Library of Modern American History – serie

At the height of the Cold War, the John F. Kennedy administration designed an ambitious plan for the Middle East-its aim was to seek rapprochement with Nasser's Egypt in order to keep the Arab world neutral and contain the perceived communist threat. In order to offset this approach, Kennedy sought to grow relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and embrace Israel's defense priorities-a decision which would begin the US-Israeli 'special relationship'. Here, Antonio Perra shows for the first time how new relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel which would come to shape the Middle East for decades were in fact a by-product of Kennedy's efforts at Soviet containment. The Saudi's in particular were increasingly viewed as 'an atavistic regime who would soon disappear' but Kennedy's support for them-which hardened during the Yemen Crisis even as he sought to placate Nasser-had the unintended effect of making them, as today, the US' great pillar of support in the Middle East.

Influential fundraising groups and senators in the US made enormous efforts in the First Afghan War to present the Mujahedeen as ‘freedom fighters’ – even while the CIA secretly armed them. A mass propaganda effort was launched, aimed at portraying parts of Afghanistan as victims of communist aggression. As we know now, many of those groups that were armed became the seedbeds for organisations like Al-Qaeda. Dr Jacqueline Fitzgibbon, through a forensic investigation of the American PR of the period, argues that this militarised and fractured Afghan society for a generation – partly resulting in the mess today. She examines the American efforts to suppress any reports which showed these forces as anti-western or anti ‘American values’, and instead to portray the arming of partisan groups, often an extremely dangerous course of action, as an example of American values in action.

The US in the 1950s and 1960s wanted to prevent a new communist regime in the Western hemisphere at any cost. Under President Eisenhower the US pursued a policy of support for dictators, the economic shoring up of regimes that impoverished their own people and sanctioned direct interventions such as the overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954. When John F. Kennedy came to power, he promised a reset of relations and set about pouring aid into Latin America. Yet in 1961 Kennedy also attempted to intervene in Central American domestic politics with the Bay of Pigs operation. How far was each of the approaches pursued by the two administrations responsible for increasing tensions and encouraging radicalism on the continent? In answering this question Bevan Sewell shows how Eisenhower's strategic stance on the Cold War became increasingly detrimental to Latin America over time, and shows how similar policies were continued by the Kennedy administration. The US and Latin America provides a new lens through which to assess US policy towards Latin America at an important time in inter-American relations.

Military, social and economic historians have long appreciated the significance of the conflict in Korea in shaping the post-war world. The policy of containment was formed, China was established as an important military power, and the US increased its military expenditure fourfold as a result of a conflict which killed over 33,000 Americans. What has been less appreciated is the role played by the United Nations and the British Commonwealth in influencing US strategy at this time of crisis: the Truman administration invested time and effort into gaining UN approval for the conflict in Korea, and the course of the war was adapted to keep UN allies, often holding crucial strategic positions in other Cold War theatres, in tow. Robert Barnes develops a fresh perspective on these fluctuating relationships, the tensions between Washington and its British Commonwealth allies and their impact on the direction of the conflict in order to challenge the common view that the United States was able to use its dominant position within the UN to pursue its Cold War ambitions with impunity.This important new interpretation is supported by evidence from a wealth of sources, from official government records to private papers and memoirs written by the most important American and Commonwealth personalities directly involved in shaping the UN's response to the conflict. This study presents a thorough deconstruction of the decision-making process behind US handling of the Korean War from the outbreak of conflict in 1950 to the Geneva Conference of 1954. This will be essential reading for students of International Relations, Cold War Studies and modern History.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by Harry S. Truman after World War II and it soon provided covert political and paramilitary support to further US foreign policy. Strengthened by President Eisenhower and under the command of Allen Dulles, by the early 1950s, the CIA was actively overthrowing governments, notably Prime Minister Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and President Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954. The Agency was less effective in Eastern Europe, however, where the Soviet Union had established control, despite opportunities for US interference such as the East German riots in 1953 and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.Stephen Long challenges the accepted view that the US believed in a post-World War II ordering of Europe which placed the East outside an American 'sphere of influence'. He argues instead that 'disorder prevailed over design' in the planning and organization of intelligence operations during the early stages of the Cold War, and that the period represents a missed opportunity for the US during the Cold War.Featuring new archival material and a new approach which seeks to unpick the relationship between the CIA, the US government and the Soviet Union, The CIA and the Soviet Bloc sheds new light on espionage, the Cold War, US diplomatic history and the history of twentieth-century Europe.

Under the growing shadow of the Cold War, President Eisenhower announced his 'Open Skies' initiative to Soviet, British and French delegations at the Geneva Summit in 1955. In a climate of intense fear and suspicion, this proposed system of mutual aerial inspection was dismissed by Khrushchev and the Soviet Union as nothing more than an 'espionage plot'. Nevertheless, Eisenhower campaigned for its implementation until the end of his presidency. Here, Helen Bury provides a new interpretation of Eisenhower's 'Open Skies' programme, arguing that it functioned as a corrective to John Foster Dulles' 'New Look' defence strategy - which relied on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. A critic of the 'military-industrial' complex which was gaining power in American statecraft and which sought to expand military spending, Eisenhower aimed instead to safeguard the economic strength of America. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex is the first in-depth study of the Open Skies policy and essential reading for historians of the Cold War and the International Relations of the United States.

