Special Issues of Thinking and Reasoning – serie

The study of deductive reasoning is one of the key areas in cognitive psychology. Much of the initial impetus for studies in this field came from a developmental perspective, in particular as a consequence of Piaget's theory of formal operations. Subsequent research that examined some of the predictions of this theory has led to what appear to be quite contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, reasoning is held to be a very precociously acquired, if not innate, competence, such that very young children can reason 'logically'. On the other hand, reasoning in adults has been found to be so convincingly 'illogical' that the very notion of logical competence, even in educated adults has been put into question. Clearly, these two conclusions cannot both be true, and their continuing existence reflects the increasing fragmentation of studies of children and of adults. In this context, developmental studies appear to be critical to an integrative approach to reasoning that considers both children and adults within a single theoretical and empirical perspective. This issue presents some of the more important developmental perspectives on the development of reasoning.

The work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky has transformed the study of judgment and decision-making, and penetrated related disciplines such as economics, finance, marketing, law and medicine. In recognition of these achievements, Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2003. This special issue presents ongoing research inspired by both Kahneman and Tversky. It covers many of the central themes – the heuristics and biases of judgment and prediction, framing effects, assessments and predictions of utility – that made their work so innovative. The specially written papers illustrate the range and depth of this work, and emphasise its continued relevance to current research.