Anand Toprani – författare

The history of oil is a chapter in the story of Europe''s geopolitical decline in the twentieth century. During the era of the two world wars, a lack of oil constrained Britain and Germany from exerting their considerable economic and military power independently. Both nations'' efforts to restore the independence they had enjoyed during the Age of Coal backfired by inducing strategic over-extension, which served only to hasten their demise as great powers.Having fought World War I with oil imported from the United States, Britain was determined to avoid relying upon another great power for its energy needs ever again. Even before the Great War had ended, Whitehall implemented a strategy of developing alternative sources of oil under British control. Britain''s key supplier would be the Middle East - already a region of vital importance to the British Empire - whose oil potential was still unproven. As it turned out, there was plenty of oil in theMiddle East, but Italian hostility after 1935 threatened transit through the Mediterranean. A shortage of tankers ruled out re-routing shipments around Africa, forcing Britain to import oil from US-controlled sources in the Western Hemisphere and depleting its foreign exchange reserves. Even as warloomed in 1939, therefore, Britain''s quest for independence from the United States had failed.Germany was in an even worse position than Britain. It could not import oil from overseas in wartime due to the threat of blockade, while accumulating large stockpiles was impossible because of the economic and financial costs. The Third Reich went to war dependent on petroleum synthesized from coal, domestic crude oil, and overland imports, primarily from Romania. German leaders were confident, however, that they had enough oil to fight a series of short campaigns that would deliver to themthe mastery of Europe. This plan derailed following the victory over France, when Britain continued to fight. This left Germany responsible for Europe''s oil requirements while cut off from world markets. A looming energy crisis in Axis Europe, the absence of strategic alternatives, and ideologicalimperatives all compelled Germany in June 1941 to invade the Soviet Union and fulfill the Third Reich''s ultimate ambition of becoming a world power - a decision that ultimately sealed its fate.

The history of oil is a chapter in the story of Europe''s geopolitical decline in the twentieth century. During the era of the two world wars, a lack of oil constrained Britain and Germany from exerting their considerable economic and military power independently. Both nations'' efforts to restore the independence they had enjoyed during the Age of Coal backfired by inducing strategic over-extension, which served only to hasten their demise as great powers.Having fought World War I with oil imported from the United States, Britain was determined to avoid relying upon another great power for its energy needs ever again. Even before the Great War had ended, Whitehall implemented a strategy of developing alternative sources of oil under British control. Britain''s key supplier would be the Middle East - already a region of vital importance to the British Empire - whose oil potential was still unproven. As it turned out, there was plenty of oil in theMiddle East, but Italian hostility after 1935 threatened transit through the Mediterranean. A shortage of tankers ruled out re-routing shipments around Africa, forcing Britain to import oil from US-controlled sources in the Western Hemisphere and depleting its foreign exchange reserves. Even as warloomed in 1939, therefore, Britain''s quest for independence from the United States had failed.Germany was in an even worse position than Britain. It could not import oil from overseas in wartime due to the threat of blockade, while accumulating large stockpiles was impossible because of the economic and financial costs. The Third Reich went to war dependent on petroleum synthesized from coal, domestic crude oil, and overland imports, primarily from Romania. German leaders were confident, however, that they had enough oil to fight a series of short campaigns that would deliver to themthe mastery of Europe. This plan derailed following the victory over France, when Britain continued to fight. This left Germany responsible for Europe''s oil requirements while cut off from world markets. A looming energy crisis in Axis Europe, the absence of strategic alternatives, and ideologicalimperatives all compelled Germany in June 1941 to invade the Soviet Union and fulfill the Third Reich''s ultimate ambition of becoming a world power - a decision that ultimately sealed its fate.

The history of oil is a chapter in the story of Europe's geopolitical decline in the twentieth century. During the era of the two world wars, a lack of oil constrained Britain and Germany from exerting their considerable economic and military power independently. Both nations' efforts to restore the independence they had enjoyed during the Age of Coal backfired by inducing strategic over-extension, which served only to hasten their demise as great powers. Having fought World War I with oil imported from the United States, Britain was determined to avoid relying upon another great power for its energy needs ever again. Even before the Great War had ended, Whitehall implemented a strategy of developing alternative sources of oil under British control. Britain's key supplier would be the Middle East - already a region of vital importance to the British Empire - whose oil potential was still unproven. As it turned out, there was plenty of oil in the Middle East, but Italian hostility after 1935 threatened transit through the Mediterranean. A shortage of tankers ruled out re-routing shipments around Africa, forcing Britain to import oil from US-controlled sources in the Western Hemisphere and depleting its foreign exchange reserves. Even as war loomed in 1939, therefore, Britain's quest for independence from the United States had failed.Germany was in an even worse position than Britain. It could not import oil from overseas in wartime due to the threat of blockade, while accumulating large stockpiles was impossible because of the economic and financial costs. The Third Reich went to war dependent on petroleum synthesized from coal, domestic crude oil, and overland imports, primarily from Romania. German leaders were confident, however, that they had enough oil to fight a series of short campaigns that would deliver to them the mastery of Europe. This plan derailed following the victory over France, when Britain continued to fight. This left Germany responsible for Europe's oil requirements while cut off from world markets. A looming energy crisis in Axis Europe, the absence of strategic alternatives, and ideological imperatives all compelled Germany in June 1941 to invade the Soviet Union and fulfill the Third Reich's ultimate ambition of becoming a world power - a decision that ultimately sealed its fate.

