Transforming War – serie

As Clausewitz observed, “In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect.” The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit's skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice.Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.

One of the most difficult security challenges of the post–Cold War era has been stabilizing failing states in an era of irregular warfare. A consistent component of the strategy to address this problem has been security force assistance where outside powers train and advise the host nation’s military.   Despite billions of dollars spent, the commitment of thousands of advisors, and innumerable casualties, the American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq failed catastrophically. Nevertheless, among those colossal military disasters were pockets of success. The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) held back the Islamic State in 2014 long enough to allow American and allied forces to flow back into the country, and many Afghan commando units fought to the bitter end as their country disintegrated around them.   What made those units successful while the larger missions ended disastrously? Author Frank K. Sobchak explores security force assistance across five case studies, examining what factors were most critical for U.S. Special Forces units to build capable partners like the ISOF and the commandos. More specifically, the book assesses the impact of five components of Special Forces advisory missions: language training and cultural awareness of the advising force; the partner force-to-advisor ratio; the advisors’ ability to organize host-nation forces; whether advisors are permitted to guide in combat; and the consistency in advisor pairing.  Based on the experiences of U.S. Army Special Forces in El Salvador (1981–1991), Colombia (2002–2016), the Philippines (2001–2015), Iraq (2003–2011), and Afghanistan (2007–2021), Sobchak argues that the most crucial factors in producing combat-effective partners are consistency in advisor pairing and maintaining a partner force-to-advisor ratio of twelve special forces soldiers advising a company-sized force or smaller. Intriguingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, at first glance language training and cultural awareness do not seem to be critical factors, as most of the Green Berets that trained units in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked both capabilities. Despite an orthodoxy that argues the opposite, there is little evidence that combat advising is decisive in producing effective partners and there is conflicting evidence that language training and cultural awareness are important. Many of these findings, while focused on Special Forces operations and doctrine, could be used to improve the odds of success for larger security-force assistance missions as well.

Always at War is the story of Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the early decades of the Cold War. More than a simple history, it describes how an organization dominated by experienced World War II airmen developed a unique culture that thrives to this day.Strategic Air Command was created because of the Air Force's internal beliefs, but the organization evolved as it responded to the external environment created by the Cold War. In the aftermath of World War II and the creation of an independent air service, the Air Force formed SAC because of a belief in the military potential of strategic bombing centralized under one commander. As the Cold War intensified, so did SAC's mission.In order to prepare SAC's "warriors" to daily fight an enemy they did not see, as well as to handle the world's most dangerous arsenal, the command, led by General Curtis LeMay, emphasized security, personal responsibility, and competition among the command. Its resources, political influence, and manning grew as did its "culture" until reaching its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAC became synonymous with the Cold War and its culture forever changed the Air Force as well as those who served.

It is convenient to think that bad guys are drumming up money for their activities far away and in shady back alleys, but the violent non-state actors (VNSAs) of the world are hiding in plain sight. They peddle knockoff sneakers, pass the hat at ethnic festivals, take a cut of untaxed booze sales, swindle senior citizens with bogus phone calls about needing bail in Mexico, and run money through mainstream banks to buy up rental properties (just to name a few). On a grand scale, their behavior erodes rule of law, creates moral injuries from corruption, and emboldens bad actors to steal and back violent tactics with impunity. Blood Money analyzes the ways in which VNSAs find money for their operations and sustainment, from controlling a valuable commodity to harnessing the grievances of a networked diaspora, and it looks at the channels through which they can flip the positives of globalization into flat, fast, and frictionless movement of people, funds, and materials needed to terrorize and coerce their opponents. Author Margaret Sankey highlights the mundane and everyday nature of these tactics, occurring under our noses online, in legitimate marketplaces, and with the aegis of intelligence services and national governments.   While reforms attempt to curtail these options, their utility and efficacy as tools of finance have proved inadequate for sovereign states.  VNSAs' defiance of rules and their capable adaptation and innovation make them extremely difficult to pin down or prosecute. Many security publications stress legislation and enforcement or frame illicit finance as a military or police problem. With Blood Money, Sankey points out the many ways VNSAs evade law enforcement, and she offers options for involving consumers and activists in exercising agency and choices in how they apply their money and where it goes. Blood Money also provides context for whole-of-government approaches to attacking underlying supports for illicit financing channels. How these groups finance themselves is key to understanding how they function and what actions might be taken to derail their plans or dismantle their structure.

How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking. With that thought in mind, the contributors to Strategy, each a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, widely considered the Department of Defense's premier school of strategy, offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power. Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, must employ critical thinking where the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace are concerned. Strategy examines various sub-disciplines regarding the use of power, and illuminates different approaches to thinking which have implications beyond the implementation of force.

As Clausewitz observed, ""In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect."" The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit's skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case, the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.

Steven A. Pomeroy has authored the first history of the American mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a technology the United States spent four decades and billions of dollars creating but never deployed. An Untaken Road showcases how the evolution of a technology that ultimately never existed and the politics that surrounded it end up significantly shaping American nuclear strategy and forces for decades. Utilizing recently declassified documents, years of experience, and an unrivaled passion for the history of military technologies, Pomeroy has created a new framework on the nature of strategic weapons technology innovation. This thorough study of a ""road not taken"" is a must read for those seeking to understand the challenges and constraints on U.S. military weapon programs, especially when inter-organization competition, domestic politics, strategic needs, and new technologies collide.

From Yeomanettes to Fighter Jets addresses a major element of twenty-first century sea power —the integration of women into all military units of the U.S. Navy. Randy Goguen delineates the cultural, economic, and political conditions as well as the technological changes that shaped this movement over the course of a century. Starting with the establishment of the Yeomen (F) in World War I and continuing through today to address the current arguments over the registration of women for Selective Service and the reform of the military justice system, Goguen describes how changes in civilian society affected the U. S. Navy and the role of Navy women. She highlights the contributions of key women and men in the military and civilian spheres who were willing to challenge convention and prejudice to advance the integration of women and make the U.S. Navy a stronger institution.Today women in the U.S. Navy have proven themselves essential to the mission success of the service. They are forward deployed around the world, sharing the same risks as their male counterparts. Some have commanded logistics and combatant ships, including aircraft carriers. They fly and maintain combat and patrol aircraft and serve as crew members on ships and submarines. Some hold major commands ashore and have risen to the highest echelons of navy leadership.Integrating women into the U.S. Navy has been a long and often contentious process, as women strived to overcome resistance imposed by prevailing cultural and institutional norms and patriarchal prejudices. Goguen, a retired naval reserve officer who holds a PhD in military history from Temple University, has written a comprehensive and up-to-date history of women’s integration into the Navy She argues that throughout the process, the decisive force driving progress was exigency. That exigency took various forms: two world wars, communist expansionism in the Cold War, the ending of the draft and the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, as well as the political pressures posed by social change, especially the mid twentieth- century feminist and contemporary “Me Too” movements. Despite a deeply ingrained institutional resistance cultivated within an insular, often misogynist, sea-going subculture, today’s U.S. Navy could not meet its mission requirements without women. Goguen asserts, “Exigency is the mother of integration.”