious initiatives, slowly converged until it became possible by the 1770s to imagine that all thirteen participated in a common American legal order, which diverged in its details but differed far more substantially from English common law. Volume three, The Chesapeake and New England, 1660-1750, reveals how Virginia, which was founded to earn profit, and Massachusetts, which was founded for Puritan religious ends, had both adopted the common law by the mid-eighteenth century and begun to converge toward a common American legal model. The law in the other New England colonies, Nelson argues, although it was distinctive in some respects, gravitated toward the Massachusetts model, while Maryland's law gravitated toward that of Virginia.

The eminent legal historian William E. Nelson's magisterial four-volume The Common Law in Colonial America traces how the many legal orders of Britain's thirteen North American colonies gradually evolved into one American system. Initially established on divergent political, economic, and religious grounds, the various colonial systems slowly converged until it became possible by the 1770s to imagine that all thirteen participated in a common American legal order, which diverged in its details but differed far more substantially from English common law. This fourth and final volume begins where volume three ended. It focuses on the laws of the thirteen colonies in the mid-eighteenth century and on constitutional events leading up to the American Revolution. Nelson first examines procedural and substantive law and looks at important shifts in the law to show how the mid-eighteenth- century colonial legal system in large part functioned effectively in the interests both of Great Britain and of its thirteen colonies. Nelson then turns to constitutional events leading to the Revolution. Here he shows how lawyers deployed ideological arguments not for their own sake, but in order to protect colonial institutional structures and the socio-economic interests of their clients. As lawyers deployed the arguments, they developed them into a constitutional theory that gave primacy to common-law constitutional rights and local self-government. In the process, the lawyers became leaders of the revolutionary movement and a dominant political force in the new United States.

The colonies that comprised pre-revolutionary America had thirteen legal systems and governments. Given their diversity, how did they evolve into a single nation? In E Pluribus Unum, the eminent legal historian William E. Nelson explains how this diverse array of legal orders gradually converged over time, laying the groundwork for the founding of the United States. From their inception, the colonies exercised a range of approaches to the law. For instance, while New England based its legal system around the word of God, Maryland followed the common law tradition, and New York adhered to Dutch law. Over time, though, the British crown standardized legal procedure in an effort to more uniformly and efficiently exert control over the Empire. But, while the common law emerged as the dominant system across the colonies, its effects were far from what English rulers had envisioned.E Pluribus Unum highlights the political context in which the common law developed and how it influenced the United States Constitution. In practice, the triumph of the common law over competing approaches gave lawyers more authority than governing officials. By the end of the eighteenth century, many colonial legal professionals began to espouse constitutional ideology that would mature into the doctrine of judicial review. In turn, laypeople came to accept constitutional doctrine by the time of independence in 1776.Ultimately, Nelson shows that the colonies' gradual embrace of the common law was instrumental to the establishment of the United States. Not simply a masterful legal history of colonial America, Nelson's magnum opus fundamentally reshapes our understanding of the sources of both the American Revolution and the Founding.

William E. Nelson here proposes a new beginning in the study of colonial legal history. Examining all archival legal material for the period 1607-1776 and synthesizing existing scholarship in a four-volume series, The Common Law in Colonial America shows how the legal systems of Britain's thirteen North American colonies--initially established in response to divergent political, economic, and religious initiatives--slowly converged into a common American legal order that differed substantially from English common law. Drawing on groundbreaking and overwhelmingly in-depth research into local court records and statutes, the first volume explores how the law of the Chesapeake colonies--Virginia and Maryland--diverged sharply from the New England colonies--Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, New Haven, Plymouth, and Rhode Island--and traces the roots of these dissimilarities from their initial settlement until approximately 1660. Nelson pointedly examines the disparate motives of the legal systems in the respective colonies as they dealt with religion, price and labor regulations, crimes, public morals, the status of women, and the enforcement of contractual obligations. He reveals how Virginians' zeal for profit led to a harsh legal framework that efficiently squeezed payment out of debtors and labor out of servants; whereas the laws of Massachusetts were primarily concerned with the preservation of local autonomy and the moral values of family-centered farming communities. The law in the other New England colonies, Nelson argues, gravitated towards the Massachusetts model, while Maryland's law, gravitated toward that of Virginia. Comprehensive, authoritative, and extensively researched, The Common Law in Colonial America, Volume 1: The Chesapeake and New England, 1607-1660 is the definitive resource on the beginnings of the common law and its evolution during this vibrant era in America's history. William E. Nelson here proposes a new beginning in the study of colonial legal history.

