A. W. Moore – författare

Very Short Introductions: Brilliant, Sharp, Inspiring Kurt Gödel first published his celebrated theorem, showing that no axiomatization can determine the whole truth and nothing but the truth concerning arithmetic, nearly a century ago. The theorem challenged prevalent presuppositions about the nature of mathematics and was consequently of considerable mathematical interest, while also raising various deep philosophical questions. Gödel's Theorem has since established itself as a landmark intellectual achievement, having a profound impact on today's mathematical ideas. Gödel and his theorem have attracted something of a cult following, though his theorem is often misunderstood.This Very Short Introduction places the theorem in its intellectual and historical context, and explains the key concepts as well as common misunderstandings of what it actually states. A. W. Moore provides a clear statement of the theorem, presenting two proofs, each of which has something distinctive to teach about its content. Moore also discusses the most important philosophical implications of the theorem. In particular, Moore addresses the famous question of whether the theorem shows the human mind to have mathematical powers beyond those of any possible computerABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

The Human A Priori is a collection of essays by A.W. Moore, one of them previously unpublished and the rest all revised. These essays are all concerned, more or less directly, with something ineliminably anthropocentric in our systematic pursuit of a priori sense-making. Part I deals with the nature, scope, and limits of a priori sense-making in general. Parts II, III, and IV deal with what are often thought to be the three great exemplars of the systematic pursuit of such sense-making: philosophy in the case of Part II, ethics in the case of Part III, and mathematics in the case of Part IV. Much of the attention throughout is devoted to the work of other philosophers: Kant and Wittgenstein feature prominently, and five of the essays take the form of reviews or critical notices of recent work in philosophy. But the interest in never purely exegetical. One of the lessons that emerges from the essays, either in opposition to the views of these other philosophers or by invocation of their views, is that we humans achieve nothing of real significance in philosophy, ethics, or mathematics except from a human point of view, and hence that all three of these pursuits can be said to betoken what may reasonably be called 'the human a priori'.

A. W. Moore argues in this bold and ambitious book that it is possible to think about the world 'from no point of view'. He examines this idea, explains its significance, and considers reasons for thinking that such a thing is not possible. In particular, drawing on the work of Kant and Wittgenstein, he considers transcendental idealism. This leads to the heart of his project: a study of ineffability and nonsense. His fundamental idea is that transcendental idealism is nonsense resulting from the attempt to express certain inexpressible insights. This idea is applied to a wide range of fundamental philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject-matter of mathematics, anti-realism, value, and God; Moores original approach forges unexpected connections between the various questions he addresses. Points of View is a lucid and lively study of the relation between reality and our representations of it, the upshot of which is a powerful critique of our own finitude.

The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a wide variety of souces, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the question which which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading.

This book is concerned with the history of metaphysics since Descartes. Taking as its definition of metaphysics 'the most general attempt to make sense of things', it charts the evolution of this enterprise through various competing conceptions of its possibility, scope, and limits. The book is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the early modern period, the late modern period in the analytic tradition, and the late modern period in non-analytic traditions. In its unusually wide range, A. W. Moore's study refutes the tired old cliché that there is some unbridgeable gulf between analytic philosophy and philosophy of other kinds. It also advances its own distinctive and compelling conception of what metaphysics is and why it matters. Moore explores how metaphysics can help us to cope with continually changing demands on our humanity by making sense of things in ways that are radically new.

This book is concerned with the history of metaphysics since Descartes. Taking as its definition of metaphysics 'the most general attempt to make sense of things', it charts the evolution of this enterprise through various competing conceptions of its possibility, scope, and limits. The book is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the early modern period, the late modern period in the analytic tradition, and the late modern period in non-analytic traditions. In its unusually wide range, A. W. Moore's study refutes the tired old cliché that there is some unbridgeable gulf between analytic philosophy and philosophy of other kinds. It also advances its own distinctive and compelling conception of what metaphysics is and why it matters. Moore explores how metaphysics can help us to cope with continually changing demands on our humanity by making sense of things in ways that are radically new.

What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Spanning his career from his first publication to one of his last lectures, the book's previously unpublished or uncollected essays address metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, as well as the scope and limits of philosophy itself. The essays are unified by Williams's constant concern that philosophy maintain contact with the human problems that animate it in the first place. As the book's editor, A. W. Moore, writes in his introduction, the title essay is "a kind of manifesto for Williams's conception of his own life's work."It is where he most directly asks "what philosophy can and cannot contribute to the project of making sense of things"--answering that what philosophy can best help make sense of is "being human." Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline is one of three posthumous books by Williams to be published by Princeton University Press. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument was published in the fall of 2005. The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy is being published shortly after the present volume.