Under the growing shadow of the Cold War, President Eisenhower announced his 'Open Skies' initiative to Soviet, British and French delegations at the Geneva Summit in 1955. In a climate of intense fear and suspicion, this proposed system of mutual aerial inspection was dismissed by Khrushchev and the Soviet Union as nothing more than an 'espionage plot'. Nevertheless, Eisenhower campaigned for its implementation until the end of his presidency. Here, Helen Bury provides a new interpretation of Eisenhower's 'Open Skies' programme, arguing that it functioned as a corrective to John Foster Dulles' 'New Look' defence strategy - which relied on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. A critic of the 'military-industrial' complex which was gaining power in American statecraft and which sought to expand military spending, Eisenhower aimed instead to safeguard the economic strength of America. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex is the first in-depth study of the Open Skies policy and essential reading for historians of the Cold War and the International Relations of the United States.

Military, social and economic historians have long appreciated the significance of the conflict in Korea in shaping the post-war world. The policy of containment was formed, China was established as an important military power, and the US increased its military expenditure fourfold as a result of a conflict which killed over 33,000 Americans. What has been less appreciated is the role played by the United Nations and the British Commonwealth in influencing US strategy at this time of crisis: the Truman administration invested time and effort into gaining UN approval for the conflict in Korea, and the course of the war was adapted to keep UN allies, often holding crucial strategic positions in other Cold War theatres, in tow. Robert Barnes develops a fresh perspective on these fluctuating relationships, the tensions between Washington and its British Commonwealth allies and their impact on the direction of the conflict in order to challenge the common view that the United States was able to use its dominant position within the UN to pursue its Cold War ambitions with impunity.This important new interpretation is supported by evidence from a wealth of sources, from official government records to private papers and memoirs written by the most important American and Commonwealth personalities directly involved in shaping the UN's response to the conflict. This study presents a thorough deconstruction of the decision-making process behind US handling of the Korean War from the outbreak of conflict in 1950 to the Geneva Conference of 1954. This will be essential reading for students of International Relations, Cold War Studies and modern History.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by Harry S. Truman after World War II and it soon provided covert political and paramilitary support to further US foreign policy. Strengthened by President Eisenhower, by the early 1950s, under the command of Allen Dulles, the CIA was actively overthrowing governments-notably Prime Minister Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and President Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954. The Agency was less effective in Eastern Europe, however, where the Soviet Union had established control- despite opportunities for US intereference such as the East German riots in 1953 and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Here, Stephen Long challenges the accepted view that the US believed in a post- World War II ordering of Europe which placed the East outside an American 'sphere of influence'. He argues instead that 'disorder prevailed over design' in the planning and organization of intelligence operations during the early stages of the Cold War, and that the period represents a missed opportunity for the US during the Cold War.Featuring new archival material and a new approach which seeks to unpick the relationship between the CIA, the US government and the Soviet Union, The CIA and the Soviet Bloc sheds new light on espionage, the Cold War, US diplomatic history and the history of twentieth-century Europe.

The US in the 1950s and 1960s wanted to prevent a new communist regime in the Western hemisphere at any cost. Under President Eisenhower the US pursued a policy of support for dictators, the economic shoring up of regimes that impoverished their own people and sanctioned direct interventions such as the overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954. When John F. Kennedy came to power, he promised a reset of relations and set about pouring aid into Latin America. Yet in 1961 Kennedy also attempted to intervene in Central American domestic politics with the Bay of Pigs operation. How far was each of the approaches pursued by the two administrations responsible for increasing tensions and encouraging radicalism on the continent? In answering this question Bevan Sewell shows how Eisenhower's strategic stance on the Cold War became increasingly detrimental to Latin America over time, and shows how similar policies were continued by the Kennedy administration. The US and Latin America provides a new lens through which to assess US policy towards Latin America at an important time in inter-American relations.

The Reagan era is usually seen as an era of unheralded prosperity, and as a high-watermark of Republican success. President Ronald Reagan's belief in "Reaganomics", his media-friendly sound-bites and "can do" personality have come to define the era. However, this was also a time of domestic protest and unrest. Under Reagan the US was directly involved in the revolutions which were sweeping the Central Americas- El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala -and in Nicaragua Reagan armed the Contras who fought the Sandinistas. This book seeks to show how the left within the US reacted and protested against these events. The Nation, Verso Books and the Guardian exploded in popularity, riding high on the back of popular anti-interventionist sentiment in America, while the film-maker Oliver Stone led a group of directors making films with a radical left-wing message. The author shows how the1980s in America were a formative cultural period for the anti-Reaganites as well as the Reaganites, and in doing so charts a new history.