A Concise History of American Law traces the development of the US legal order from the colonial era to the twenty-first century. Emphasizing the essential role of the common law--derived from judicial precedent, rather than legislation--eminent legal historian William E. Nelson examines the foundations of the American rule of law and its interactions over time with political, economic, and societal transformations. Synthesizing the broad structural, institutional, and ideological changes embedded within American legal history illuminates the significant role courts have played in structuring politics and society. Nelson's accessible chronological narrative details how the rule of law has both facilitated change, by protecting the rights of those who advocate for it, and inhibited change, by acting as a conservative bulwark protecting the rights and property of the rich and powerful. Weaving this fundamental tension between law and politics into his pithy account of how the law was made and practiced over three centuries of American history, Nelson has produced an invaluable guide to the intricate evolution of the modern US legal system.

A Concise History of American Law traces the development of the US legal order from the colonial era to the twenty-first century. Emphasizing the essential role of the common law--derived from judicial precedent, rather than legislation--eminent legal historian William E. Nelson examines the foundations of the American rule of law and its interactions over time with political, economic, and societal transformations. Synthesizing the broad structural, institutional, and ideological changes embedded within American legal history illuminates the significant role courts have played in structuring politics and society. Nelson's accessible chronological narrative details how the rule of law has both facilitated change, by protecting the rights of those who advocate for it, and inhibited change, by acting as a conservative bulwark protecting the rights and property of the rich and powerful. Weaving this fundamental tension between law and politics into his pithy account of how the law was made and practiced over three centuries of American history, Nelson has produced an invaluable guide to the intricate evolution of the modern US legal system.

William E. Nelson's first volume of the four-volume The Common Law of Colonial America (2008) established a new benchmark for study of colonial era legal history. Drawing from both a rich archival base and existing scholarship on the topic, the first volume demonstrated how the legal systems of Britain's thirteen North American colonies-each of which had unique economies, political structures, and religious institutions -slowly converged into a common law order that differed substantially from English common law. The first volume focused on how the legal systems of the Chesapeake colonies--Virginia and Maryland--contrasted with those of the New England colonies and traced these dissimilarities from the initial settlement of America until approximately 1660. In this new volume, Nelson brings the discussion forward, covering the years from 1660, which saw the Restoration of the British monarchy, to 1730. In particular, he analyzes the impact that an increasingly powerful British government had on the evolution of the common law in the New World. As the reach of the Crown extended, Britain imposed far more restrictions than before on the new colonies it had chartered in the Carolinas and the middle Atlantic region. The government's intent was to ensure that colonies' laws would align more tightly with British law. Nelson examines how the newfound coherence in British colonial policy led these new colonies to develop common law systems that corresponded more closely with one another, eliminating much of the variation that socio-economic differences had created in the earliest colonies. As this volume reveals, these trends in governance ultimately resulted in a tension between top-down pressures from Britain for a more uniform system of laws and bottom-up pressures from colonists to develop their own common law norms and preserve their own distinctive societies. Authoritative and deeply researched, the volumes in The Common Law of Colonial America will become the foundational resource for anyone interested the history of American law before the Revolution.

In a remarkably fresh and historically grounded reinterpretation of the American Constitution, William Nelson argues that the fourteenth amendment was written to affirm the general public’s long-standing rhetorical commitment to the principles of equality and individual rights on the one hand, and to the principle of local self-rule on the other.

On the surface, the case itself seems a minor one at best. William Marbury, a last-minute judicial appointee of outgoing Federalist president John Adams, demanded redress from the Supreme Court when his commission was not delivered. But Chief Justice John Marshall could clearly see the danger his demand posed for a weak court filled with Federalist judges. Wary of the Court’s standing with the new Republican administration of Thomas Jefferson, Marshall hit upon a solution that was both principled and pragmatic. He determined that while Marbury was justified in his suit, the law on which his claim was based was in conflict with the Constitution. It was the first time that the Court struck down an act of Congress as unconstitutional, thus establishing the doctrine of judicial review that designates the Court as chief interpreter of the Constitution.Nelson relates the story behind Marbury and explains why it is a foundational case for understanding the Supreme Court. He reveals how Marshall deftly avoided a dangerous political confrontation between the executive and judicial branches by upholding the rule of law. Nelson also shows how Marshall managed to shore up the Court’s prestige and power rather than have it serve partisan political agendas.

