Agency and Deontic Logic

John Horty is a Professor in the Philosophy Department and the Institute for Advanced Computer Studies at the University of Maryland. He is the author of Frege on Definitions (Oxford, 2007) as well as papers on a variety of topics in logic, philosophy, and computer science.

"Agency and Deontic Logic represents a major advance in the field, developing fresh ideas for thinking about longstanding internal problems and making significant connections with external areas of research, most notably decision theory and utilitarian ethical theory. Although the book is technically sophisticated, the discussion is exceptionally clear and readable and benefits greatly from numerous examples and diagrams. Agency and Deontic Logic should interest an audience that includes logicians, computer scientists, and those working in decision theory, game theory, and ethics, as well as applications of these disciplines.

• 1. OVERVIEW ; 2. INDETERMINISM AND AGENCY ; 2.1 Branching time ; 2.1.1 Frames and Models ; 2.1.2 2.1.2 Propositions ; 2.2 Individual agency ; 2.2.1 Agents and choices ; 2.2.2 Stit operators ; 2.2.3 Some logical considerations ; 2.3 Individual ability ; 2.3.1 Kenny's objections ; 2.3.2 Brown's theory ; 2.3.3 Refraining and ability ; 2.4 Group agency and ability ; 2.4.1 Group actions ; 2.4.2 A group agency operator ; 3. OUGHT TO BE ; 3.1 The standard theory ; 3.2 A utilitarian theory ; 3.2.1 General models ; 3.2.2 Utilitarian models ; 3.2.3 Logic of the utilitarian ought ; 3.3 The Meinong/Chisholm analysis ; 3.3.1 The analysis ; 3.3.2 Some logical features ; 3.4 Evaluating the analysis ; 3.4.1 Agency in the complement ; 3.4.2 The gambling problem ; 4. OUGHT TO DO ; 4.1 Dominance ; 4.1.1 Ordering the propositions ; 4.1.2 A sure-thing argument ; 4.1.3 Ordering the actions ; 4.2 Dominance act utilitarianism ; 4.2.1 Optimal actions ; 4.2.2 The finite choice condition ; 4.3 A new deontic operator ; 4.3.1 The definition ; 4.3.2 Deontic logic and act utilitarianism ; 4.3.3 Logic of the dominance ought ; 4.4 Independence ; 4.4.1 Independence and conditionals ; 4.4.2 Conditionals and sure-thing reasoning ; 4.4.3 Refining the analysis ; 5. CONDITIONAL OUGHTS ; 5.1 Conditionally optimal actions ; 5.2 A conditional operator ; 5.2.1 The definition ; 5.2.2 Some logical considerations ; 5.3 Two patterns of argument ; 5.3.1 The action argument ; 5.3.2 The ought argument ; 5.4 Orthodox act utilitarianism ; 5.4.1 An example ; 5.4.2 The definition ; 5.4.3 An orthodox deontic operator ; 6. GROUP OUGHTS ; 6.1 Optimal group actions ; 6.2 Individual and group act utilitarianism ; 6.3 Deontic operators for group oughts ; 6.3.1 Definitions ; 6.3.2 Some logical points ; 6.4 Rule utilitarianism ; 6.4.1 Formulating the theory ; 6.4.2 Act and rule utilitarianism ; 7. STRATEGIC OUGHTS ; 7.1 Strategies ; 7.1.1 Basic idea ; 7.1.2 Limiting the range ; 7.2 Strategies and choices ; 7.2.1 Agency ; 7.2.2 Ability ; 7.3 Strategic dominance and optimality ; 7.3.1 Dominance ; 7.3.2 Optimality ; 7.4 A strategic ought operator ; 7.4.1 The definition ; 7.4.2 Logical points ; 7.4.3 Actualism and possibilism ; A. Proofs of validities and propositions ; A.1 Validities ; A.2 Propositions ; Bibliography ; Index