Anne Jeffrey – författare

Aristotelian Naturalism is an ethics on which moral goodness is a species of natural goodness-the kind of goodness we find on display creatures whose habits and activities enable them to thrive. What it takes for humans to be good is to have habits and engage in activities that contribute to human flourishing. The primary aim of this book is to present a revisionist version of Aristotelian Naturalism enriched by empirical evidence and responsive to criticisms from feminist and disability ethics. Pluralist Aristotelian Naturalism holds that human goodness is not a single, unitary ideal to which all humans should aim, instead admitting of real diversity, just as goodness in general admits of diversity across various species. Consequently, there are various sets of human virtues that promote human flourishing in its many forms.Being and Becoming Good explicates an Aristotelian methodology of ethics on which philosophical reasoning is used to integrate observational evidence about the shape life forms take and the dispositions that contribute to good human lives. Observing what humans are and do in order to thrive in a wide array of bodies, social-political contexts, and environments, puts pressure on the standard Aristotelian Naturalist singular ideal of human goodness as depicted by a flourishing neurotypical, able-bodied, resource-rich mature adult. There is substantial variation in human forms of life and human flourishing, and so no one human good or single set of virtues. Instead, there is a diversity of forms of human goodness, all equally valuable. Moreover, the achievement of one kind of human goodness changes what we are able to do and be. By being good in one way, humans acquire the capacity to be good in another way. Most of us, for most of our lives, are simultaneously being good and becoming good.

Aristotelian Naturalism is an ethics on which moral goodness is a species of natural goodness-the kind of goodness we find on display creatures whose habits and activities enable them to thrive. What it takes for humans to be good is to have habits and engage in activities that contribute to human flourishing. The primary aim of this book is to present a revisionist version of Aristotelian Naturalism enriched by empirical evidence and responsive to criticisms from feminist and disability ethics. Pluralist Aristotelian Naturalism holds that human goodness is not a single, unitary ideal to which all humans should aim, instead admitting of real diversity, just as goodness in general admits of diversity across various species. Consequently, there are various sets of human virtues that promote human flourishing in its many forms.Being and Becoming Good explicates an Aristotelian methodology of ethics on which philosophical reasoning is used to integrate observational evidence about the shape life forms take and the dispositions that contribute to good human lives. Observing what humans are and do in order to thrive in a wide array of bodies, social-political contexts, and environments, puts pressure on the standard Aristotelian Naturalist singular ideal of human goodness as depicted by a flourishing neurotypical, able-bodied, resource-rich mature adult. There is substantial variation in human forms of life and human flourishing, and so no one human good or single set of virtues. Instead, there is a diversity of forms of human goodness, all equally valuable. Moreover, the achievement of one kind of human goodness changes what we are able to do and be. By being good in one way, humans acquire the capacity to be good in another way. Most of us, for most of our lives, are simultaneously being good and becoming good.

Aristotelian Naturalism is an ethics on which moral goodness is a species of natural goodness-the kind of goodness we find on display creatures whose habits and activities enable them to thrive. What it takes for humans to be good is to have habits and engage in activities that contribute to human flourishing. The primary aim of this book is to present a revisionist version of Aristotelian Naturalism enriched by empirical evidence and responsive to criticisms from feminist and disability ethics. Pluralist Aristotelian Naturalism holds that human goodness is not a single, unitary ideal to which all humans should aim, instead admitting of real diversity, just as goodness in general admits of diversity across various species. Consequently, there are various sets of human virtues that promote human flourishing in its many forms.Being and Becoming Good explicates an Aristotelian methodology of ethics on which philosophical reasoning is used to integrate observational evidence about the shape life forms take and the dispositions that contribute to good human lives. Observing what humans are and do in order to thrive in a wide array of bodies, social-political contexts, and environments, puts pressure on the standard Aristotelian Naturalist singular ideal of human goodness as depicted by a flourishing neurotypical, able-bodied, resource-rich mature adult. There is substantial variation in human forms of life and human flourishing, and so no one human good or single set of virtues. Instead, there is a diversity of forms of human goodness, all equally valuable. Moreover, the achievement of one kind of human goodness changes what we are able to do and be. By being good in one way, humans acquire the capacity to be good in another way. Most of us, for most of our lives, are simultaneously being good and becoming good.

This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God's existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.

This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God''s existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.

This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God''s existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.