In recent decades, sanctions have become the preferred tool for the nonviolent coercion of other nations. The US government employs sanctions and embargoes to pressure not only enemies but sometimes even its friends. Despite their ubiquity, the debate over their efficacy continues. Measuring their success is controversial since many sanctions are economic, while the desired outcomes are political. Under what circumstances can sanctions or embargoes deliver their intended policy objectives at an acceptable cost? How can they best be integrated with other available instruments of national power?The Strategy of Sanctions uses case studies from antiquity to the present to evaluate the strategic utility of sanctions and embargoes. The authors utilize a blended approach combining earlier definitions of sanctions, concepts from teaching of strategy, as well as terms of their own creation. They apply a common framework for teaching strategy, which disaggregates operational-level from strategic-level goals, and goals from strategies. By examining sanctions in different eras and contexts, the book highlights the circumstances that are most conducive to their efficacy.

In recent decades, sanctions have become the preferred tool for the nonviolent coercion of other nations. The US government employs sanctions and embargoes to pressure not only enemies but sometimes even its friends. Despite their ubiquity, the debate over their efficacy continues. Measuring their success is controversial since many sanctions are economic, while the desired outcomes are political. Under what circumstances can sanctions or embargoes deliver their intended policy objectives at an acceptable cost? How can they best be integrated with other available instruments of national power?The Strategy of Sanctions uses case studies from antiquity to the present to evaluate the strategic utility of sanctions and embargoes. The authors utilize a blended approach combining earlier definitions of sanctions, concepts from teaching of strategy, as well as terms of their own creation. They apply a common framework for teaching strategy, which disaggregates operational-level from strategic-level goals, and goals from strategies. By examining sanctions in different eras and contexts, the book highlights the circumstances that are most conducive to their efficacy.

John Lehman is a legendary figure in American naval history. He was one of the youngest people ever to serve as Secretary of the Navy and arguably the most-powerful holder of that office. While the President and Secretary of Defense determine defense policy in the United States, it is up to the military services to implement it. The secretary of each service – the "man in the middle," as one Air Force Secretary put it – represents the higher-level civilian leadership to the military. Lehman filled this role unlike anyone who came before (or after) him. He reversed the decline in the size of the Navy after the Vietnam War, oversaw the Navy's expansion to almost 600 ships during the defense buildup of the Reagan era, and promoted an offensive maritime strategy against the Soviet Union. Drawing from recently declassified sources, private archives, and interviews with dozens of Lehman's contemporaries, Anand Toprani offers a fresh perspective on the Navy during the last decade of the Cold War. By exploring how Lehman confronted his major challenges, from applying naval power against a continental power to reforming an inefficient system for designing and procuring new weapons that has produced a smaller and more-expensive military, this book gives readers vital insights into contemporary defense policy, as national-security leaders confront similar problems today.

John Lehman is a legendary figure in American naval history. He was one of the youngest people ever to serve as Secretary of the Navy and arguably the most-powerful holder of that office. While the President and Secretary of Defense determine defense policy in the United States, it is up to the military services to implement it. The secretary of each service—the "man in the middle," as one Air Force Secretary put it—represents the higher-level civilian leadership to the military. Lehman filled this role unlike anyone who came before (or after) him. He reversed the decline in the size of the Navy after the Vietnam War, oversaw the Navy's expansion to almost 600 ships during the defense buildup of the Reagan era, and promoted an offensive maritime strategy against the Soviet Union. Drawing from recently declassified sources, private archives, and interviews with dozens of Lehman's contemporaries, Anand Toprani offers a fresh perspective on the Navy during the last decade of the Cold War. By exploring how Lehman confronted his major challenges, from applying naval power against a continental power to reforming an inefficient system for designing and procuring new weapons that has produced a smaller and more-expensive military, this book gives readers vital insights into contemporary defense policy, as national-security leaders confront similar problems today.

A roadmap for US military innovation based on the Navy’s history of success through civilian-military collaborationsThe US military must continually adapt to evolving technologies, shifting adversaries, and a changing social environment for its personnel. In American Defense Reform, Dave Oliver and Anand Toprani use US naval history as a guide for leading successful change in the Pentagon.American Defense Reform provides a historical analysis of the Navy during four key periods of disruptive transformation: the 1940s Revolt of the Admirals, the McNamara Revolution in systems analysis, the fallout from the Vietnam War, and the end of the Cold War. The authors draw insights from historical documents, previously unpublished interviews from four-star admirals, and Oliver’s own experiences as a senior naval officer and defense industry executive. They show that Congress alone cannot effectively create change and reveal barriers to applying the experience of the private sector to the public sector Ultimately, Oliver and Toprani show that change can only come from a collaborative effort between civilians, the military, and industry, each making vital contributions. American Defense Reform provides insights and practical recommendations essential to reforming national defense to meet future demands.

A roadmap for US military innovation based on the Navy’s history of success through civilian-military collaborationsThe US military must continually adapt to evolving technologies, shifting adversaries, and a changing social environment for its personnel. In American Defense Reform, Dave Oliver and Anand Toprani use US naval history as a guide for leading successful change in the Pentagon.American Defense Reform provides a historical analysis of the Navy during four key periods of disruptive transformation: the 1940s Revolt of the Admirals, the McNamara Revolution in systems analysis, the fallout from the Vietnam War, and the end of the Cold War. The authors draw insights from historical documents, previously unpublished interviews from four-star admirals, and Oliver’s own experiences as a senior naval officer and defense industry executive. They show that Congress alone cannot effectively create change and reveal barriers to applying the experience of the private sector to the public sector Ultimately, Oliver and Toprani show that change can only come from a collaborative effort between civilians, the military, and industry, each making vital contributions. American Defense Reform provides insights and practical recommendations essential to reforming national defense to meet future demands.