Altuğ Yalçıntaş – författare

What narratives are underrepresented in the history of economic thought? How do economists account for freedom, justice, and democracy in non-Western cultures? How are ideas in non-English speaking countries disseminated? This book answers these critical questions with contributions by authors from underrepresented backgrounds within economics.Decolonial Narratives in Economics offers alternative perspectives to challenge mainstream rhetoric in economics that ignores the existence and significance of colonialism in knowledge production. Moving beyond monist narratives, authors engage in a pluralist conversation on ignored scholarships in the field that have theoretical and practical significance today. Expanding the scope of decoloniality in economics, the book questions coloniality as a research practice to better understand how it operates and to develop strategies to address the ethical issues associated with it. Ultimately, this book initiates a dialogue with authors who produce decolonial narratives within or about the nations and cultures that are underrepresented in economics.Decolonial Narratives in Economics is an essential read for students and scholars of development economics, economic history, and political, radical and feminist economies, as well as politics, sociology, philosophy and cultural and indigenous studies.

Is economics always self-corrective? Do erroneous theorems permanently disappear from the market of economic ideas? Intellectual Path Dependence in Economics argues that errors in economics are not always corrected. Although economists are often critical and open-minded, unfit explanations are nonetheless able to reproduce themselves. The problem is that theorems sometimes survive the intellectual challenges in the market of economic ideas even when they are falsified or invalidated by criticism and an abundance of counter-evidence.A key question which often gets little or no attention is: why do economists not reject theories when they have been refuted by evidence and falsified by philosophical reasoning? This book explores the answer to this question by examining the phenomenon of intellectual path dependence in the history of economic thought. It argues that the key reason why economists do not reject refuted theories is the epistemic costs of starting to use new theories. Epistemic costs are primarily the costs of scarcity of the most valued element in academic production: time. Epistemic scarcity overwhelmingly dominates the evolution of scientific research in such a way that when researchers start off a new research project, they allocate time between replicable and un-replicable research.This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the methodology, philosophy and history of economics.