On the surface, the case itself seems a minor one at best. William Marbury, a last-minute judicial appointee of outgoing Federalist president John Adams, demanded redress from the Supreme Court when his commission was not delivered. But Chief Justice John Marshall could clearly see the danger his demand posed for a weak court filled with Federalist judges. Wary of the Court’s standing with the new Republican administration of Thomas Jefferson, Marshall hit upon a solution that was both principled and pragmatic. He determined that while Marbury was justified in his suit, the law on which his claim was based was in conflict with the Constitution. It was the first time that the Court struck down an act of Congress as unconstitutional, thus establishing the doctrine of judicial review that designates the Court as chief interpreter of the Constitution.Nelson relates the story behind Marbury and explains why it is a foundational case for understanding the Supreme Court. He reveals how Marshall deftly avoided a dangerous political confrontation between the executive and judicial branches by upholding the rule of law. Nelson also shows how Marshall managed to shore up the Court’s prestige and power rather than have it serve partisan political agendas.

The period between 1860 and 1920—inclusive of the Gilded Age and much of the Lochner era in legal history—is typically regarded as the heyday of conservative jurisprudence. According to this received wisdom, conservative judges and much of the legal profession were on the side of big business and the rich. Judges in this period subscribed to “classical” legal thought, and it was only when this was supplanted by “progressive” legal thought that courts reached decisions critical of business.Renowned legal historian William E. Nelson seeks to correct this narrative by examining in close detail the work of judges in the single jurisdiction of New York as well as the rulings of U.S. Supreme Court justices. What he finds is another type of conservatism besides the one that favors the rich. Instead, the judges in this period often reached decisions that were critical of business. Many of their accomplishments were forward-looking and progressive in character but conservative for another reason: they rigidly followed precedent, with only occasional exceptions. While some legal realists see the emphasis on precedent as a veneer to hide the judges’ policy preferences, Nelson shows that this explanation does not fit the evidence. The judges had no consistent policy preferences, and their decisions favored a wide array of policies.Two Forms of Conservatism is the work of an expert historian with an eye for detail and a deep understanding of legal thought. He shows that these New York judges, who were quite conservative regarding the law, nevertheless laid the foundation for the liberalism of later political leaders.

Based on a detailed examination of New York case law, this pathbreaking book shows how law, politics, and ideology in the state changed in tandem between 1920 and 1980. Early twentieth-century New York was the scene of intense struggle between white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant upper and middle classes located primarily in the upstate region and the impoverished, mainly Jewish and Roman Catholic, immigrant underclass centered in New York City. Beginning in the 1920s, however, judges such as Benjamin N. Cardozo, Henry J. Friendly, Learned Hand, and Harlan Fiske Stone used law to facilitate the entry of the underclass into the economic and social mainstream and to promote tolerance among all New Yorkers. Ultimately, says William Nelson, a new legal ideology was created. By the late 1930s, New Yorkers had begun to reconceptualize social conflict not along class lines but in terms of the power of majorities and the rights of minorities. In the process, they constructed a new approach to law and politics. Though doctrinal change began to slow by the 1960s, the main ambitions of the legalist reformation--liberty, equality, human dignity, and entrepreneurial opportunity--remain the aspirations of nearly all Americans, and of much of the rest of the world, today. |Based on a detailed examination of New York case law, this book shows how law, politics, and ideology in the state changed in tandem between 1920 and 1980, as state court judges used law to facilitate the entry of the underclass into the economic and social mainstream and to promote tolerance.

Nelson identifies three principal institutions involved in conflict resolution: the twon meeting, the church congregation, and the courts of law. He subsequently determines the type of cases over which each institution had jurisdiction and studies the procedures by which each functioned. He examines the tendency after 1800 to bring disputes to the court and sees this as a response to the introduction of new, nontraditional values not held by local institutions.A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

In Pursuit of Right and Justice chronicles the life of the United States District Court's Judge Edward Weinfeld, from his humble Lower East Side origins to his distinction as one of the nation's most respected federal judges. Judge Edward Weinfeld's personal growth and socio-economic mobility provides an excellent illustration of how Catholics and Jews descended from turn-of-the-century immigrants were assimilated into the mainstream of New York and American life during the course of the twentieth century. Weinfeld left a rich collection of personal papers that William E. Nelson examines, which depict the compromises and sacrifices Weinfeld had to make to attain professional advancement. Weinfeld's jurisprudence remained closely tied to his own personal values and to the historical contexts in which cases came to his court.Nelson aptly describes how Weinfeld strove to avoid making new law. He tried to make decisions on preexisting rules or bedrock legal principles; he achieved just results by searching for and finding facts that called those rules into play. Weinfeld's vision of justice was simultaneously a liberal one that enabled him to develop law that reflected societal change, and an apolitical one that did not rest on contested policy judgments.