Anthony Gray – författare

This book explains the historical significance and introduction of the presumption of innocence into common law legal systems. It explains that the presumption should be seen as reflecting notions of moral comfort around judgment of others. Specifically, when one is asked to make a judgment about the guilt or otherwise of a person accused of wrongdoing, the default position should be to do nothing. This reflects the very serious consequences of what we do when we decide someone is guilty of wrongdoing and is not a step to be taken lightly. Traditionally, decision makers have only taken it when they are morally comfortable with that decision. It then documents how legislators in a range of common law jurisdictions have undermined the presumption of innocence, through measures such as reverse onus provisions, allowing or requiring inferences to be made against an accused, redefining offenses and defenses in novel ways to minimize the burden on the prosecutor, and by dressing proceedings as civil when they are in substance criminal. Courts have too easily acceded to such measures, in the process permitting accused persons to be convicted although there is reasonable doubt as to their guilt, and where they are not guilty of sufficiently blameworthy conduct to attract criminal sanction. It finds that the courts must be prepared to re-assert the prime importance of the presumption of innocence, only permitting criminal sanctions to be imposed where they are morally certain that the accused did that of which they have been accused, and morally comfortable that the conduct being addressed is worthy of the kind of criminal sanction which prosecutors seek to impose. Courts must be morally comfortable about the finding of guilt, and the imposition of the criminal penalty in a given case. They have lost sight of this moral underpinning to criminal law process and substance, and it must be regained.

The United States Bill of Rights was groundbreaking in providing constitutional recognition to freedom of speech. In the past century the Supreme Court has decided hundreds of cases concerning free speech, providing an established system of jurisprudence to analyze free speech cases. This book explains the development in the US case law and compares it to developments in similar jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, and Europe. Anthony Gray critiques the jurisprudence of each nation studied, while noting some important similarities and differences in terms of how free speech is protected in the Western world, what causes these differences, what one system might learn from others, and whether convergence in approach can be expected.

This book considers the application of free speech principles in controversial contexts discussing United States law and equivalent law in Europe, Canada and Australia. Anthony Gray examines the extent to which speech of public sector employees is and should be protected. He tackles the difficult question of hate speech and the degree to which regulation of it has been permitted, and should be permitted. The growing controversy of speech in a university setting is discussed along with the roles campuses play in fostering intellectual debate which democracies depend on. Lastly, Gray looks at free speech issues at stake in the exponential growth of online activity and analyzes questions the of liability these tech companies have and their role as facilitators of mass communication, to what extent does the first amendment even apply, and the potential of the internet to support democratic traditions. Overall, Gray finds that in these several key areas, free speech rights are not as strongly protected as they should be. Courts have often bowed to decision makers balancing away free speech rights in favor of other objectives and instead need to re-assert the importance of free speech in these disparate contexts.

The scope of vicarious liability has significantly expanded since its original conception. Today employers are being found liable for actions of employees that they did not authorise, and never would have authorised if asked. They are being held liable for an employee’s criminal activity. In the related strict liability field of non-delegable duties, they are being held liable for wrongdoing of independent contractors.Notions of strict liability have grown increasingly isolated in the law of tort, given the exponential growth in the tort of negligence. They require intellectual justification. Such a justification has proven to be elusive and largely unsatisfactory in relation to vicarious liability and to concepts of non-delegable duty. The law of three jurisdictions studied has now apparently embraced the ‘enterprise risk’ theory to rationalise the imposition of vicarious liability. This book subjects this theory to strong critique by arguing that it has many weaknesses, which the courts should acknowledge. It suggests that a rationalisation of the liability of an employer for the actions of an employee lies in more traditional legal doctrine which would serve to narrow the circumstances in which an employer is legally liable for a wrong committed by an employee.

Gradually, the law of tort has shifted away from a strict-liability approach to one where fault predominates. This book charts important case law documenting this shift. It seeks to understand how and why it occurred. Given that the Rylands v Fletcher decision is typically seen as a prime exemplar of strict liability, it focusses particularly on that case, as part of the historical development of tort law. It considers the intellectual arguments made in favour of strict liability, and for fault-based liability. Having done so, it then focusses on particular areas of the law of tort, including nuisance, defamation and trespass. It is somewhat anomalous that though most would view these as examples of torts of strict liability, fault considerations have become prominent in their application. This presents an uneasy compromise, where torts that are notionally strict in nature are infused with fault considerations, often through exceptions or defences. This book advocates for further development in the law of tort to better reflect a primarily fault-based approach to liability, at least in the common law. This would make the law of tort more coherent.

