Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - Böcker

Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) nimmt in der Geschichte der Ontologie eine ausgezeichnete Stellung ein. Er war der erste Philosoph, der in systematischer Weise eine quasi-ontologische Disziplin entwickelte, die im Vergleich zu der Disziplin, die man traditionell Metaphysik oder Ontologie nennt, viel allgemeiner sein sollte. Die Metaphysik untersucht das Seiende als Seiendes, und die seienden Entitäten bilden – so die These Meinongs – nur ein kleines Fragment dessen, was man unter dem Namen "Gegenstandstheorie" untersuchen kann. Die Gegenstände als solche (die "reinen" Gegenstände) sind, wie Meinong sagt, "außerseiend", was bedeutet, dass sie bezüglich ihres Seins bzw. Nicht-Seins neutral sein sollen. In diesem Buch wird die so verstandene Gegenstandstheorie in ihrer historischen Entwicklung im Zusammenhang mit Meinongs Intentionalitätstheorie untersucht, denn der wahre Grund, warum Meinong einen Bereich der außerseienden Gegenstände überhaupt postulierte, ist nicht anders als die philosophischen Rätsel, auf die man in der Intentionalitätstheorie stößt.  The thought of Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) has a distinguished position within the conceptual space of ontology. He was the first philosopher who tried systematically to develop a quasi-ontological discipline which was intended to be much more general than the metaphysics in the traditional sense. Metaphysics investigates being qua being; and this constitutes only a small part of the domain of the theory of objects (Gegenstandstheorie) as Meinong conceived of it. For – so reads one of Meinong’s most frequently cited theses – the objects considered purely qua objects are neutral concerning their being or non-being. In this book Meinong’s theory of objects is presented in its historical development and investigated within the context of his theory of intentionality. This connection is justified because the real motivation behind Meinong’s introduction of entities "beyond being and non being" lies in the philosophical puzzles of the theory of intentionality.

Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) belonged to those phenomenologists who never accepted Husserl's transcendental idealism. He devoted a great part of his intellectual energy to the "preparatory" analytical studies in which he hoped to develop an ontological framework suitable for an ultimate refuta­tion of Husserl's idealistic doctrine. In these works we find a rich arsenal of ontological tools which is interesting even for those philosophers who are not interested in the subtleties of the Husserlian tradition or esoteric dialectics of the idealism / realism debate. Contributors: Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Szczecin and Salzburg), Gregor Haefliger (Fribourg), Guido Küng (Fribourg), Jeff Mitscherling (Guelph), Andrzej Póltawski (Cracow), Peter Simons (Leeds), Edward Swiderski (Fribourg), Amie L. Thomasson (Miami), Daniel von Wachter (Munich).

For a long time Franz Brentano has been widely perceived almost exclusively as the re-discoverer of intentionality and the founder of the continental phenomenology. It was only during the last 30 years that his immense importance for the development of analytic philosophy (and also the arbitrariness of the very division between analytic and continental philosophy) became clear. This volume is devoted to Brentano's influence on the Polish Analytic Philosophy better known under the name of: "Lvov-Warsaw School". Contributors: Arianna Betti (Amsterdam), Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Szczecin and Salzburg), Dale Jacquette (Pennsylvania), Dariusz Lukasiewicz (Bydgoszcz), Maria van der Schaar (Leiden), Peter Simons (Leeds), Barry Smith (Buffalo and Saarbrücken), Jan Wolenski (Cracow).

The history of twentieth century philosophy is characterized by the gap between analytic and continental philosophy - even though both have their roots in a tradition referred to as "Austrian" or "Central-European" philosophy. The essays in this volume show in historical and systematic studies, how a reassessment of this "Central-European" tradition can build an interesting bridge between phenomenology and analytic philosophy and, thus, create a new foundation that allows for an original perspective on central problems of philosophy