The scope of vicarious liability has significantly expanded since its original conception. Today employers are being found liable for actions of employees that they did not authorise, and never would have authorised if asked. They are being held liable for an employee’s criminal activity. In the related strict liability field of non-delegable duties, they are being held liable for wrongdoing of independent contractors.Notions of strict liability have grown increasingly isolated in the law of tort, given the exponential growth in the tort of negligence. They require intellectual justification. Such a justification has proven to be elusive and largely unsatisfactory in relation to vicarious liability and to concepts of non-delegable duty. The law of three jurisdictions studied has now apparently embraced the ‘enterprise risk’ theory to rationalise the imposition of vicarious liability. This book subjects this theory to strong critique by arguing that it has many weaknesses, which the courts should acknowledge. It suggests that a rationalisation of the liability of an employer for the actions of an employee lies in more traditional legal doctrine which would serve to narrow the circumstances in which an employer is legally liable for a wrong committed by an employee.

Gradually, the law of tort has shifted away from a strict-liability approach to one where fault predominates. This book charts important case law documenting this shift. It seeks to understand how and why it occurred. Given that the Rylands v Fletcher decision is typically seen as a prime exemplar of strict liability, it focusses particularly on that case, as part of the historical development of tort law. It considers the intellectual arguments made in favour of strict liability, and for fault-based liability. Having done so, it then focusses on particular areas of the law of tort, including nuisance, defamation and trespass. It is somewhat anomalous that though most would view these as examples of torts of strict liability, fault considerations have become prominent in their application. This presents an uneasy compromise, where torts that are notionally strict in nature are infused with fault considerations, often through exceptions or defences. This book advocates for further development in the law of tort to better reflect a primarily fault-based approach to liability, at least in the common law. This would make the law of tort more coherent.

This book explores the use of the doctrine of good faith in the common law when interpreting contracts and resolving disputes.This doctrine is well-accepted in civil law, is reflected in international commercial law, and is a fundamental aspect of private law in the USA. However, its use in the UK is extremely limited. Inconsistent application has given rise to confusion and uncertainty. This apparent antipathy is somewhat hard to fathom, given its previous widespread acceptance in English law.The book explains in depth the history of good faith in English law, and clarifies its current status in English, Australian and international law. It explores the relationship between good faith within contractual relations and the neighbour principle in tort law, and notes the workability of good faith in the commercial context of insurance. This will be welcomed by contract lawyers in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. A subsequent volume will explore how acceptance of good faith in the law might lead to a re-interpretation of existing contract law doctrine.

This book explores the use of the doctrine of good faith in the common law when interpreting contracts and resolving disputes.This doctrine is well-accepted in civil law, is reflected in international commercial law, and is a fundamental aspect of private law in the USA. However, its use in the UK is extremely limited. Inconsistent application has given rise to confusion and uncertainty. This apparent antipathy is somewhat hard to fathom, given its previous widespread acceptance in English law.The book explains in depth the history of good faith in English law, and clarifies its current status in English, Australian and international law. It explores the relationship between good faith within contractual relations and the neighbour principle in tort law, and notes the workability of good faith in the commercial context of insurance. This will be welcomed by contract lawyers in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. A subsequent volume will explore how acceptance of good faith in the law might lead to a re-interpretation of existing contract law doctrine.

This volume explores in detail the use of the doctrine of good faith in the common law when interpreting contracts and resolving disputes.Building on the findings of Good Faith and Relational Contracts (Hart, 2024) the book discusses the implications of relational contract theory and good faith for issues such as liquidated damages clauses, discretion to terminate a contract, contract forfeiture, employment contracts and contractual remedies. The author discusses the potential for good faith to unite a number of currently disparate contract law and equitable principles into a coherent framework, providing an opportunity to question and jettison some archaic aspects of existing doctrine that are no longer defensible.Ambitious and thoughtful, this is a significant statement on the role of good faith in private law.

This volume explores in detail the use of the doctrine of good faith in the common law when interpreting contracts and resolving disputes.Building on the findings of Good Faith and Relational Contracts (Hart, 2024) the book discusses the implications of relational contract theory and good faith for issues such as liquidated damages clauses, discretion to terminate a contract, contract forfeiture, employment contracts and contractual remedies. The author discusses the potential for good faith to unite a number of currently disparate contract law and equitable principles into a coherent framework, providing an opportunity to question and jettison some archaic aspects of existing doctrine that are no longer defensible.Ambitious and thoughtful, this is a significant statement on the role of good faith in private law.